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Abstract 
 
Religious pluralism is a meaningful framework for many scholars and students 
of religion as well as citizens working to make sense of a religiously and culturally 
diverse society. It purports noble aims: bringing people together across differences and 
facilitating the inclusion of more people at the proverbial table of democracy. 
Pluralism has become an essential element in the management of religious diversity in 
the American public sphere. While presenting itself as politically neutral, the discourse 
of pluralism is, in fact, embedded with veiled politics. While it embraces a 
democratizing agenda, it simultaneously engages in regulatory activities that impose 
limitations and exclusions on people’s beliefs and behaviors. My work investigates this 
tension.  
I use Norman Fairclough’s theory of critical discourse analysis to analyze world 
religions textbooks as discursive sites for the production of the discourse of religious 
pluralism. I contend that pluralism is a formally non-political discourse that 
reproduces and legitimates liberal norms and ideology. It functions as a practice of 
liberal governance—a mode of governmentality. Its discursive practices serve as tools 
for orchestrating social cohesion and regulating religion within a liberal social 
framework. By framing this analysis through the concept of governmentality, I aim to 
explore the enduring salience of liberalism in American society and the multiple 
discourses that support liberalism’s totalizing tendencies. I investigate the ways in 
which the rhetoric of liberalism touts individual freedoms as a foundational value, 
while it simultaneously works in other ways to implicitly manage, regulate, and limit 
many of those freedoms.  As I look at how these world religions textbooks help to 
mediate and transmit the liberal public sphere, I also consider how these discursive 
practices reveal the ambivalence and complexity involved in religious diversity in the 
U.S. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the 2000s, I directed educational programs at an interfaith organization in 
New York City. I remember a conversation with a colleague as we were working 
together on a grant proposal for a program that would take a religiously and culturally 
diverse group of high school students to visit a different religious site each month over 
the course of ten months so that they could learn about these communities and engage 
in dialogue. My colleague insisted that one of the objectives of the program was to 
create pluralists, citizens who appreciated the religious and cultural diversity of 
American society and recognized the importance of engaging religious and cultural 
differences as part of the task of building a shared democratic society. I was less sure 
that this should be an explicit objective. I knew we wanted to teach participants about 
religions and religious diversity, but I was not sure that the success of our program 
depended on their acceptance of this diversity or that we should insist on it. Insisting 
that our participants eschew exclusivist views produced another kind of exclusion, 
which seemed to contradict our inclusivist aims. I was not sure how to reconcile this 
tension, though I recognized that our work was grounded in pluralist assumptions. 
 Around the same, I also served as an instructor in a religious studies 
department at a liberal arts college in downtown Brooklyn, teaching introductory world 
religions courses. On the first day of class one semester, I asked students what they 
hoped to learn in the course. One student said that he wanted to learn more about the 
people he regularly saw “with those funny-looking hats and curls.” (Brooklyn, of 
course, has the largest Hasidic population in the U.S.) At the time, I remember thinking 
that it would be a worthwhile accomplishment if my students could learn enough 
about religious diversity to cease thinking of their neighbors as “funny-looking.” I used 
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a textbook, Mary Pat Fisher’s Living Religions, in this effort.1 In my world religions 
classroom, not unlike the interfaith organization where I also worked, I was also 
working to create pluralists. 
 Many interfaith organizations in New York, particularly in the years immediately 
after the attacks of September 11, justified their work as an important tool in 
promoting social cohesion in a city that had recently seen what was commonly labeled 
as religiously-motivated violence. My interfaith work was clearly activist work. It is 
worth noting, however, how easily its values and objectives also operated in the world 
religions courses I taught and the textbook I had assigned.  
Given the context of the early 2000s, I felt it was salient and important to help 
students better understand religious diversity. This seemed to be an opportunity for 
academic knowledge to benefit the greater good and wider society outside the “ivory 
tower.” Yet, I was not just teaching about religion or the academic study of religion. I 
was teaching a kind of civic ethos, grounded in the idea that understanding and 
respecting religious diversity would contribute to a greater common good and protect 
democratic ideals of religious freedom, human rights, and justice.  
Many students enrolled in my classes because they were interested in 
spirituality. I informed them that, instead, we would be learning about the diversity of 
religions in their midst. When Stephen Prothero’s book Religious Literacy was 
published in 2005, I gave my classes the quiz included in its appendix, which, 
according to Prothero, was meant to test the basic knowledge that one ought to have in 
order to understand and engage religion in the American public sphere.2  We engaged 
in some discussion about the general social benefits of knowing more about religious 
diversity, but we did not explicitly discuss norms of citizenship or governance.  While I 
                                            
1 Mary Pat Fisher, Living Religions, Fifth Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 
2 Stephen Prothero, Religious Literacy (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2007), 235. 
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implicitly promoted a civic ethos of inclusivity, we did not discuss who remain 
excluded in these dynamics of religious pluralism. Is promoting a particular kind of 
civic engagement what pluralism and its subsequent study of religion entail? What is at 
stake in this approach? What social interests are operative and being protected? These 
questions about the world religions course and its implicit politics and pluralist 
assumptions—especially the larger implications, its hidden costs, complexities and 
dilemmas— have sparked an academic interest that has resulted in this dissertation.  
1.1 World Religions Textbooks and Religious Pluralism 
In this thesis, I use Norman Fairclough’s theory of critical discourse analysis to 
analyze world religions textbooks as discursive sites for the production of the 
discourse of religious pluralism. I contend that religious pluralism is a formally non-
political discourse embedded with veiled politics that reproduce and legitimate liberal 
norms and ideology. In doing so, pluralism functions as a rhetorical practice of liberal 
governance—a mode of governmentality. These discursive practices serve as tools for 
orchestrating social cohesion and regulating religion within a liberal social framework. 
By framing this analysis through the concept of governmentality, I aim to explore the 
enduring salience of liberalism in American society and the multiple discourses that 
support liberalism’s totalizing tendencies.  
Religious pluralism is a meaningful framework for many scholars and students 
of religion as well as many American citizens working to make sense of a religiously 
and culturally diverse society. For many people, pluralism entails not just tolerance, 
but also respect and understanding as well as compassion, empathy, and justice. It is a 
force for good in a complex world. It purports noble aims: bringing people together 
across differences, helping neighbors get to know one another, serving as an impetus 
and justification for enacting more equitable policies, and facilitating the inclusion of 
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more people at the proverbial table of democracy. Pluralism has become an essential 
element in the negotiation and governance of religious diversity in the American public 
sphere. It frequently presents itself as objective and universal. Yet the discourse of 
pluralism is embedded with often veiled politics. While it embraces a liberating, 
democratizing agenda, it simultaneously engages in regulatory activities that impose 
limitations and exclusions on people’s beliefs and behaviors. My work investigates this 
tension.  
The discourse of religious pluralism is also found in the discipline of religious 
studies. Consequently, my research is situated in an emerging critical discourse that 
explores the socially constructed or “invented” nature of contemporary taken-for-
granted categories in that discipline. Asking how the discourse of pluralism and the 
dominant approaches to world religions function in the service of liberal governance 
and shape certain liberal civic identities brings a new dimension to this critical inquiry, 
bridging religious studies, critical social theory, and political theory. Through my 
critique of the dominant discourse of liberal pluralism, I theorize a critical pluralism, a 
counter-hegemonic discourse that interrogates the power, privilege, and assumptions 
naturalized by the dominant discourse. By uncovering obscured assumptions and 
biases, this project aims to consider how the study of religion can more effectively 
support more equitable, less coercive forms of knowledge production and enhance 
public discourse on the accommodation and recognition of religious and cultural 
diversity.   
This project focuses on liberalism and religious pluralism in the American 
context. Yet, I write this dissertation from the frame of reference of a Canadian 
university. Viewing the American context through an expatriate lens and drawing from 
the resources of the Canadian discourse on pluralism and multiculturalism has 
 5 
provided me with a broader perspective from which to interrogate otherwise taken-for-
granted assumptions about the American social order. 
1.2 Thesis Overview  
In Chapter 2, I develop a theoretical framework drawn from the social theory of 
critical discourse analysis, primarily the work of Norman Fairclough, and the concept 
and approach of governmentality, initially developed by Michel Foucault. These 
approaches shed light on modern formations of political power and the relationship 
between liberalism, ideology, and hegemony. Critical discourse analysis illumines how 
texts and talk—discourse—shape social and material realities, especially the modes by 
which discourse processes negotiate normativity, or latently construct and support 
certain systems of dominance. Discourse exists in a dialectical relationship with social 
structures, functions as a mode of political and ideological practice, and operates 
through processes of hegemonic struggle. Approaching religious pluralism as a 
discourse involves keeping in view not just the phenomena that the discourse of 
pluralism seeks to describe, but also the ways in which these discursive practices of 
describing and analyzing the subject of religious plurality simultaneously construct, 
reproduce or transform their subjects.  
The conceptual framework of governmentality defines governance in broad 
terms, not just as the formal government of a state in its exercise of authority over 
populations, but also as self-governance, or how we govern ourselves. Theorists of 
governmentality, such as Foucault, Colin Gordon, and Mitchell Dean, argue that liberal 
governance is dispersed in nature and accomplished through a wide range of 
mechanisms—including discourse— that are frequently seen to be apolitical. 3  Thus, I 
                                            
3 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. 
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); 
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use this framework to explore how these world religions textbooks—a discursive site 
typically seen as not formally political—reproduce and maintain the liberal public 
sphere, especially in the ways they prescribe a normative role for religion in civil 
society.  
As I explore pluralism as a discourse of liberal governance, I engage in a brief 
overview highlighting the ideological foundations of modern liberalism that support a 
liberal social order and inform the dominant discourse of religious pluralism, 
particularly focusing on: individualism and autonomy; secularism and the public 
sphere; and liberal tolerance. I explore a range of liberal theorists, from John Locke, 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant to John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, and Charles 
Taylor. Drawing from theorists of governmentality, liberalism is not just a doctrine or 
political theory, but a “style of thinking quintessentially concerned with the art of 
governing.” It is both attentive to and challenged by the management of difference and 
competing values.   
In Chapter 3, I define the discourse of religious pluralism and situate it in an 
American context. The dominant discourse of religious pluralism is a liberal ideology 
that entails a broad commitment to recognize, value, and understand perceived 
religious differences.4 While some scholars use pluralism interchangeably with 
plurality or diversity, others argue that the term carries prescriptive norms and thus 
should not be seen as synonymous with diversity, a more neutral term that describes a 
demographic and social reality. Rather the discourse of pluralism in the United States 
                                                                                                                                             
Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, Second Edition (London: 
Sage Publications, 2009). 
4 Pamela E. Klassen and Courtney Bender, “Introduction: Habits of Pluralism,” in After Pluralism: 
Reimagining Religious Engagement, ed. Courtney Bender and Pamela E. Klassen (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 2. 
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today works to define and order religious diversity. In this sense, pluralism is just one 
possible response to religious diversity.  
Several central features characterize the American social context in which 
pluralism operates—demographic diversity; institutionalized liberal norms, especially 
freedom, tolerance, and secularism; the lingering effect of the domination of 
Protestant culture; and an evolving multicultural narrative. After exploring this social 
context, I examine the ways in which the dominant discourse of pluralism is produced 
by scholars within the academic study of religion. Considering the work of Charles 
Lippy, Peter Berger, Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, Catherine Albanese, William 
Hutchison, and Diana Eck, I look at two major approaches to American religious 
pluralism—pluralism as multiplicity and pluralism as a tension between diversity and 
unity— in order to discern some common rhetorical features of the discourse of 
religious pluralism as well as their regulatory effects.   
In the dominant discourse of pluralism, I uncover a number of common claims, 
i.e., that religion is important; that it is or should be a positive force in the world; that 
religious plurality or diversity is good for society; and therefore, that religion and 
religious diversity ought to be respected. Yet, many scholars now question these 
assumptions and practices, asking how it is that religious difference has been 
construed as a problem that religious pluralism is set to solve. They wonder whether  
religious pluralism, with its ostensible objectives of engaging and understanding 
religious difference, actually involves a process of imagining and ordering those 
differences. While religious pluralism claims to celebrate and affirm difference, does it 
simultaneously promoting a hegemonic unity and engage in unseen sociopolitical 
work? Scholars who critically theorize pluralism, such as Russell McCutcheon, Timothy 
Fitzgerald, Tomoko Masuzawa, Courtney Bender and Pamela Klassen, argue that in 
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American society and scholarship, pluralism relies on an essentialist, sui generis 
definition of religion that privileges Protestant norms and positions religion as 
essentially private, voluntary, individual, and belief-based.5 In my research, I build on 
these critiques and approach pluralism as a regulatory discourse that works to manage 
religious diversity in a liberal democratic society. I identify and examine some common 
discursive practices of pluralism that serve this regulatory function, including the 
process of defining religion and the delineation of difference; the assertion that 
religious difference can be negotiated through education and dialogue; and the 
equation of pluralist values with liberal American civic values. 
In Chapter 4, I explore the world religions textbooks as a discursive site, 
examining the interwoven relationship between the world religions textbook as genre 
and discourse. Drawing from the field of textbook studies, I look at the textbook as a 
discursive genre that carries often hidden power dynamics. The textbook is a tool and 
a symbol in education and the construction of knowledge. It represents a source of 
authority and legitimate knowledge. Thus, the medium of the textbooks plays an 
important role in the enactment of the discourses within its pages. I then turn my 
attention to the construction of the category of world religions and its relationship 
with religious pluralism. In this analysis I rely on Tomoko Masuzawa’s genealogy of 
world religions, especially her analysis of the historical Eurocentric power dynamics 
deeply embedded in the category of world religions and the processes of classification 
and categorization in the academic study of religion.  
                                            
5 Russell McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the 
Politics of Nostalgia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Russell McCutcheon, “Critical 
Trend in the Study of Religion in the United States,” in New Approaches to the Study of Religion: 
Regional, Critical, and Historical Approaches, ed. Peter Antes, Armin W. Geertz, Randi Ruth 
Warne, 2004; Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Religious Studies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000); Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or How European 
Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2005); Klassen and Bender, “Introduction: Habits of Pluralism.” 
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From here, I elaborate the method I use for my textbook analysis. I am 
interested in the power dynamics involved in the ways in which this information is 
presented-- how it constructs its subject, how it reproduces ideologies, as well as the 
larger social order in which it is produced.  I look for patterns and recurring key 
elements and asking how they function in the production of meaning. I draw from the 
critical discourse analysis methods of Fairclough as well as Theo Van Leeuwen and 
Ruth Wodak, especially their methods for analyzing discursive strategies of 
recontextualization and legitimation.6 The concept of recontextualization brings to 
light the ways in which the categories of religion and pluralism take a range of social 
practices and re-present or recontextualize them to fit within the narrative of a liberal 
social order. 
 My data set involves six widely used world religions textbooks, which I selected 
after conducting a short survey of members of the Religious Studies in Secondary 
Schools, a professional organization for secondary school teachers also engaged in 
teacher training on teaching world religions. I identified the six most frequently used 
world religions textbooks: 1. Mary Pat Fisher, Living Religions, 2. Huston Smith, The 
World’s Religions 3. Jeffrey Brodd, World Religions: A Voyage of Discovery, 4. T. Patrick 
Burke, The Major Religions: An Introduction with Texts, 5. William Young, The World’s 
Religions: Worldviews and Contemporary Issues, and 6. Jacob Neusner, ed, World 
Religions in America.  
 In Chapters 5 and 6, I engage in a detailed analysis of these six textbooks, 
focusing on their discussion of religion and religious pluralism, as well as their 
                                            
6 Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research (London: 
Routledge, 2003); Theo Van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak, “Legitimizing Immigration Control: A 
Discourse Historical Analysis,” Discourse Studies 1, no. 1 (February 1999): 83–118; Theo Van 
Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,” Discourse & Communication 1, no. 1 
(2007): 91–112. 
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chapters on Islam and Buddhism, which Masuzawa argues were, along with 
Christianity, the first “world religions.” As I analyze these texts, I look at both what the 
texts say and how they say it, and then I consider the implications of these practices. I 
look at the wider discourses reflected in these descriptions, especially the intertextual 
and interdiscursive relationships between discourses of pluralism, world religions, 
liberalism, and tolerance, and consider how they have come to be seen as natural 
accounts of the world.    
  In Chapter 5, I give considerable attention to prefaces and introductions as 
spaces in which authors set out to explain to their readers their task and their purpose, 
as well as concluding chapters as spaces in which authors aim to shore up the 
coherence of their narratives. I explore how these sections of the textbooks construct 
normativity. My analysis involves looking at the ways in which these texts address the 
reader, the kind of social realities they describe and the ways in which they prescribe 
that the reader should respond to these realities. I investigate discursive practices that 
work to construct subjects, unify diverse social practices under the category of 
religion, and build commonality and identification with a sympathetic approach to the 
study of religion. I look at how these texts define sameness among the world religions, 
while simultaneously inscribing difference. These texts mark the boundaries of 
religions and establish the “other.”  I also analyze the ways in which the discursive 
practices of these textbooks operate to legitimate a particular role for religion within a 
liberal social order, outlining how they engage in practices that perpetuate certain 
dynamics of authority, designating some ways of thinking about and describing 
religions as legitimate and authoritative, and others as deviant or problematic. In 
Chapter 6, I draw from Masuzawa’s major insights on the elements of Eurocentrism 
and colonialism found in eighteenth and nineteenth century studies of Buddhism and 
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Islam and apply to them to an analysis of the chapters on Buddhism and Islam in the 
world religion textbooks in my study.  
 The textbooks in my study reveal common discursive practices. Each engages in 
the construction of normative religion; that is, they position certain discursive and 
social practices as standard, dominant, and natural.  All assume that the term ‘religion’ 
is familiar to the reader, that it requires little or no definition or contextualization and 
that it is appropriate to begin with description. The texts that do address the definition 
of religion tend not address the social, historical, and political nature of the category 
religion; they define it as a separate sphere of the life of the individual and the 
community. Other textbooks in my study do not explicitly address the definition of 
religion at all. However, as we will see, definition begins with the world religions 
framework itself. World religion textbooks position each religion as an established, 
clearly demarcated tradition. This discursive practice naturalizes the boundaries 
between each religion. Moreover, it establishes a hierarchy, asserting positions of 
importance, privilege, and dominance for those religions included, while implicitly 
marginalizing religions that are excluded. Exemplifying the pluralism that the authors 
seek to promote, the textbooks also place all religions in dialogue. This comparative 
approach assumes that religions occupy discrete, coherent, and autonomous spaces 
that lend themselves to commensurate comparison. It assumes religions can be framed 
in comparable terms.  
My analysis uncovers how religion is positioned as an autonomous, universal 
aspect of human experience that individuals have the capacity for, regardless of their 
cultural contexts. Moreover, this common human experience is oriented around the 
individual— religion is defined first and primarily as an experience had by individuals, 
and, only secondarily, in terms of institutional forms such as rituals and practices. The 
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positioning of the individual as the fundamental unit of analysis reflects the 
permeation of liberal norms.  
These practices of normatively positioning religion are just one part of a larger 
process of ordering religion. All of these textbooks also include arguments for the 
importance of both religion itself and its study. They argue that religious diversity is 
part of a healthy society. Some argue that religion can be a potential source of conflict. 
At the same time, they argue that religion is good and largely plays a positive role in 
society. Thus, religion causes conflict when it is either distorted or misunderstood, or 
both. Many assert that the religion to be embraced and celebrated is the religion that 
also embraces and celebrates other religions. They suggest that good religion, 
authentic religion, allows people to be individuals, to be free, and to be different. Good 
religion is liberal religion. 
These textbooks argue that learning about religions, developing an 
understanding of religions, will lead to respect for religions and religious diversity. 
This, in turn, will alleviate potential for social conflict. Indeed, some explicitly argue 
that this religious literacy is essential to good citizenship. Others argue that religious 
literacy will cultivate one’s moral character. I see both lines of argument as forms of 
governance. This discourse works to regulate our society. By having students read 
these texts, by telling them that this is what religion is about, it tells them this is how 
they ought to think and behave as good citizens in a liberal democracy.  Viewed from 
this perspective, these practices illuminate ways in which the construction of religion 
simultaneously aims to shape civic norms.  
The central social order or practice that I problematize here is the hegemonic 
regulation of religion in American society as a means of legitimating liberal norms and 
securing the dominance of liberal governance. I am interested in the ways in which the 
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rhetoric of liberalism touts individual freedoms as a foundational value, while it 
simultaneously works in other ways to implicitly manage, regulate, and limit many of 
those freedoms. I aim to better understand how the regulation of religion in civil 
society is enacted and naturalized. As I look at how these textbooks help to mediate 
and transmit the liberal public sphere, I also consider how these discursive practices 
reveal the ambivalence and complexity involved in religious diversity in the U.S. 
In order to understand how these textbooks serve as a discursive site for the 
formation and regulation of good, liberal citizens, it is first necessary to understand 
how liberalism shapes the American social order, paying particular attention to the 
place of religion and religious pluralism in that order. Consequently, in the next 
chapter, I will engage in a brief discussion of liberalism. 
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Chapter 2: Liberalism, Critical Discourse Analysis and Governmentality 
 
In this thesis, I examine how religious pluralism operates as a normative 
discourse in the study of religious diversity. I argue that pluralism is a formally non-
political discourse embedded with veiled politics that reproduce and legitimate liberal 
norms and ideology. In doing so, pluralism functions as a rhetorical practice of liberal 
governance—a mode of governmentality. These discursive practices serve as tools for 
orchestrating social cohesion and managing religion within a liberal framework. In this 
chapter, I introduce the social theory of critical discourse analysis and the concept of 
governmentality that I use to frame my examination of introductory world religions 
textbooks. These entail conceptual approaches that illuminate the relationship between 
liberalism, ideology, and hegemony. First, however, I highlight the formative features 
of liberal ideology in the American context to which critical discourse analysis and my 
discussion of governmentality offer a critique.7  
2.1 The Mechanisms of Liberal Discourse 
Liberalism refers to a modern ideological project that involves a set of political 
theories as well as a practice of governance; as such it is a discourse about the social 
order, the broad organization of society. Liberal theory tends to universalize and aims 
to provide a universal theory for the best regime for all of humanity; yet, in practice, 
liberalism varies in its character according to particular socio-historical and cultural 
contexts. Thus, to be more precise, one should use the term liberalisms. There are 
numerous liberal theories— classical liberalism, economic liberalism, welfare 
liberalism, and neo-liberalism—as well as liberal traditions specific to particular social 
contexts, such as English liberalism, French liberalism, and American liberalism. 
                                            
7 Portions of my discussion on liberalism, governmentality and critical discourse analysis 
appeared in Tiffany Puett, “Managing Religion: Religious Pluralism, Liberalism, and 
Governmentality,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 48, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 317–27. 
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Subsequently, there are many debates about what exactly liberalism entails, its central 
philosophical commitments and its implications for political practice.8 Yet, as John 
Gray argues, “it is none the less a mistake to suppose that the manifold varieties of 
liberalism cannot be understood as variations on a small set of distinctive themes.”9 
Moreover, it is the dominant political ideology in the U.S., so constant and naturalized 
that it is often unseen. As Louis Hartz puts it, “There has never been a ‘liberal 
movement’ or a real ‘liberal party’ in America: we have only had the American Way of 
Life.”10 Interpretations of liberalism are often contested in American society; yet, I 
contend, these contentions take place within the parameters of or in response to a 
liberal social order. Contestations of liberalism are still defined by liberal norms.  
My purpose here is not to detail an exhaustive genealogy of liberalism. Rather, I 
identify the ideological foundations of modern liberalism that support a liberal social 
order, shape liberal governance, and inform the dominant discourse of religious 
pluralism in the United States. Subsequently I focus on three continuous and 
overlapping sets of features of the liberal discourse on social order: 1) individualism 
and autonomy; 2) secularism and the public sphere; and 3) liberal tolerance.  
2.1.1 Individualism and autonomy 
Early liberal theory signifies a modern social transformation in which society 
was reframed around the individual, rather than the sovereign, the Church, or the clan, 
tribe or family. Theories of liberalism arose in the wake of the Protestant Reformation. 
The rise of liberalism coincided with the Scientific Revolution, as well as the rise of the 
                                            
8 As another perspective, Mitchell Dean argues “The variant forms of liberalism, and indeed of 
neo-liberalism, stem less from fundamental philosophical differences and more from the 
historical circumstances and styles of government which are met by a certain form of critique, 
an ethos of review and a method of rationalization.” Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in 
Modern Society, 74. 
9 John Gray, Liberalism, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), xiii. 
10 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1955), 
11. 
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nation-state, the market economy, and, later, the Industrial Revolution. Broadly, 
liberalism advocates for the primacy of the individual, who is rational, autonomous, 
equal to all others, and endowed with natural rights to life, liberty and property. 
Liberalism legitimates a social and political structure in which the proper role of 
government is to protect the rights and freedom of the individual. Freedom or liberty 
involves the flourishing of autonomy. Political theorist John Gray argues that all 
variants of the liberal tradition assert a common modern conception of humanity. This 
anthropology is 1) individualist in that it “asserts the moral primacy of the person 
against any claims of social collectivity;” 2) egalitarian in that it recognizes all persons 
as having the same moral status, which is not impacted by political or social 
differences; 3) universalist, in that it asserts a universal and essential human morality; 
and 4) meliorist, in that it asserts the “improvability of all social institutions and 
political arrangements.”11   
Immanuel Kant’s “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” is widely 
heralded as a seminal essay establishing the philosophical roots of the notion of the 
rational, autonomous individual.12 In this essay, Kant argues that enlightenment is the 
result of using one’s own reason as the ultimate source of authority.13 The use of one’s 
own reason is tantamount to autonomy. Those who rely on the authority of others, 
particularly the authority of institutions, to inform their understanding are guilty of a 
                                            
11 Gray, Liberalism, xii. 
12 Talal Asad qualifies the importance of the Kant essay, stating “I do not take him to be 
representative of the Enlightenment as a whole… in saying this I merely concede that no one 
text or authorially defined set of texts—or for that matter, no single generation of authors—can 
adequately represent a complex, developing tradition of discussion and argument.” With this 
caveat noted, Asad goes on to state “Kant’s text may nevertheless be taken as marking a 
formative moment in the theorization of a central feature of ‘civil society,’ the feature 
concerning the possibilities of open, rational criticism.” He notes that Habermas also claimed 
its importance for later liberal theory and the development of the “public sphere.” Talal Asad, 
Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 201–202. 
13 Immanuel Kant, “What Is Enlightenment,” in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and 
What Is Enlightenment, 2nd edition (New York: Macmillan, 1990). 
 17 
self-imposed immaturity. Kant’s position on the rational, autonomous individual is 
also a critique of the authority of the church. He argues that church doctrine places 
limitations on reason and freedom and, subsequently, is a significant obstacle to 
enlightenment. For Kant, moral principles are an object of rational choice. As John 
Rawls explains, Kant holds that “a person is acting autonomously when the principles 
of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his nature 
as a free and equal rational being,” as opposed to acting upon principles dependent 
upon social contingencies.14  
The notion of the autonomous individual is also grounded in the idea of the 
social contract, a concept that ultimately legitimates the existence and authority of 
liberal democratic political institutions, especially the state, and situates legitimate 
political authority as derived from the consent of the governed. According to social 
contract theory, individuals, who are naturally self-interested, exist in a state of nature 
that is characterized by some degree of brutishness or harshness. For Hobbes, humans 
in a state of nature live at war with each other.15 Locke does not see the situation of 
humanity as being quite so grim and believes that individuals guided by reason may 
live in coexistence. However, he also admits that there will always be individuals who 
do not defer to reason and thus threaten the basic rights to others. Consequently, 
individuals willingly consent to give up some of their natural freedoms or rights in this 
state of nature so that they may enter into a social contract, which ultimately insures 
their right to security, by protecting their lives, and, as Locke adds, their right to 
property.16  
                                            
14 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 252. 
15 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994). 
16 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C.B. MacPherson (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1980). 
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For Hobbes, the social contract requires an absolute sovereign, the state, for the 
guarantee of security and freedom. Ultimately, the sovereign functions to protect self-
interest and autonomy. Hobbes observed a tendency among people to desire, as C.B. 
Macpherson describes, “not just to live but to live well or commodiously.”17 Thus, the 
sovereign functions to keep this desire in check, to insure that one’s self-interest does 
not detrimentally infringe upon another’s. Hobbe’s rather low view of human nature 
has little concern with virtue and self-actualization. Rather, Hobbesian individualism, 
as Gray explains, sees that “civil society, as assured by the authority of the sovereign, 
is a framework in which man may pursue his restless striving for pre-eminence over 
his fellows without thereby inaugurating a disastrous war of all against all.”18 As 
Macpherson argues, Hobbes sets out a materialist model of the individual and the 
market model of society that establishes political obligation: “equality of need for 
continued motion and equal insecurity because of equal liability to invasion by others 
through the market.”19  
Lockean individualism is slightly more generous than Hobbes in its view of 
persons as endowed with and guided by reason, which provides for a moral compass. 
Yet, this is still a conception of an autonomous individual, who is “essentially the 
proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.”20 This 
“possessive individualism,” which Macpherson first attributes to Hobbes, positions 
persons as consumers or proprietors and freedom as autonomy that is contingent 
upon one’s ownership of oneself. As Macpherson explains: 
The human essence is freedom from dependence on the wills of others, and 
freedom is a function of possession. Society becomes a lot of free equal 
                                            
17 C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1962), 26. 
18 Gray, Liberalism, 26. 
19 MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 265. 
20 Ibid., 3. 
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individuals related to each other as proprietors of their own capacities and of 
what they have acquired by their exercise. Society consists of relations of 
exchange between proprietors. Political society becomes a calculated device for 
the protection of this property and for the maintenance of an orderly relation of 
exchange.21 
 
While differentiated from the economy, civil society still becomes framed in terms of 
economic relationships and, according to Macpherson, functions to regulate and 
protect those relationships. 
In Rousseau’s notion of the social contract, an individual, as a democratic 
citizen, consents to become part of a republic or body politic. Thus, the sovereign 
authority is composed of equal, rational individuals who have entered this social 
contract and given it legitimacy. Rousseau asserts: “Finally, each man, in giving himself 
to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over which he does not 
acquire the same right as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for 
everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has.”22 
Thus, for every right an individual gives up to become part of the republic, another one 
is gained. 
This concept of the autonomous individual is profoundly interwoven with 
concomitant notions of freedom, authenticity, and morality. Following Kant, autonomy 
is freedom— “the freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters.”23 Or, as 
Gray puts it, autonomy as freedom is “the rational self-government of the individual 
agent.”24 Morality then becomes construed as a process of self-regulation, of “following 
a voice of nature within us.”25 Charles Taylor explains that this notion of a morality of 
                                            
21 Ibid., 269. 
22 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G.D.H. Cole (London: J.M 
Dent and Sons Ltd, 1973), 192. 
23 Kant, “What Is Enlightenment,” 120. 
24 Gray, Liberalism, 57. 
25 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 29. 
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self-determining freedom then forms an ideal of authenticity. Part of the exercise of 
autonomy entails being true to oneself. As Taylor puts it: 
There is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live 
my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else’s life. But this notion 
gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of 
my life; I miss what being human is for me.26 
 
This individualism, from this perspective of authenticity, means that every individual 
has a unique way of being human. From here, one could argue that the actualization of 
one’s authentic and autonomous individuality requires a pursuit of knowledge in the 
name of understanding one’s true self.  
Liberalism positions all of these notions as universal. Regardless of culture, 
religion, or circumstance, human beings are fundamentally equal and autonomous 
individuals. Even when liberal theorists who support multiculturalism, such as Rawls 
and Kymlicka, recognize that not all cultures view autonomy as the foundational 
quality of what it means to be human, they are hard pressed to posit an acceptable 
alternative social arrangement that does not rely upon the norms of liberal 
individualism and egalitarianism.  
2.1.2 Secularism and the liberal public sphere 
Reordering society around the notion of the autonomous individual— the liberal 
subject— also involves reshaping and resituating the place of religion in society in 
ways that encourage the social arrangement of secularism. If individuals are to freely 
exercise their reason to make decisions (i.e., if they are to be autonomous and 
authentic), then religion can no longer play the role of a coercive, overarching source of 
a unified and cohesive social reality. Religion had to become a matter of personal, 
private choice, and churches had to become “voluntary associations” to which free 
                                            
26 Ibid., 30. 
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individuals chose to belong because of what they believed rather than authoritarian 
social institutions into which one was born. Consequently, religion became oriented 
towards individual volition and subjective emotion, rather than objective dogma. This 
modern subjective shift also accompanied the reconfiguration of society into separate 
differentiated spheres—the state, the economy, civil society, and religion.27 
The secularization narrative, which has long held a prominent position in the 
sociological study of religion, theorizes these modern social shifts. Some versions of 
this narrative have contended that as religion loses its overarching authority, its social 
significance will decline.28 In response, other theories have arisen to counter this 
narrative and highlight the persistence of religion, especially in American society, such 
as that of Jose Casanova who argues that the “decline of religion” argument is a weak 
and unnecessary component of secularization theory.29 Many of these theories—those 
that support and those that dispute the secularization narrative—share a view of 
religion as differentiated and private or individually-oriented. As Courtney Bender puts 
it, “they agree that ‘religion’ in modern society is self-evidently identifiable and, 
through processes of differentiation, increasingly disentangled from state control and 
state regulation.”30  
                                            
27 Jose Casanova argues that “the first cause which set the modern process of differentiation 
into motion” is difficult to pinpoint precisely, but four developments contributed to modern 
processes of differentiation and secularization: “the Protestant Reformation; the formation of 
modern states; the growth of modern capitalism; and the early modern scientific revolution.” 
Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994), 21. 
28 See Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (New York: Anchor Books, 1967); Steve Bruce, God Is 
Dead (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). 
29 Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World; For a prominent alternative approach that 
strongly rejects secularization theory, see Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, Acts of Faith: 
Explaining the Human Side of Religion (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000). 
30 Courtney Bender, “Pluralism and Secularism,” in Religion on the Edge: De-Centering and Re-
Centering the Sociology of Religion, ed. Courtney Bender et al. (Cambridge: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 139. 
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Thus, secularism can be understood as a modern social process of 
differentiation through which religion loses its singularly and seamlessly unifying 
social authority and becomes relegated to its own separate social sphere. This process 
does not necessarily entail the decline of the social significance of religion—as 
evidenced by the American context—but rather a change of position and power 
dynamics. Moreover, this process is socio-historically situated and contextual, thus not 
universal.31 Conceptually, the liberal anthropology, rooted in a notion of the 
autonomous individual guided by reason, drives this reorientation of religion. Janet R. 
Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini make a similar observation:  
secularism is central to the Enlightenment narrative in which reason 
progressively frees itself from the bonds of religion and in doing so liberates 
humanity… This Enlightenment narrative separates secularism from religion 
and through this separation claims that secularism, like reason, is universal (in 
contrast to the particularism of religion.)32  
 
To be clear, this separation of religion is also a process of defining religion, of 
constructing a modern norm of religion. It situates religion somewhere in the spectrum 
of individual, private pursuit and aspect of culture that informs individual identity. 
Not only does this support the liberal conception of the autonomous individual, 
it also supports the formation of the liberal public sphere. Following the social contract 
theory of classical liberalism, the nation-state is defined as an entity that functions to 
protect individuals’ rights to security, property, political representation and equality 
before the law. This legitimates social differentiation, in which the Church, and thus 
religious authority, are relegated to a private sphere distinct from the political and 
economic spheres. To enter the public sphere, participants must do so using the 
                                            
31 See Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), especially the chapter "Secularism, Nation-State, Religion," for 
a discussion of the contextual nature of secularism. 
32 Janet R. Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, “Introduction: Times Like These,” in Secularisms, ed. 
Janet R. Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 2. 
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purportedly universal language of reason. In other words, the public sphere is 
regulated by liberal norms. Secularism also paves the way for religious pluralism. Once 
religion is no longer taken for granted or imposed upon people, religious communities 
begin to compete and market themselves to individuals, thus creating a social climate 
in which multiple religions can exist side by side.33 Of course, these religions can only 
coexist so long as they remain in the private sphere and only interact in the public 
sphere through liberal norms of reason. 
2.1.3 Liberal tolerance 
Liberal discourse works to define and manage religion, a regulatory function 
that has historical roots in early liberal discourse. It is along these lines that a liberal 
case for toleration is developed. In “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” John Locke 
argues that religion itself ought to be more liberal, based on reason rather than 
revelation, and thus, focused on universal values that unite, rather than particularities 
that divide.34 Locke argues for toleration of those with different religious beliefs, but it 
is clear that his scope of tolerable differences are delimited by Protestantism since he 
argues against toleration for atheists and Catholics. For Locke, liberal political theory 
was morally neutral, but the liberal commonwealth still required a moral foundation. 
Society still required the strong moral framework that Protestantism, but not atheism 
or Catholicism, provided. According to Locke, by denying God, atheism also denies 
reason, and, by giving legitimacy to papal authority, Catholicism is decidedly illiberal. 
                                            
33 Berger, The Sacred Canopy.  Here Berger writes on the relationship between liberalism, 
religion and secularization. Years later, Berger wrote that his secularization theory included one 
big mistake and one great insight. The mistake was his link between the decline of religion and 
modernity. The great insight was his recognition of the dialectical relationship between 
secularization and pluralism-- that the relegation of religion to a discrete sphere undermines 
taken-for-granted beliefs and values, which in turn supports religious diversity and pluralism. 
Peter Berger, “Protestantism and the Quest for Certainty,” The Christian Century, September 26, 
1998. 
34 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (Minneapolis: Filiquarian Publishing, 2007). 
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However, Protestantism with its emphasis on individual morality and salvation 
provides a liberal morality with universal relevance. Locke gives a Protestant rationale 
for autonomy and toleration with arguments such as, “God has given no man authority 
over another.”35 Rousseau offers a similar sentiment in calling for a universal civil 
religion that provides a basic moral framework to support the state.36  
Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” not only calls for toleration for various 
Protestant sects, but it also articulates a sharp distinction between civil and political 
society, on the one hand, and the differentiated religious sphere on the other. Locke’s 
call for toleration has a number of significant consequences. First, it reduces the truth 
claims of religion to subjective, private belief, thus reducing the civil and political 
authority of religion. Second, it positions tolerance as pertaining to individual beliefs 
and practices, which fits into Locke’s liberal framework. It does not offer tolerance or 
recognition for group rights. This issue of recognition and group rights has become a 
focus in contemporary discourse on liberalism and religion. Wendy Brown asserts that 
with Locke’s contention, 
tolerance of diverse beliefs in a community becomes possible to the extent that 
those beliefs are phrased as having no public importance; as being constitutive 
of a private individual whose beliefs and commitments have minimal bearing on 
the structure and pursuits of political, social, or economic life; and as having no 
reference to a settled common epistemological authority.37  
 
Consequently, religious groups lose claim to what happens in public or political life. 
This sentiment has resonated through tolerance discourse to this day. However, 
Locke’s letter privileges Protestant norms, imagined as universal. Thus, a kind of 
generic, universalized Protestantism, which maps neatly onto the values of liberalism, 
was set as the norm by which tolerance would be measured. Liberal tolerance 
                                            
35 Ibid., 9. 
36 Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses. 
37 Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 32. 
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continues to carry this bias, yet, assumptions of secularism mean that what might 
actually have a religious, Protestant tone is instead labeled as secular and culturally 
neutral. 
Rousseau makes a similar argument for the role of religion in civil society and 
tolerance. He maintains that religion is a private matter and only concerns the 
sovereign or the republic in so far as it has “reference to morality and to the duties 
which he who professes them is bound to do to others.”38 He argues for a kind of 
universal, civil profession of faith that expresses values for good citizenship, including 
respect for equality, democracy, the “sanctity of the social contract,” the rule of law, 
and justice. He also argues that all religions should be tolerated, so long as they 
tolerate other religions and “their dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of 
citizenship.”39 Essentially, religious tolerance may be extended to liberal religions, a 
principle that has carried through to contemporary liberal tolerance discourse, as well. 
Twentieth-century philosopher and liberal theorist John Rawls positions 
tolerance as a central liberal value, but contextualizes it by distinguishing between the 
concepts of a “comprehensive doctrine” and a “political conception.” Rawls defines a 
“comprehensive doctrine” as one that “includes conceptions of what is of value in 
human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character, that are to inform much 
of our nonpolitical conduct (in the limit our life as a whole).”40 A political conception 
on the other hand is not comprehensive and only relates to political life. It is a 
“module, an essential constituent part, that in different ways fits into and can be 
                                            
38 Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, 307. 
39 Ibid., 308. 
40 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 175. 
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supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society 
regulated by it.”41  
Rawls recognizes that there are competing comprehensive doctrines and that it 
is not feasible, or liberal, to claim a single comprehensive doctrine as universally 
relevant; therefore, no comprehensive doctrine is “appropriate as a political conception 
for a constitutional regime.”42 However, a political conception may be acceptable to 
multiple comprehensive doctrines. This is accomplished through a process of 
“overlapping consensus,” which requires “the criterion of reciprocity,” that is the terms 
of consensus must be reasonably accepted without manipulation or political force.  
Rawls critiques the traditional liberal view of autonomy as a foundational liberal 
value. While he acknowledges its importance, he raises concerns that autonomy as a 
moral value has significant limitations in that not all comprehensive doctrines place 
importance upon it and some even reject the notion. Thus autonomy as a liberal value 
fails to satisfy the criteria of reciprocity. Rawls instead posits tolerance as a central 
liberal value.  
Rawls struggles with the liberal problematic of cultural imperialism and 
accommodation for non-liberals. He recognizes the problem of positioning liberalism 
as a comprehensive philosophical doctrine and expecting it to have universal relevance. 
However, even by positioning liberalism as a political conception rather than a 
comprehensive doctrine, Rawls cannot avoid implying that liberalism has universal 
salience and a kind of cultural neutrality. Rawls argues all reasonable belief systems 
can be accommodated—and should be—in the name of tolerance. He does not want to 
impose liberalism on non-liberals. Yet this becomes unavoidable. In the end, non-
                                            
41 Ibid., 145. 
42 Ibid., 135. 
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liberal doctrines are only acceptable as private belief. As he states, “For we always 
assume that citizens have two views, a comprehensive and a political view; and that 
their overall view can be divided into two parts, suitably related.”43 There is no space 
for certain beliefs and doctrines in the political sphere, which means that they 
essentially have no power.  
 Will Kymlicka grapples with the question of whether autonomy or tolerance is 
the fundamental value within liberal theory. A concern arises that groups who do not 
value autonomy become alienated within liberal culture and may “undermine their 
allegiance to liberal institutions, whereas a tolerance-based liberalism can provide a 
more secure and wider basis for the legitimacy of government.”44 Kymlicka criticizes 
the position of Rawls, who focuses on tolerance over autonomy. He points out that 
Rawls distances himself from autonomy as the foundation of liberalism, because he 
recognizes that it may not carry universal salience and may alienate those holding 
certain worldviews, or “comprehensive doctrines.” Rawls believe he can make 
liberalism more inclusive, or universal, by focusing on tolerance. Yet, as Kymlicka 
argues, liberal tolerance has historically been distinguished by its commitment to 
autonomy. It has focused on freedom of individual conscience, which entails the 
protection of individual rights to dissent from their group, as well as the right of 
groups to not be persecuted by the state. Kymlicka contends that it also entails 
freedom of choice, which includes the freedom for individuals to choose how they lead 
their lives. This choice may involve choosing one conception of the good life, 
reconsidering, and then choosing another. This is the liberal assumption that “our 
                                            
43 Ibid., 140. 
44 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 154. 
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beliefs about the good life are fallible and revisable,” which Kymlicka finds rooted 
deeply in the liberal tradition from Mill to Rawls.45  
This notion of choice informs the liberal understanding of religion. Religion is, 
and ought to be, a matter of personal choice. Liberal society must protect this choice, 
allowing individuals the freedom to pursue their existing religion, question it, abandon 
it, or share it with others. Liberal tolerance hinges upon the notions of autonomy and 
freedom of choice. As Kymlicka argues, essentially, tolerance and autonomy are two 
sides of the same coin. From the perspective of liberalism, tolerance and autonomy are 
intertwined. Thus, when pluralism extends tolerance to many religions, this comes 
with the assumption, or even the condition, that these religions have been freely 
chosen and freely allow choice. Illiberal religions fall outside the bounds of tolerance. 
2.2 Analyzing Liberal Governance: The Concept of Governmentality 
From highlighting some overarching facets of liberal discourse that feature 
centrally in the discourse of pluralism, I now want to elaborate the conceptual 
frameworks and techniques I will use to analyze patterns of power in liberal discourse 
in modern society. The concept of governmentality provides a means of describing the 
ways in which power is constructed and exercised in modern society. It views 
government as an activity or practice, something in formation, rather than a static 
entity.  
2.2.1. Foucault and governmentality 
The theoretical concept of governmentality was initially developed by Foucault. 
He defines government as “the conduct of conduct”—“that is to say, a form of activity 
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aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons.”46 For 
Foucault, government used in this sense does not refer narrowly and exclusively to the 
ruling authority within a nation-state. Thus, Foucault does not use the term 
“government” in a conventional sense. Foucault writes that “Government, therefore, 
has a purpose, it arranges things… and it arranges things for an end… government is 
very clearly distinguished from sovereignty.”47 Rather, government involves broad 
processes and activities of governance, which then entails more than just the exercise 
of authority over others, or entities such as states and populations; it also 
encompasses self-governance, or how we govern ourselves.48 Mitchell Dean elaborates 
Foucault’s definition with his own: 
Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a 
multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and 
forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the 
desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but 
shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, 
effects, and outcomes.49 
 
Along these lines, for Foucault, the state is not an entity with fixed properties or an 
inherent essence, nor is it tantamount to government or the singular organizing power 
of modern society. Rather the state is produced by practices of government more 
broadly interpreted, or to use the parlance of Foucault, it has been 
“governmentalized.”50 Modern governance has a dispersed nature and “the powers and 
                                            
46 Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), 2. 
47 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 98. 
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rationalities governing individual subjects and the populace as a whole operate 
through a range of formally nonpolitical knowledges and institutions.”51 
The notion of governmentality, then, gets to these varied and dispersed 
practices that construct governance. Foucault defines the term “governmentality” as 
dealing with “governmental rationality,” or “mentalities of government.” He lays out 
three general features of governmentality. First, he describes governmentality as: 
the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very 
complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its 
major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical 
instrument.52  
 
He explains the second aspect of governmentality as “the type of power that we can 
call ‘government’ and which has led to the development of a series of specific 
governmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, and [and, on the other] to the 
development of a series of knowledges (saviors).”53 The third feature, Foucault 
describes as “the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the 
administrative state in the 15th and 16th centuries and was gradually 
‘governmentalized.’”54 Governmentality points to the “art” of government, a craft that 
entails imagination and fashioning. It signifies the ways in which power is exercised 
through the governance and regulation of individual conduct and through knowledges 
that manifest in self-regulating practices. It addresses how the practices of government 
are largely taken for granted, as well as how they are constructed and embedded in 
discourses and other technologies often viewed as unrelated to political power, 
governance or the state. As Mitchell Dean explains, “discourses on government are an 
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integral part of the workings of government rather than simply a means of its 
legitimation; government is accomplished through multiple actors and agencies rather 
than a centralized set of state apparatuses.”55 This kind of analysis, or “analytics of 
government” to use Dean’s term, seeks to uncover the ways in which social, cultural, 
and political practices of government produce so-called “truth.” It asks how these 
practices construct and depend upon particular forms of knowledge. It looks at how 
regimes of power beyond the state apparatus produce and maintain knowledges 
associated with governmentality and self-regulated governance.  
Dean argues that a study of governmentality also entails looking at the ways in 
which modern governance constructs morality. Processes that aim to shape individual 
conduct produce moral questions. Modern morality and ethics, or the study of 
morality, assume an autonomous individual capable of self-regulation; they assume 
self-governance. As he explains: “If morality is understood as the attempt to make 
oneself accountable for one’s own actions, or as a practice in which human beings take 
their own conduct to be subject to self-regulation, then government is an intensely 
moral activity.”56 Moreover, practices of government regularly assume or work to 
establish “what constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of 
individuals and collectives.”57 Examining government from this view illuminates the 
relationship of “questions of government, politics, and administration to the space of 
bodies, lives, selves and persons.”58 Dean also critiques normative political theory such 
as Rawls or Habermas, arguing that “claims to be operating in the service of ‘values’ 
must be scrutinized as components of the rhetorical practice of government and as 
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part of different forms of governmental and political reason.”59 Thus, the question of 
values in government is not about how certain practices are expressions of values, but 
rather how values function in governmental practices.  
2.2.2 Conducting liberal governance 
An analysis of governmentality provides a particularly helpful framework for 
parsing the relationship between practices of governance and liberalism. Liberalism is 
not simply a doctrine, but as Colin Gordon explains, a “style of thinking 
quintessentially concerned with the art of governing.”60 Liberalism is primarily 
occupied with ordering the “conduct of conduct.” It is a critique of practices of 
governance; it simultaneously disdains too much governance and insists on 
universality. In this way, liberalism seeks both to individualize and totalize. As Dean 
argues: 
The real innovation of the study of liberalism as a rationality of government, 
however, is not the emphasis on the respect for the rights and freedoms of 
subjects. Rather it is that the liberties and capacities of the governed are the 
mechanisms through which an art of government as a comprehensive 
management of civil society will come to operate.61 
 
Liberalism proclaims freedom and liberty, while tending to impose a mode of public 
discourse that privileges certain forms of expression and silences others. Thus, it 
promotes individual autonomy and “liberty,” but within the bounds of the liberal state. 
It is a measured liberty.  
Through hegemonic discursive practices, liberal discourse is inclined to 
attribute social change to individual agency, thus concealing the function and 
mechanisms of society and masking dynamics of power. As an example given by 
Wendy Brown, “the reduction of freedom to rights and of equality to equal standing 
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before the law eliminates from view many sources of subordination, marginalization 
and inequality that organize liberal societies and fashion their subjects.”62  
Brown sharpens Foucault’s theory of governmentality by looking at how 
dispersed governance and the de-centering of the state mask the functions of power 
and governance in modern society. She argues that Foucault underestimates the role of 
the state, that in fact, the state “remains the fulcrum of political legitimacy in late 
modern nations.”63 As such, an analytics of government should look at the varied and 
dispersed practices of governance and consider not only how they order and govern, 
but also how they function to legitimate the state. While the liberal state engages in 
individualization— orienting its population around the autonomous individual— it 
must simultaneously universalize and totalize its control over its population within its 
sovereign authority.  
This points to a tension between plurality and unity inherent in liberal 
democracies. A liberal democracy claims to be the government by and for its entire 
people. Composed of diverse, autonomous individuals, it must recognize plurality. 
However, insofar as it aims to be the government for this diverse population, there 
must be some unity and coherence to hold it together and give it legitimacy. Given this 
tension, there must be limits to either plurality or unity. Moreover, in view of the 
totalizing and hegemonic nature of liberal democracy, the limitations are usually 
placed on plurality. This relationship is more precisely framed as a dialectical one 
rather than a dichotomy, in which this tension between plurality and unity is not 
external to either, but rather constitutive of each. Plurality exists because the notion of 
the autonomous, inherently equal, free individual, which is at the heart of a liberal 
                                            
62 Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire, 17–18. 
63 Ibid., 83. 
 34 
democracy, calls it into being. This autonomous individual negotiates her or his 
relationships with all other individuals through a social contract, which affirms and 
protects her or his freedom, provides for her or his prosperity, and, importantly, 
legitimates the liberal state as the agent of these functions. Thus, the plurality of 
individuals calls for the unity of the sovereign for its security and perhaps its very 
existence.  
Liberal discourses are vital to the legitimation of the liberal democratic nation-
state and the practice of liberal governance. Moreover, as Mitchell argues, “liberalism is 
thus as much concerned with the appropriate normalizing practices to shape the 
exercise of citizens’ political freedom as it is with guaranteeing their rights and 
liberties.”64 Wendy Brown looks at how contemporary tolerance discourse—a liberal 
discourse— functions as a mode of governmentality by asserting the normalcy of the 
powerful and the deviance of the marginal. As a practice of liberal governance, 
tolerance discourse poses as a universal value and neutral practice, as it “designates 
certain beliefs and practices as civilized and others as barbaric.” It “regulates the 
presence of the Other” and “legitimates the most illiberal actions of the state by means 
of a term consummately associated with liberalism.”65 Tolerance fundamentally 
assumes that religious, cultural, or ethnic differences are inherently and naturally sites 
of conflict and hostility. Thus tolerance is positioned as “a tool for managing or 
lessening this hostility to achieve peaceful coexistence”66 
The talk and texts of tolerance advocate for multiculturalism, equality, and 
liberty; they promote social cohesion. At the same time, this cohesion entails a certain 
passivity that supports and legitimates the state. As Brown argues, it is precisely this 
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legitimation, the association of the state with liberal tolerance, that allows the state to 
pursue its security function and engage in actions that are decidedly illiberal—such as 
the compromise of civil liberties through the Patriot Act or the detention of prisoners 
at Guantanamo Bay forgoing due process and using interrogation techniques of 
torture. As Brown clarifies, “Defined against the unfree, intolerant peoples who menace 
us, a tolerant citizenry is a virtuous and free citizenry; and it is precisely this virtue 
and freedom that licenses the violation of principles of tolerance and freedom in the 
name of our security.”67 Writing about the illiberality of liberal government, Mitchell 
Dean also points out that:  
Within liberal forms of government, at least, there is a long history of people 
who, for one reason or another, have been deemed not to possess or to display 
the attributes (e.g. autonomy, responsibility) required of the juridical and 
political subject of rights and who have therefore been subjected to all sorts of 
disciplinary, bio-political and even sovereign interventions.68  
 
Essentially, tolerance discourse, as well as other liberal discourses engaged in 
hegemonic discursive practices, functions to mask its politics and power dynamics. In 
doing so, these discourses can legitimate or obscure illiberal and contradictory actions. 
These practices also highlight the complexity and contestation that underlie liberal 
ideologies. As Dean explains, “liberalism always contains the possibility of non-liberal 
interventions into the lives of those who do not possess the attributes required” by the 
liberal social order.69 
Brown calls this process of masking power and politics “depoliticization,” which 
she defines as a process that “involves removing a political phenomenon from 
comprehension of its historical emergence and from a recognition of the powers that 
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produce and contour it.”70 Brown describes other liberal mechanisms of 
depoliticization as involving “construing inequality, subordination, marginalization, 
and social conflict, which all require political analysis and political solutions, as 
personal and individual, on the one hand, or as natural, religious, or cultural on the 
other.”71 Brown’s notion of depoliticization is a particularly helpful concept for 
understanding the ways in which liberal norms and ideology permeate liberal societies. 
Liberal governance is not solely enacted by the state or by institutions formally 
recognized as governmental or political. Rather, it is dispersed in nature and 
accomplished through a wide range of apparatuses and mechanisms that are 
frequently not seen to be political. It is through these processes of depoliticization that 
liberalism becomes invisible in liberal societies, and especially in the United States. 
From this theoretical framework, I contend that the discourse of religious pluralism is 
also a discourse of depoliticization. It is a discourse with obscured liberal politics that 
operates in the service of liberal governance. 
2.3 The Social Theory of Critical Discourse Analysis 
My analysis of normative politics and patterns of power dynamics in liberal 
discourse draws not only from the conceptual frame of governmentality, but also from 
the social theory of critical discourse analysis. Here I want to elaborate this theory, 
drawing especially from the work of Norman Fairclough, a linguist whose social theory 
aims to explain power, social change and transformation through the analysis of 
discourse, with attentiveness to the connection between discourse processes and the 
social practices of which they are a part.72  
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2.3.1 The dialectics of discourse 
Discourse is a mode of representation, as well as a mode of action, a way in 
which people may act upon the world and especially upon each other.73 It represents 
social realities and forms them through the construction of social identities, 
relationships between people, and systems of knowledge and belief. Central to 
Fairclough’s theory is his emphasis on a dialectical relationship between discourse and 
social structure. Discourse is shaped and confined by social structure, while at the 
same, socially constitutive; that is, it plays a role in reproducing society, while 
simultaneously transforming it. Fairclough adapts the constitutive view of discourse 
from Foucault’s social theory on discourse, which examines the relationship between 
language, discourse, knowledge and power.74 Foucault is interested in the larger 
domains of knowledge constituted by rules of discourse and discursive formations, 
systems of rules which make it possible for certain statements, but not others, to occur 
at particular times, places and institutional locations. A major theoretical insight from 
Foucault highlighted by Fairclough is this constitutive view of discourse, which 
positions discourse as actively constructing society through complex and typically 
unseen processes.75 As Fairclough explains this constitutive view, discourse functions  
as contributing to the production, transformation, and reproduction of the 
objects [and subjects] of social life ... discourse is in an active relation to reality, 
that language signifies reality in the sense of constructing meanings for it, 
rather than that discourse is in a passive relation to reality, with language 
merely referring to objects which are taken to be given in reality.76  
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Yet, Fairclough warns against a temptation to overemphasize the constitutive aspect of 
discourse and ignore its social determination, or to reduce social practice to discourse. 
Rather, he emphasizes a dialectical relationship between discourse and social 
structure, in which the discursive constitution of society stems from “a social practice 
which is firmly rooted in and oriented to real, material social structures.”77 He explains 
this dialectical relationship in these terms: “Discourse contributes to the constitution 
of all those dimensions of social structure which directly or indirectly shape and 
constrain it: its own norms and conventions, as well as the relations, identities and 
institutions which lie behind them.”78  
2.3.2 Discourse and power 
Fairclough highlights Foucault’s move toward decentering the subject, which 
entails “the view of the subject as constituted, reproduced and transformed in and 
through social practice, and the view of the subject as fragmented.”79 Foucault argues 
that modern subject formation involves the construction of individuality, or individual 
identity, as a means of regulation. Yet, Fairclough objects to the ways in which this 
positioning of the subject can exclude active social agency and instead advocates for a 
dialectic approach to the subject, one that “sees social subjects as shaped by discursive 
practices, yet also capable of reshaping and restructuring those practices.”80 
Fairclough draws from Foucault to outline the relationship between power and 
discourse. For Foucault, power, particularly in modernity, is not an ontological entity 
or a force for good or evil. Rather, it is better understood as a complex cluster of 
relationships, constantly in flux. Foucault sees power as omnipresent: “not because it 
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has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it 
is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation 
from one point to another.”81 At the same time, while omnipresent, power is also 
evasive. It “is tolerable only on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its 
success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.”82 As part of its 
elusiveness, modern power rises “from below” rather than being imposed from above.  
Foucault asserts: “Power does not work negatively by forcefully dominating those who 
are subject to it; it incorporates them, and is ‘productive’ in the sense that it shapes 
and ‘retools’ them to fit in with its needs.”83 It grows out of certain “microtechniques” 
that involve the formation and regulation of the individual subject, such as the 
examination. Fairclough explains that there is  
a dual relation between power and knowledge in modern society: on the one 
hand, the techniques of power are developed on the basis of knowledge which is 
generated for example, in the social sciences; on the other hand, the techniques 
are very much concerned with exercising power in the process of gathering 
knowledge.84 
 
Significantly, the practices of power in modernity are largely discursive. To analyze 
social structures and institutions in terms of power requires understanding and 
analyzing their discursive practices.85 It entails looking at the ways in which “the 
production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed 
according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its 
dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality.”86 
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As he conceptualizes the relationship between power and transformation, 
Fairclough sees discourse as a mode of political and ideological practice, which creates 
and transforms power relations, as well as the collective entities that power relations 
shape. It is both a site of power struggle and a stake in power struggle. In other words, 
power struggles are enacted through discourse. Part of the power struggle is over 
access to shaping discourse, over who gets to set the terms of the conversation. 
Fairclough quotes Foucault to illustrate this relationship: “Discourse is not simply that 
which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by 
which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized.”87 Illustrative of 
the evasive nature of power, individuals do not tend to be aware of how their 
discursive practices are shaped by social structures and relations of power nor are they 
cognizant of how their discursive practices effect and shape social structures and 
relations of power.  
2.3.3 Discourse and ideology 
For Fairclough, ideology is another essential conceptual component located in 
the realm of sustaining or restructuring power relations. Fairclough asserts three 
important claims about ideology: 1) it has a material existence in social practices of 
institutions; 2) the constitution of subjects is one of the more significant ‘ideological 
effects;’ and 3) institutions are both “sites of and stakes in struggle, which points to 
struggle in and over discourse as a focus for an ideologically-oriented discourse 
analysis.”88 The struggle in and over discourse is also a part of hegemonic struggle.89 
Fairclough defines ideology as “significations/constructions of reality (the physical 
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world, social relations, social identities), which are built into various dimensions of the 
forms/meanings of discursive practices, and which contribute to the production, 
reproduction or transformation of relations of domination.”90 Ideologies that work to 
establish or sustain domination serve this purpose best when they are naturalized or 
taken as common sense. Yet, their naturalized status should not be taken as stable; 
ideologies are often contested and subject to the struggle to reshape discursive 
practices in the context of transforming relations of domination.  
Ideologies are embedded in social structures, which allows for their continual 
reproduction, while, at the same time, also located in events that lead to the 
transformation of structures.91 This relationship between structures and events is 
dialectical. All of these practices and processes typically take place without the 
awareness of individuals; they are naturalized and taken for granted. As such, ideology 
tends to legitimate existing social practices and power relations. However, while 
ideology may function in the construction of subjects as naturalized, thus giving the 
illusion of an autonomous subject, there are also occasions in which the subject 
encounters contradictory ideologies, leading to confusion and the problematization of 
convention. These are the conditions under which awareness, as well as transformation 
is most likely to develop.92 Fairclough again emphasizes his dialectical position:  
subjects are ideologically positioned, but they are also capable of acting 
creatively to make their own connections between the diverse practices and 
ideologies to which they are exposed, and to restructure positioning practices 
and structures. The balance between the subject and ideological ‘effect’ and the 
subject as active agent, is a variable which depends upon social conditions such 
as the relative stability of relations of domination.93 
 
2.3.4 Hegemonic discourses 
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Fairclough develops his view of ideology and power by situating it within a 
theory of hegemonic power. The notion of hegemony allows for the explanation of 
change and transformation in discursive practices and power dynamics. Hegemony is a 
means and structure of power in which one social or economic class or group 
establishes dominance over others through a complex process of consent and 
concessions: “Hegemony is about constructing alliances, and integrating rather than 
simply dominating subordinate classes, through concessions or through ideological 
means, to win their consent.”94 Hegemonic power explains why subordinate groups of 
people participate in social structures and actions that do not benefit them but rather 
benefit a dominant group instead. This process of consent and concessions is largely 
unseen and naturalized. It is facilitated by the ideological and political practices of 
discourse. It often takes the form of ‘common sense.’ It is also involved in the 
formation of subjects. Of course, hegemony is not the only form of organizational 
power in contemporary society. There is also the form of power in which domination is 
achieved by uncompromising imposition of rules, norms, and conventions, i.e. coercive 
power. 
According to Fairclough, the concept of hegemony provides a means for 
analyzing social practice, in which discourse plays a role in power relations—
reproducing, restructuring or challenging hegemony. The concept of hegemony also 
offers a means for analyzing discursive practice itself as a mode of hegemonic 
struggle. Fairclough describes discourse within hegemonic struggle in terms of 
articulation, disarticulation, and rearticulation, the latter two of which lead to 
discursive change. The problematization of conventions in language (e.g., patriarchal 
language) often produces discursive change—“disarticulating existing orders of 
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discourse and rearticulating new orders of discourse, new discursive hegemonies.”95 
These discursive changes are always rooted in previous or existing orders. They do not 
reflect new language or conventions, but rather new combinations of existing 
conventions, codes or elements—in a word, intertextuality.  
2.3.5 Intertexuality and interdiscursivity 
Fairclough uses the concept of intertextuality to convey that the idea that 
discursive practices have an interdependent relationship that constitutes, defines and 
transforms them. Thus, texts always take or render from other contemporary and 
historically prior texts.96 Intertextuality refers to the ways in which texts are shaped by 
previous texts to which they are responding and future texts they are anticipating. 
Each text is a link in a chain.  
Fairclough connects this with the dialectical relationship between discourse and 
social practice. Texts are historical. They absorb and are built out of previous texts; at 
the same time, they rework and rearticulate these texts, influencing mentalities and 
bringing about social change. In this sense, texts are productive. Fairclough once again 
reminds us, however, that the productivity of texts is not a boundless “space for 
textual innovation and play.”97 Rather, it is socially constrained and restricted by 
relations of power. The constraints of power upon intertextuality can be explained 
through the concept of hegemony, which frames “intertextual processes and processes 
of contesting and restructuring orders of discourse as processes of hegemonic 
struggle.”98 Thus, to bring the conceptual approach of intertextuality to the analysis of 
discourse “entails an emphasis upon the heterogeneity of texts, and a mode of analysis 
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which highlights the diverse and often contradictory elements and threads which go to 
make up a text.”99 It is often the source of ambivalence and contradiction in a text. 
Given the connection between texts and social reality, Fairclough argues that 
analyzing discursive change provides a tool for analyzing social change. Discursive 
practices within orders of discourse are heterogeneous. They can function as both 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic practices. They can often be contradictory. This 
again gets to Fairclough’s emphasis on the dialectical and ambivalent nature of 
discourse, in which the change and flux demand analytic attention. While hegemonic 
struggle should not be reduced to discursive practice, there is an interdependent and 
dialectical relationship between the two, particularly when one aims to explain social 
change and transformation. Fairclough’s emphasis on the heterogeneous and unstable 
nature of discursive practice within orders of discourse points to the potential and 
actualization of social change. Again, this view of discursive, as well as social, change 
is complex and layered, grounded in a historical process of intertexuality, in which 
prior texts and conventions are rearticulated and transformed. Discursive practices 
have implications for social realities, as Fairclough explains:  
discursive practice, the production, distribution, and consumption (including 
interpretation) of texts, is a facet of hegemonic struggle which contributes in 
varying degrees to the reproduction or transformation not only of the existing 
order of discourse (for example, through the ways prior texts and conventions 
are articulated in text production), but also through that of existing social and 
power relations.100 
 
An order of discourse can be seen as the discursive facet of hegemony. At the same 
time, the power to determine the articulation and rearticulation of orders of discourse 
is a stake in hegemonic struggle.  
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Critical discourse analysis hinges on the idea that social reality is shaped by 
unseen, naturalized, and depoliticizing practices, that is, practices that function to 
hide the politics of their formation. For my purposes in this study, it offers an 
interpretive framework from which to view the construction of “religion.” 101 To draw 
from Fairclough’s theory, especially the view of the constitutive nature of discourse, 
points the question beyond how “religion” is a discursive construction to how these 
discursive practices might shape social reality, including the experience of religion. 
Applying this framework to religious pluralism as a discourse involves recognizing 
that the texts and talks of religious pluralism not only point to social practices but are 
themselves social, political and ideological practices. It requires continuously keeping 
in view not just the phenomena that the discourse of religious pluralism seeks to 
describe but also the ways in which these discursive practices of describing and 
analyzing the subject of religious plurality simultaneously construct, reproduce or 
transform their subjects. It necessitates keeping in mind the co-constitutive 
relationship between the discourse of religious pluralism and the social and political 
realities of religious pluralism. Moreover, it illuminates intertextual and interdiscursive 
relationships.  
In the next chapter, I draw from these theoretical foundations and turn my 
analysis to the discourse of religious pluralism. As I examine the construction of the 
concept of pluralism, the history of this discourse, and its discursive practices, I look 
at how it functions as a mode of governmentality as it aims to orchestrate social 
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cohesion and manage religion within a liberal framework. I parse its interdiscursive 
and intertextual relationship with the discourses of liberalism and tolerance and bring 
to the surface a few of its discursive practices that serve a regulatory function. 
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Chapter 3: Situating the Discourse of Religious Pluralism 
“Today, as in every era, Americans are appropriating anew the meaning of “We, the 
people of the United States of America. . . .” What does it mean to say “we” in a 
multireligious America? How do “we” relate to one another, when that “we” includes 
Buddhist Americans, like the Hawaiian born Buddhist astronaut who died on the 
Challenger, Muslim Americans, like the mayor of a small town in Texas, and Sikh 
Americans, like the research scientist in Fairfax, Virginia. What, then, is pluralism?” 
—Diana Eck, 1997102 
 
“I realized that it was precisely because of America's glaring imperfections that I 
should seek to participate in its progress, carve a place in its promise, and play a role 
in its possibility. And at its heart and at its best, America was about pluralism.” 	  
–Eboo Patel, 2010103 
 
3.1. Defining Pluralism 
In these statements, scholar/activists Diana Eck and Eboo Patel situate religious 
pluralism as an essential element of and ethos for the American public sphere. 
However, the dominant discourse of religious pluralism— of which these statements 
are examples— does not just work to describe a plurality of religions; it also prescribes 
an ideal approach to diversity rooted in liberalism. It functions to regulate and govern 
religion in ways that reproduce liberal norms and ideologies. In this chapter, I define 
and situate this discourse.104 
 Parsing the discourse of religious pluralism involves identifying various ways in 
which the term “pluralism” is framed. Broadly, pluralism is a term that indicates 
diversity of some kind, typically affirming that diversity. In early usage in the twentieth 
century, philosopher Horace Kallen brought the term into currency around 1924 
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writing about cultural pluralism in order to advocate for respect for ethnic diversity.105 
A few decades later, sociologist Will Herberg, in the influential 1955 book Protestant-
Catholic-Jew, used the term “pluralist” in contrast to “melting pot assimilationist” as 
part of his argument for recognition of difference and diversity.106 He argued that 
Americans believe “the plurality of religious groups is a proper and legitimate 
condition.”107 At the same time, Herberg contended that pluralism entailed a “unity in 
multiplicity,” grounded in a “common faith,” a kind of civil religion, and involving 
cooperation and coexistence.108 He asserted that this common faith was at the core of 
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism, which he designated “religions of 
democracy,” and that religious pluralism was a key to American social cohesion, “an 
essential aspect of the American Way of Life.” He suggested that it served as an 
unofficial religious establishment.109 Thus, for Herberg, pluralism entailed both 
diversity and a unifying common ground. 
A look at theories of multiculturalism as governance for managing diversity 
reveals parallels with pluralism. Augie Fleras describes three major models of 
multiculturalism as governance: conservative, liberal and plural. Conservative models 
advance diversity or culture-blind governance. They tend to focus on equality despite 
differences and tend to offer limited recognition of group-based differences. Liberal 
models are more tolerant of diversity. They advocate for the dominant culture to 
accommodate difference. As Fleras explains, they endorse “a governance (or society) of 
many cultures as long as people are treated the same (equally) as a matter of course, 
yet treated similarly (as equals) by taking differences into account when necessary to 
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ensure equality, belonging, and participation.”110 Plural models of multiculturalism then 
are more diversity conscious. They take differences seriously and tend to advocate for 
autonomous coexistence rather than assimilation or adaptation to a dominant culture. 
As Fleras explains, the distinctions between these models are often more analytic than 
actualized. In practice, multicultural governance may draw from varying aspects from 
these three models. 
The dominant discourse of religious pluralism that I explore in this project is 
predominantly a liberal pluralism. While it does advocate for taking differences 
seriously, it does so within a liberal framework. It encourages diverse religions to 
participate in a dominant culture—that of liberalism. Through my critique of this 
discourse, I theorize a critical pluralism, a counter-hegemonic discourse that 
interrogates the power, privilege, and assumptions naturalized by the dominant 
discourse. 
For my purposes in this project, I understand religious pluralism as a second-
order concept used to manage a multiplicity of diverse social practices and 
institutions. It broadly entails “a commitment to recognize and understand others 
across perceived or claimed lines of religious difference.”111 While some scholars use 
pluralism interchangeably with plurality or diversity, which I will elaborate later in this 
chapter, I argue that the term pluralism carries prescriptive norms and thus, should 
not be seen as synonymous with diversity. Rather, pluralism works to define and order 
religious diversity. In this sense, I concur with Diana Eck’s claim that “pluralism is only 
one of the possible responses to this diversity.”112  
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Courtney Bender and Pamela Klassen elaborate a brief genealogy of religious 
pluralism in which they highlight the historical fluctuations in the use of the term to 
illuminate the ambiguous nature of pluralism, a category and discourse that frequently 
shifts between descriptive and prescriptive positions.113 As they argue, it is “a fully 
modern concept arising in concert with equally modern ideas of secularity and 
religion.”114 Religious pluralism is often used to refer to plurality or religious diversity, 
thus seeming to function as a descriptive term. Many studies of religious pluralism in 
the U.S. involve mapping religious terrain and they often highlight a growing religious 
diversity, described as a “new” plurality or pluralism that has occurred in the U.S. since 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Yet, pluralism tends to quickly shift from 
a descriptive to a prescriptive category; or it appears to be used as a descriptive term, 
while implicitly reproducing prescriptive norms. For example, the knowledge of 
religious diversity gained from mapping religious terrain is often used to advocate for 
practices of tolerance, respect, and understanding. This normative usage prescribes a 
positive affirmation of plurality and represents an ethos for engaging religious 
diversity, negotiating religious difference and fostering social cohesion. Bender and 
Klassen argue that these empirical studies may offer a valuable view of the American 
religious landscape, but they do so while simultaneously embedding “prescriptive 
models of interaction and normative understandings of religious communities.”115  
As the category of religious pluralism ostensibly works to describe religious diversity, 
which assumes multiplicity and difference, it simultaneously defines and orders 
difference, which assumes a commonality. What remains hidden are the values, beliefs, 
and practices prescribed by those assumptions of common ground.  
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Moreover, as these discursive practices describe a certain reality, they 
simultaneously shape and form that reality. Thus, it is the nature of values, ideas, and 
practices and how they operate to construct reality and regulate behavior that I aim to 
illuminate in this thesis from the perspective of critical discourse analysis.  
3.2 The Social Context of Pluralism 
As a discourse, religious pluralism is a way of talking about a set of social 
practices and structures. Thus, it arises out of and responds to a social context. Yet, it 
simultaneously constructs this social context, by shaping meanings that order these 
social practices. Here, I want to look at some of the social structures that provide the 
context for the discourse of religious pluralism. Several central features characterize 
the American social context in which pluralism operates—demographic diversity, 
institutionalized liberal norms, especially freedom, tolerance, and secularism, a 
lingering Protestant cultural establishment, and an evolving multicultural narrative.  
3.2.1 Demographic diversity 
The national narrative that celebrates tolerance and freedom has a long history 
in the United States. From the early colonial period onward, this narrative has also 
extolled America’s remarkable demographic, religious and cultural diversity. To that 
effect, the American story has been constructed through accounts, such as one written 
in 1782 by Hector St. John Crevecoeur, a French immigrant who spent many years 
traveling through the colonies, that described a diverse young nation: “Here individuals 
of all nations are melted into a new race of men.”116 This report was not unique. Many 
European observers, themselves all too aware of battles in their home countries over 
church establishments and religious freedom, made a point to highlight the distinctive 
circumstances of religious diversity in America, either to celebrate it or condemn it. 
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For example, Alexis de Tocqueville described the character of the U.S. as the result of 
“the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty,” which he argued “elsewhere have often 
been at war but in America have somehow been incorporated into one another and 
marvelously combined.”117  
Despite the celebration of this great social experiment in diversity and 
tolerance, early America was not really so diverse initially—nor so tolerant. Before 
1820, over 95 percent of the population adhered to some variety of European 
Protestantism.118 A significant shift in diversity came in the early to mid-nineteenth 
century, which saw a more radical demographic shift than any other period in U.S. 
history.119 Prior to this time, what counted as diversity was largely Anglo, Protestant, 
and more specifically Calvinist. By 1850, immigration demographics had shifted to 
include large numbers of Irish and Germans, many of whom were Catholic (about a 
third of German immigrants and nearly all Irish immigrants). Protestant Germans were 
Lutheran, which began to erode the Calvinist hegemony within American 
Protestantism.120 At the same time, there was the first substantial immigration of 
Chinese immigrants—around 50,000 between the late 1840s and 1860. Territorial 
acquisitions in the South and Southwest, home to  many Roman Catholic Spanish-
speaking residents, also contributed to an increase in the Catholic population of the 
young nation. Historian William Hutchison writes that between 1820 and 1860, the 
percentage of the population that were Protestant was reduced to only 75 percent.121  
This increasing diversity at times contributed to social tensions and fuelled 
nativist movements, which have waxed and waned throughout American history. The 
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Immigration Act of 1924 evinced these tensions and the negative responses to shifting 
demographics they often inspired. The Immigration Act established a system of 
national origin quotas in immigration that resulted in the privileging of western 
European applicants over southern and eastern Europeans. It also excluded Asian 
immigrants. It remained in effect until 1965 when the passage of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act abolished the national origin quota system. Consequently, immigration 
patterns changed to include a considerable increase of immigrants from Asia, Africa, 
and the Middle East. This has led to an increase in both non-Christian religions and 
diversity within Christianity in the United States. As of 2008, Protestants make up 
approximately 51% of the U.S. population. This encompasses hundreds of different 
denominations. Catholics make up the next largest group at 23.9% of the population, 
followed by the unaffiliated at 16.1%. Judaism is the next largest religion at 1.7%, 
followed by Buddhism at .7%, Islam at .6% and Hinduism at .4%.122  
3.2.2 The First Amendment and the Institutionalization of Liberal Norms 
American commitments to religion and religious freedom led to the adoption of 
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution with its protection of the free exercise of 
religion and guard against state establishment of religion. These legal protections of 
religious freedom give the appearance of an unregulated public sphere in which 
religion can be freely enacted and exercised. However, this mode of governance has 
shaped an American style of secularism, in which religion is highly regulated and best 
recognized as an individual, private belief exercised in the private sphere. The 
enforcement and protection of religious freedom and First Amendment rights has 
generally fallen to the judicial branch of the American government. In judicial cases 
that involve religion, courts find themselves in the position of defining religion. 
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Frequently, this ad hoc definition stems from a dominant model of religion, the norms 
of Protestantism.123  
3.2.3 The Protestant Establishment 
For all the diversity and shifting demographics in the American population, 
American culture has continually been dominated by Protestant norms. While 
Americans have ideologically valued religious freedom and disestablishment, in 
practice, Protestant Christianity has historically occupied a place of dominance that 
resulted in an informal or “social” establishment. During its history of rapid change, 
Americans have sought unity, order, and coherence. Hutchison argues that “a religious 
establishment, even if its legal sanctions were scattered and miscellaneous, as in the 
American instance, could serve as a vehicle of social as well as religious coherence.”124 
The hegemonic nature of the Protestant establishment has entailed a slow process of 
naturalizing Protestantism so that it has ceased to seem particular and instead seemed 
normative, universal, and significantly, quintessentially American.  Hutchison argues 
that Protestant establishment permeated American society in such a way that it 
provided the foundation for what came to be seen as a universal American ethos, 
involving individualism, moralism, activism, and millennial optimism, also distinctly 
Protestant in character.125 For most Americans, this informal religious establishment 
was just enough to provide for social cohesion without sacrificing ideals of religious 
freedom and disestablishment.126 
Historian Charles Lippy also describes the diffusion of Protestant thought in 
American culture. Protestantism, as the dominant religion in American society, 
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gradually “liberalized” and “Americanized” to become less particular and more 
universal, which meant that it underwent a “gradual homogenization,” in which 
denominations accustomed to dominance “downplayed what made each distinct from 
the other.”127 Simultaneously, the center of authority in Protestantism shifted away 
from doctrine and tradition to private, subjective feeling and spirituality. As part of the 
privatization of religion, personal experience became the foundation for belief and the 
starting point of theological understanding.128 Moreover, Lippy argues that spirituality, 
a term he uses to refer to a private, rather than communal endeavor, eventually 
replaced religion as the locus for talking about meaning in life in American public 
discourse. 
3.2.4 From Tri-faith to Multiculturalism 
By the middle of the twentieth century, the narrative of Protestant America 
expanded to become Protestant-Catholic-Jewish America. It began shifting during the 
war years and especially after World War II as Protestants, Catholics, and Jews saw 
themselves sharing in a common belief in America as a privileged and chosen nation 
that was united in opposition against foreign enemies, first Nazi Germany and Imperial 
Japan, and later atheist communists. Nevertheless, the Protestant-Catholic-Jewish 
dynamic has been defined by Protestants norms and the ways in which Catholics and 
Jews shared beliefs in common with or similar to Protestants. Moreover, in this 
dynamic, only these three religions were deemed acceptable and legitimately 
American.129  
After World War II, the discourse of religious pluralism—a discourse that 
affirmed and even extolled religious diversity—developed as a moral advance away 
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from a long history of religious intolerance and discrimination in the United States. 
Along with a rising civil rights movement, pluralism grew out of a move toward 
increased social inclusion and equality and, eventually, a recognition of diverse group 
identities, those of immigrant ethnic groups as well as African Americans, Native 
Americans, women and others.130 The discourse of pluralism promoted the idea of the 
equal moral worth of all citizens regardless of their race, ethnicity, or religion.  
3.3 Pluralism and the Study of Religion  
The dominant discourse on pluralism is not just the product of on-the-ground 
interactions among diverse religions or public conversations in civil society but has 
developed through a dialectical relationship with the discourse on pluralism in the 
academic world. Pluralism has received attention throughout the social sciences, but it 
has occupied a special position in the academic study of religion. Scholars such Russell 
McCutcheon, Timothy Fitzgerald, and Amanda Porterfield argue that it has become a 
dominant interpretive framework within the discipline of religious studies.131 Given 
that this thesis examines themes of pluralism in religious studies textbooks, I want to 
examine the role that pluralism plays in that discipline in some detail.  
3.3.1 Pluralism, Protestantism, and theologies of religion 
After WWII, the field of religious studies saw dramatic growth in the U.S., with 
increased demand for world religion courses, “a result of widespread cultural approval 
of religion as an essential component of American democracy.”132 Amanda Porterfield 
argues that the discourse of religious pluralism was shaped in Protestant academic 
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institutions, from which it emerged “to operate as a dynamic factor in the growth of 
religious studies” and eventually came to occupy a place in the study of American 
religious history, both as a subject of inquiry and an interpretive framework.133 The 
American field of religious studies emerged out of Protestant seminaries and their 
focus on scripture and theology. While scholars in religious studies have worked to 
distinguish their method and focus from those of theology, remnants of the Protestant 
theological roots of the discipline linger. Porterfield argues that the concept of 
religious pluralism in religious studies was has been shaped by liberal Protestant ideals 
of ecumenism and interfaith cooperation as well as the influence of scholars such as 
Mircea Eliade and Paul Tillich, who “promoted variants of a romantic approach to 
religion that appealed to universal structures of human consciousness, and to a 
universal human quest for meaning at work in all the different cultures and religious 
traditions of the world.”134  
Pluralism also has resonance with Christian theological studies, though usually 
identified as pluralist theology or theology of religions. Made popular by theologians 
and scholars such as John Hick and Paul Knitter, pluralist theology aims to affirm the 
validity of all religious traditions including those outside of Christianity and the value 
of religious diversity. It involves an epistemological and theological perspective toward 
“other” religions regarding their claims to truth and ultimate reality, often as part of a 
typology of theological approaches to other religions contrasted with Christian 
exclusivism, the view that Christianity is singularly true, as well as Christian 
inclusivism, the view that Christian truth is available to non-Christian religions. Many 
scholars of religious studies claim that pluralist theology is outside the scope of 
concern of the category of pluralism as it is deployed in religious studies. However, 
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essentialist notions of religion informed by Protestant norms suggest an enduring 
legacy, a point argued by McCutcheon, Fitzgerald, and Masuzawa.135  
3.3.2 The turn to pluralism: American religious history and the sociology of religion 
In the second half of the last century, historians of American religions turned 
their focus to pluralism and, Porterfield argues, “came to define religious pluralism 
with increasing clarity in the process of grappling with the problem of comprehending 
growing religious diversity in the United States.”136 For many years, the study of U.S. 
religion hardly extended beyond the study of mainline Protestantism. Beginning in the 
1960s and 1970s, the historiography of religion in America began to shift. It had 
previously been viewed as either a subfield of Church History or subfield of U.S. 
History that focused primarily on Protestantism and its role in the public sphere. 
Sydney Alhstrom’s A Religious History of the American People, published in 1972, gave 
more attention to a wider diversity of religions than any scholar before. By the 1980s, 
“Religion in North America,” or “American Religious History,” was recognized as a 
distinct field, or subfield, largely due to the work of scholars such as Catherine 
Albanese and Thomas Tweed, who advocated for multiple narratives and telling all the 
stories of religion in America, not just the Protestant stories. Tweed argues that during 
that same time, an “ethnographic turn” led many scholars to focus on participant 
observation and religious practice. Along with this new approach to “lived religions,” 
many scholars worked to illuminate the breadth of America’s religious diversity, which 
had previously received little attention in the academic study of religion.137   
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During this time period, in the sociology of religion, pluralism was primarily 
understood within the context of the grand narrative of secularization theory, often 
taken for granted as the defining narrative about religion in North America. Early 
sociologists of religion Max Weber and Emile Durkheim both linked the increasing 
social differentiation of modernization with secularization. Peter Berger’s 1967 book 
The Sacred Canopy made the move to link pluralism with secularization and the 
declining significance of religion in modern society. According to Berger, once a 
singular religion no longer provided the sole source of legitimacy and authority for all 
aspects of society, i.e., “the sacred canopy,” religion became a matter of personal 
choice. Subsequently, religions began to compete for individuals’ preferences, thus 
creating a social climate in which multiple religions could exist side by side, a climate 
of pluralism.138 However, some twenty years later, sociologists began to highlight the 
seeming persistence of religion and question the accuracy of secularization theory, 
particularly the claim that modernity has led to the declining social significance of 
religion. Thus, sociologists addressing diversity in the past fifty years tend to frame 
pluralism as either an indication of religion’s waning social authority or a sign of its 
enduring importance.139 
 Accordingly, studies of American religion invariably connect it with religious 
pluralism, constructing and reproducing the dominant, liberal discourse of religious 
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pluralism. They define and describe what pluralism entails, or ought to entail. They 
situate pluralism within an American narrative, naturalizing pluralism as a standard 
category through which to describe and understand religious diversity. Moreover, their 
framing and description of religious diversity has influenced broader public discourse 
on religious pluralism and managing religious diversity.  
3.3.3 Two Approaches to Pluralism 
Here I want to look at two major approaches to American religious pluralism—
pluralism as multiplicity and pluralism as a tension between diversity and unity— in 
order to discern some common rhetorical features of the discourse of religious 
pluralism, as well as their regulatory effects. 
1. Pluralism as Multiplicity 
Lippy 
In the 2000 text Pluralism Comes of Age, Charles H. Lippy, a historian of 
American religions, examines expanding religious diversity in the U.S. through the 
category or lens of religious pluralism. While Lippy gives a broad historical overview, 
he focuses on the twentieth century, a time in which American religious culture is 
“more diverse and considerably more complex than it was at the dawn of the century—
and all the richer as a result.”140 Lippy never precisely defines pluralism nor his other 
key term, religion. Rather, he makes a number of descriptive statements about 
pluralism from which the reader might surmise something of a working definition. 
Generally, Lippy uses the term pluralism in a descriptive manner to correspond with 
plurality or multiplicity. Yet, he states that he aims to present more than “a portrait of 
increasing diversity;” rather he aims to “show that the shifts in the century when taken 
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together are more than that.”141 For Lippy, pluralism is “a lens through which to view” 
American religious patterns.142 He asserts that pluralism is the context in which 
American religious movements and trends can be understood. Lippy continually 
alludes to the substance of pluralism, but never precisely elaborates it. Rather, he 
makes numerous vague, ambiguous references to pluralism as “so much more” than 
diversity, or a story that is “more finely nuanced.”143 These references are value laden, 
implying that pluralism benefits the social order by being “richer” and “more” than 
simple demographic diversity.  
Lippy takes a teleological view of American religious history as a progressive 
trajectory of increasing diversity and pluralism, and he narrates the successive 
expansion of pluralism through U.S. history. He describes religion in America as 
innovative and novel. He identifies denominationalism as a noteworthy and distinctive 
American “contribution to the story of religion in human culture.”144 
Denominationalism led to pluralism, which eventually expanded beyond the 
denomination. What begins as diversity among Protestant denominations eventually 
grows to a diversity of many different religions. At the same time, Lippy identifies 
many different coexisting layers and locations of pluralism: within Protestantism, as 
power shifts away from mainline Protestants to emerging evangelical denominations 
and new forms of worship; within Catholicism, as changing immigration demographics 
lead to ethnic pluralism; within Christianity, as the ecumenical movement arises, and 
within society as a whole, as Catholicism and Judaism join Protestantism as the “three-
pronged pluralism” of public religion in America. Notably, Lippy gives scant attention 
to Islam, Baha’i, several new religious movements, as well as Buddhism and Hinduism 
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(included under the troubling heading of “The Lure of the Orient,” which is not 
followed by a critique of Orientalism). They are subsumed under a chapter titled, “The 
Proliferation of Pluralism,” and seemingly included primarily to highlight the great 
multiplicity and diversity of the American religious landscape.145  
 For Lippy, pluralism entails plurality, what Albanese calls “manyness,” but Lippy 
does not emphasize a tension with unity or oneness as Albanese does. Rather, Lippy 
sees an ever-increasing manyness, which he attributes to an increasing emphasis on 
personal experience and belief, individualism, and privatization. Lippy argues that 
pluralism has “come of age,” i.e., progressed to such a point that religious communities 
that once may have felt the need to identify themselves against a presumed Protestant 
majority no longer have to do so and instead “simply assumed the right to stake out a 
place for themselves on the religious landscape of the nation.”146 As he moves to his 
conclusion, he argues again for a pluralism that is greater than the sum of its parts, 
“about far more than numbers… It is also about the myriad ways individuals construct 
a world of meaning through which they understand and interpret their own human 
experience.”147 He ends his text with a claim that promotes pluralism as a positive 
value.  
On balance, it may well be that the greatest contribution made by the United 
States to global religious life is its demonstrating that, however vast the 
pluralism, a vital religious culture can flourish. Pluralism does not undermine 
common life, but seems to enrich it.148  
 
How then does Lippy demonstrate that common life has been enriched? For Lippy, it 
would seem to be by the existence of pluralism. Thus, pluralism enriches common life 
by making it pluralistic. According to this tautology, pluralism—diversity or plurality—
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is good. Moreover, this claim makes a subtle nod to American exceptionalism, a view 
that this progressive unfolding of American history has led to the country’s distinctive 
position in the world. Lippy proclaims that pluralism makes America great and 
positions pluralism as a quintessentially American value. 
Berger, Stark and Finke 
Sociologists Rodney Stark and Roger Finke also view pluralism as multiplicity. 
Their framing of pluralism is best understood as a response to secularization theory, 
thus I briefly want to describe the role of pluralism in classical secularization theory. 
Sociologist Peter Berger defines secularization as a social process that involves the 
lessening significance of religion. His sacred canopy metaphor refers to the canopy of 
legitimation that religion once provided to social arrangements that were socially 
constructed but imagined to be natural or God-given; to step outside this canopy was 
tantamount to stepping outside the social order and into chaos. Religions were once 
powerful mechanisms of world construction and world maintenance. However, with 
modern social differentiation, religion became a matter of personal choice. The social 
importance of religion declined and religion no longer provided this sacred canopy. 
Religion lost its plausibility structure. 
Berger makes an argument for the relationship between secularization and 
pluralism, that secularization — and the problem of plausibility— create the conditions 
for pluralism. He describes a failure of legitimation where “the fundamental problem 
of the religious institutions is how to keep going in a milieu that no longer takes for 
granted their definitions of reality.”149 For Berger, pluralism means a plurality of 
legitimate religions. It refers to cases “in which different religious groups are tolerated 
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by the state and engage in free competition with each other.”150 Pluralism involves “an 
increasingly friendly collaboration between the different groups engaged in the 
religious market.”151 It is largely the result of the demonopolization of religion and 
individualization. The demonopolization of religion, as the church no longer provided 
the sole authority for all aspects of society, naturally paved the way for religious 
pluralism. It created an environment in which multiple religious traditions could exist 
side by side. As religion became a matter of personal choice rather than authoritative 
imposition, religions began to market themselves to individuals. Thus pluralism was 
part of a market situation. Berger argued that pluralism was a sign of secularization 
and the gradual decline of religion.  
Yet the persistence of religion in the public sphere, especially in the U.S., points 
to flaws or even failures in classical secularization theory. In the last twenty years, 
Courtney Bender argues, many current sociological accounts of religious pluralism 
have been formed in response to the failure of the decline of religion thesis as part of 
secularization theory. Strongly critical of secularization theory, Stark and Finke have 
made a converse argument for the relationship between pluralism and the influence of 
religion in society. They argue from “rational choice theory” that “within the limits of 
their information and understanding, restricted by available options, guided by their 
preferences and tastes, humans attempt to make rational choices” and that this 
principle of human rationality should be applied to attempts to understand religious 
decisions and choices.152 They explain pluralism using a “supply-side” theory of 
religious economies, arguing that to the degree that religious economies are 
“unregulated,” that is, no religious monopoly is enforced by the state, they are more 
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vibrant. They claim that increased diversity and competition leads to increased 
religious participation.  
Stark and Finke agree with the proponents of secularization theory that there is 
evidence of decline among mainline Protestant denominations in the U.S. and Europe. 
However, they interpret this decline not as evidence of the decline of religion per se 
but of religious institutions that are no longer competitive and not adapting to meet 
market demands. For all the denominations in decline, there are other religious 
organizations and institutions growing in number and influence. As they argue, “effort 
pays—that to the extent that organizations work harder, they are more successful.”153 
They sum up their conclusions explaining that “societies with ‘universal’ religions 
aren’t very religious when it comes to organized participation” and “only in 
unregulated religious economies with a multitude of competing religious firms will 
there be high levels of commitment.”154 Thus, the more pluralistic a society is the more 
religion will thrive. Stark and Finke assume that religions in the U.S. operate freely. 
They argue  
government interference in the affairs of religious organizations is relatively 
rare… Of course some religious groups are considered deviant by most 
Americans. And of course groups constantly attack one another’s legitimacy. 
But the range of conventionality is far, far wider than in nations with regulated 
religious economies and state churches. And the range of legality is wider still.155 
 
Their view of American civil society as unregulated ignores the regulatory nature of 
liberalism and the ways in which liberal societies insist on universal conformity within 
liberal norms. Along these lines, Courtney Bender points out that the rational choice or 
free market model of religious pluralism depends primarily on data compiled from 
varieties of Christian groups. “The models take a conception of religious belonging 
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(voluntary membership in a congregation that the believer himself or herself chooses) 
as the norm into which other forms of membership are adapted or translated in order 
for analysis to proceed.”156 Thus, this model of religious pluralism works to legitimate 
and reproduce liberal norms. 
Bender argues that Stark and Finke’s market model of religious vitality shares 
secularization theory’s view of religion as differentiated and private. She writes that it 
“agrees that ‘religion’ in modern society is self-evidently identifiable and, through 
processes of differentiation, increasingly disentangled from state control and state 
regulation.”157 These studies of American religious diversity “share a deep sedimented 
and taken-for-granted conception of the social conditions that generate pluralism.”158 
They assume that pluralism takes place within “a free and unregulated civil sphere, or 
civil society.” Rather, Bender explains, religious diversity is not stable, nor is its 
“political value.”159 As such, studies of religious pluralism would do well to address 
“the sociological question of how ‘religion’ is socially constructed (and shaped and 
regulated) within an American secular society that is committed to certain kinds of 
governance and citizen or how ‘pluralism’ that takes shape within it relates to these 
forms.”160 
2. Pluralism as a Tension between Plurality and Unity   
Other texts on American religious diversity frame pluralism as an ongoing 
process that involves negotiating tensions between plurality and unity, difference and 
common ground, manyness and oneness. 
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Albanese 
Catherine Albanese’s groundbreaking book America: Religions and Religion, an 
overview of religion in America, represented a new approach to interpreting religious 
diversity when it was published in 1981, and it continues to occupy a pivotal place in 
the historiography of U.S. religions.161 Frequently used as a textbook, the fifth edition 
book description claims it has “become the standard introduction to the study of 
American religious traditions” as it introduces students to “the rich religious diversity 
that has always been a hallmark of the American religious experience.” Albanese, a 
historian of American religions influenced by the study of comparative religions and 
the ‘history of religions’ perspective gained through her studies at the University of 
Chicago, acknowledges a condition of pluralism in the U.S. previously given too little 
attention. Critiquing convention in American religious historiography, she argues: 
To be a pluralistic land means to be one country made up of many peoples and 
many religious faiths. Yet when we look at America’s history books—and more 
to the point here, America’s religious history books—we find that they generally 
tell one major story, incorporating the separate stories of many peoples into a 
single story line arranged chronologically.162 
 
She sets out to remedy this shortcoming by paying attention to plurality, telling many 
stories and then, searching for “the tentative oneness amidst the manyness of the 
United States.”163 She takes an approach to the study of religion that stresses “contact 
and combination.”164 
Albanese gives significant attention to the plurality of religious forms and 
practices throughout U.S. history. She initially shies away from a precise definition of 
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religion, calling it elusive and instead aims to describe religion. In line with her contact 
approach, she emphasizes the ways in which religions have arisen “in the context of 
dealing with boundaries”— territorial, temporal, corporeal, and social.165 She also 
distinguishes between two types of religion: ordinary, or immanent, and extraordinary, 
or transcendent. She nevertheless ends up with a working definition of religion, “a 
system of symbols (creed, code, cultus) by means of which people (a community) orient 
themselves in the world with reference to both ordinary and extraordinary powers, 
meanings, and values.”166 
In her narrative of American religious history, Albanese looks for what is 
distinctly American in this history and she gives pluralism a central role. Among the 
noteworthy features of this text, Albanese deemphasizes the Anglo-European 
Protestant influence on American religious history and gives significant attention to 
the religious forms, practices, and histories of Native Americans and those of Spanish, 
French, and African origin. She also attends to regional religion, looking at the role of 
space and terroir in the unfolding of communities and traditions. While she claims to 
eschew grand narratives in favor of multiple stories, she simultaneously constructs a 
comprehensive narrative of American religion, structured around tensions between the 
“manyness of religions” and the “oneness of religion” in the U.S., thus the subtitle 
“religions and religion.”   
For Albanese, the one religion represents an impulse for social cohesion or 
religious unity in American society. It exists as an unofficial Protestant establishment. 
Historically the majority religion in American society, Protestantism has long 
permeated American culture. As Albanese argues, foundational principles of American 
governance, such as church-state separation, protections for religious freedom and 
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democratic equality, are imbued with Protestant norms and have favored religious 
communities organized denominationally.167  
Albanese equates the manyness of religions with religious pluralism.168 She 
positions pluralism as essential to the American narrative, “from the first, a central 
feature of American history.”169 Her use of the term pluralism tends toward the 
descriptive, synonymous with plurality. She does not explicitly establish it as a norm of 
positive engagement among diverse religions. She describes its position in the 
American context as one of dialectic tension with the oneness of religion, or religious 
unity. Through pluralism, many religions each try to maintain their separate identities, 
while simultaneously, the one religion tries to bring them together to establish unity 
and “dissolve the differences in American life.”170 
 Albanese discusses the tensions involved in this dialectic relationship between 
the manyness and oneness, pluralism and unity. Historically the one religion occupied 
a dominant position in American society, which subsequently resulted in negative 
responses toward pluralism and discrimination and conflict for non-Protestant 
religions. These many religions either resisted the coercive tendencies of the dominant 
culture by maintaining separate identities or acquiesced and opted “to ‘Americanize’ 
by becoming more like mainstream Protestants.”171 In fact, most communities did a bit 
of both. Finally, Albanese describes this condition of dialectic tension as a defining 
feature of American religious history, as well as the nation itself. She calls the U.S. 
“among the most pluralistic religious and social experiment in history.”172 She goes on 
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to emphasize the significance of American religious pluralism, especially in its dialectic 
tension: 
But it is also a significant ordinary and extraordinary achievement, an 
achievement that suggests a potential to be tapped and a basic fund of regard 
and respect to be counted. Still more, the tension between the one and the many 
is not simply a burdensome condition with which American religious history has 
been saddled and with which it has dealt in a successful way. Rather, the 
tension created by point and counterpoint is an asset.173 
 
While Albanese infuses the conclusion of her text with sentiments of American 
exceptionalism, celebrating a pluralism laden with normativity, she also ends with 
some ambivalence. The new American religious experiment, the tension between the 
one and the many, is encumbered by a lingering millennialism derived from an older 
European idealism. For Albanese, this millennialism prevents Americans from fully 
confronting present-day challenges and building truly cohesive community, though 
perhaps there is still potential to be actualized. She concludes that “a completely 
American religion has not yet come to be. People in the New World are still learning to 
do something really new.”174 
Hutchison 
In Religious Pluralism in America: The Contentious History of a Founding Ideal 
(2003), American religious historian William Hutchison aims to trace the development 
of religious pluralism through U.S. history. Whereas Albanese narrates religious 
diversity through American religious history and frequently uses pluralism as a 
descriptive category for this plurality, Hutchison’s text recognizes pluralism as a 
normative and ideological construct and offers a history of this category. Calling 
pluralism “a work in progress,” Hutchison directs his focus toward the power 
dynamics involved in religious diversity in the U.S. and the subsequent tensions 
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engendered by this diversity. He centers his attention on the Protestant establishment 
and the slow, often tense and conflicting, unfolding of pluralism, which he defines as 
“the acceptance and encouragement of diversity.” Like Lippy, Hutchison also takes a 
teleological view of American religious history and narrates the progressive unfolding 
of pluralism in the U.S. as a positive development. He outlines three major stages.  
In the first stage, pluralism entails simply tolerance or toleration. The second 
stage of pluralism expands to advocate for inclusivity. Both these stages assume the 
normative position of a Protestant establishment to which minority groups must 
assimilate or adapt. The third and current stage of pluralism in American society 
involves participatory pluralism. As Hutchison argues, “pluralism as participation 
implied a mandate for individuals and groups (including, quite importantly, ethnic and 
racial groups) to share responsibility for the forming and implementing of the society’s 
agenda.”175 This state of pluralism, in contrast to the two previous stages, “stands for 
equal participation” and, as such, requires the accommodation of difference.176 
Hutchison’s main thesis in his narrative is that pluralism has not been a great 
American success story. Accounts of the acceptance and embrace of religious diversity 
are partly true, but largely exaggerated. Notably, he positions pluralism as a normative 
project, as an agenda. Pluralism is an ideology with an objective.177    
Hutchison describes a “myth of pluralist success” long embedded in the 
American narrative.178 From the beginning, the British North American colonies, and 
then the young nation, were known for their remarkable religious and cultural 
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diversity, as well as their new social experiment in religious freedom. Yet there were 
inconsistencies between perceptions and reality. For all this new diversification and the 
institutional moves meant to protect it, there was still growing bigotry and social 
intolerance, a point Hutchison emphasizes. Moreover, this initial diversity was not 
really so diverse. Most, over 95 percent, represented some variety of European 
Protestantism.179 Then in the early to mid nineteenth century, demographics began to 
more radically shift away from the largely Anglo, Protestant, and Calvinist majority to 
include Irish, Germans, Catholics, Lutherans, Chinese, and Hispanics. Hutchison 
describes nineteenth century attitudes towards religious diversity as fraught with a 
certain ambivalence, characterized by tensions between the celebration of “a 
remarkable onward march of religious freedom” and concerns for social stability.180 
Essentially, a wide range of beliefs was tolerated so long as they were kept mostly 
private and did not translate into a wide range of behaviors. Thus, what counted as 
pluralism during this time was the toleration of theological difference, but this was 
predicated on the control of these differences through assimilation into the liberal 
norms of the larger society. It was acceptable to think differently so long as one 
generally behaved like everyone else. As an example, Mormons found more social 
acceptance and a decrease in discrimination against them once they gave up the 
widespread practice of plural marriage, or polygamy. 
Hutchison identifies a move toward participatory pluralism with the rise of 
identity politics in the 1960s. Calls for “genuine recognition of group identity” shaped 
the new pluralism with claims “that inclusion in itself is not enough” and that those 
who were once outsiders should be given “not just a place at the table but a right to 
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speak and be heard, and a right to help formulate the agenda.”181 Yet Hutchison offers 
no rosy picture of advances in non-assimiltative pluralism, as he points out that even 
up to the present, there remains ambivalence and concern “about the divisive potential 
in a new pluralism that seemed to leave little room for the forms of moral consensus 
that hold a society together.”182 He acknowledges that Americans are faced with a 
“difficult and confused” struggle to negotiate the tensions between unity and 
pluralism. He describes the two sides of this tension as on one side, “acceptance of 
pluralism itself as the only remaining common value for the society at large and at the 
other, a return to the kind of unitive ideal that, even in expanded form, would 
repristinate and reimpose the common values of an older Protestant America.”183 He 
advocates for a median position: “that we should accept pluralism as a primary value, 
but that we must also deal seriously and studiously with pleas concerning social and 
moral cohesion” or a “new symbiosis between pluralism and unity without returning to 
the traditional melting pot formula.”184  
For Hutchison, abandoning pluralism is not an option; commitments to 
pluralism as tolerance and as inclusivity are already woven into fabric of American 
society. Moreover, Hutchison argues that this participatory pluralism is a core value of 
liberal democracy, writing:  
If pluralism has seemed inadequate as a unifying ideal, that may be because our 
civic and religious rhetoric has proclaimed it so inadequately-- so thinly and 
defensively-- when the pluralist ideal has been proclaimed at all... it deserves a 
more positive kind of advocacy, both as a leading element in democratic 
ideology and as an allowable, perhaps a necessary, element in theistic religion185  
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The new pluralism is a work in progress. Hutchison describes it as an ongoing project 
of multiculturalism and recognition, in which dominant groups must come to realize 
that if they want respect for their own commitments, then “they will have to respect 
those of others.”186 Yet, he does not attend to what respect for others actually entails, 
or how it manifests itself in practice and policy. Hutchison leaves his reader with less 
confidence in the promise of pluralism and more of a resigned commitment to the 
project of pluralism that must be pursued because there is “no turning back.” 
Eck 
Diana Eck’s A New Religious America: How a ‘Christian Country’ Has Become the 
World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation, published in 2001 by popular press Harper 
SanFrancisco, stands in distinction as a text of American religious history grounded in 
academic scholarship, but aimed at a broad, general audience, rather than scholars. 
Eck, a scholar of comparative and Indian religions at Harvard University, has 
significantly shaped the discourse of religious pluralism through this text as well as 
through the work of her research organization, the Pluralism Project. As indicative of 
her influence beyond the academy, Eck received a National Humanities Medal from 
President Bill Clinton in 1998. 
A New Religious America includes a historical overview of American religious 
diversity, with emphasis on the growth and transformations of Hinduism, Islam, and 
Buddhism in the U.S. As she describes these communities, representative of the new 
pluralism and new immigration, she weaves history with personal ethnographic 
anecdotes. She emphasizes the ways in which these communities have adapted to 
American society, while retaining what makes them distinct. She looks at the 
development of a distinctly American form of these three religions. The crux of the 
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book, however, is the common ground of religious pluralism, which she champions 
through affective and emotive language. 
Eck recognizes that the U.S. religious landscape has always been characterized 
by diversity and pluralism, but she argues that this landscape has “changed radically” 
since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, leading to a “new immigration” and 
subsequent “new pluralism.”187 Eck describes the “new immigration” as shaped not only 
by new demographics but also by phenomena such as transnationalism and 
globalization; thus “as our own identities become increasingly multilocal, the 
formation of complex national identities becomes increasingly challenging.”188 
For Eck, this diversity poses a potential social problem if not understood in the 
proper context and perspective. Whereas Albanese describes pluralism in terms of a 
dialectic between the one and the many, Eck frames pluralism as both a challenge and 
a solution. She assumes that religious differences are often inherently and naturally 
sites of conflict and hostility. She writes: “For many Americans, however, religious 
pluralism is not a vision that brings us together but one that tears us apart. The 
controversies of the public square are just beginning.”189 Thus, she sets out to address 
and remedy the problem of religious diversity through developing the notion of 
pluralism. 
Pluralism involves a relationship between and among religions, but Eck does not 
precisely define religion. Instead, she describes it as “dynamic not static, changing not 
fixed” and “never a finished product, packaged, delivered, and passed intact from 
generation to generation.”190 At the same time, Eck sees religion as a fundamental and 
enduring aspect of human experience. For Eck, pluralism is not merely a descriptive 
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term denoting plurality or diversity. She is clear that “diversity alone does not 
constitute pluralism” but rather pluralism entails “whether we are able to work 
together across the line of religious difference to create a society in which we actually 
know one another.”191 She positions pluralism as an approach to diversity found 
through U.S. history, along with exclusion and assimilation. Eck contrasts 
assimilationists, who urged immigrants to “come, but leave your differences behind as 
quickly as possible. In other words, come and be like us” with pluralists, for whom “the 
American promise was to come as you are, with all your differences, pledged only to 
the common civic demands of citizenship. In other words, come and be yourselves.”192 
Eck defines pluralism as “the dynamic process through which we engage with 
one another in and through our very deepest differences.”193 She explains that this 
process involves “active engagement with that plurality,” “requires participation, and 
attunement to the life and energies of one another,” and “goes beyond mere tolerance 
to the active attempt to understand the other.” She responds to a perceived criticism of 
pluralism as entailing cultural relativism or “anything goes” as she explains that it “is 
not simply relativism… It is, rather, the encounter of commitments.”194 
A New Religious America situates this prescriptive conception of pluralism as 
engagement and process within a liberal democratic framework, arguing that 
cultivating pluralism is central to establishing social cohesion and the American 
common good. Eck argues that this new, intense religious diversity that now 
characterizes American society has the potential to either create conflict and tension 
or harmony and cooperation. As she states, “Creating the unum from the pluribus is 
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now more challenging than ever.”195 She argues that in the near aftermath of 9/11, 
America sits at a crossroads faced with the question: “Will all these differences of race, 
culture, ethnicity, and religion fracture our communities, or will they lead us toward 
the common purpose of an informed, energetic, and even joyous pluralism?”196 Of 
course, Eck endorses the latter. She references Horace Kallen, who brought the term 
pluralism into contemporary prominence with his work on “cultural pluralism,” and 
borrows his musical metaphor for illustrating the relationship of diversity to American 
society: “Our challenge today is whether it will be jazz or simply noise, whether it will 
be a symphony or cacophony, whether we can continue to play together through 
dissonant moments.”197 
Eck grounds her advocacy for pluralism within the fabric of American civic 
values and governance, i.e. the leitmotif of e pluribus unum, religious freedom, and the 
narrative of founding fathers who “intentionally founded a nation in which no form of 
religious belief would be privileged in the public sphere.”198 She describes America as 
an idea and “the motto of the republic, E Pluribus Unum, ‘From Many One,’ is not an 
accomplished fact but an ideal that Americans must continue to claim.”199 She argues 
that religious freedom leads to religious diversity and, as such, a positive affirmation 
of religious diversity—pluralism—is tantamount to upholding principles of religious 
freedom, which she emphasizes are “so basic to the very idea of the image of 
America.”200 Thus, the new pluralism, new immigration, and new demographics require 
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principles of religious freedom to be articulated in a new way, essentially a way that 
affirms pluralism.201  
 Eck argues that America’s religious diversity ought to be embraced and 
celebrated “to create a truly pluralist American society in which this great diversity is 
not simply tolerated but becomes the very source of our strength.”202 How does 
diversity become a source of strength? Essentially, when it is managed by pluralism. 
This entails creating pluralist citizens, who positively affirm diversity and difference in 
the service of liberal democracy and the common good. Eck argues that it is common 
liberal democratic citizenship that provides the common ground from which difference 
can be engaged.203  
She argues that the engagement of difference must be negotiated through 
education.  “We will all need to know more than we do about one another and to listen 
for the new ways in which new Americans articulate the ‘we’ and contribute to the 
sound and spirit of America.”204 We must learn about each other and attempt to 
understand one another in order to cultivate respect and appreciation. When Eck looks 
at incidences of religious conflict and discrimination, she largely chocks them up to 
ignorance and lack of knowledge, which she argues can be resolved through a kind of 
engaged education. She writes: 
Time and again, stories that begin with incidents of hatred or conflict evolve in 
time into stories of new neighbors who have, in the course of their conflict, 
learned much more about one another… Strangers, in time, become neighbors. 
And neighbors, even those who differ from us, become allies in creating our 
common society.205 
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She calls this pluralist engagement “bridge building,” a means of negotiating religious 
difference that “builds upon our differences rather than ignores them.”206  
3.3.4 Pluralism as the Promise of American Liberal Democracy 
Of course, these texts are not exhaustive representations of the discourse of 
religious pluralism. Other scholars of religion write in support of religious pluralism as 
an essential civic norm. Sociologist Wade Clark Roof asserts that, “religious pluralism 
must be understood in its broadest sense-- as a normative system that is socially 
created and maintained. Such a normative system does not arise without human effort: 
it must be envisioned, cultivated, shared, and practiced.”207 Historian Martin Marty 
echoes this idea as he explains that “Careful listening to scholars and public figures 
who devote themselves to the subject would reveal that ‘pluralism’ implies and 
involves a polity, a civic context which provides some ‘rules of the game,’ refers to an 
ethos, and evokes response.”208  
Similar to positions shared by Eck and Hutchison, Marty and Roof highlight a 
relationship between pluralism and the good of American civil society, linking 
pluralism to the norms and values of liberal democracy. In an essay in which he aims 
to describe “pluralisms,” Marty acknowledges concerns that too much plurality could 
threaten the common good and counters them by stating: “Among the issues posed in 
the face of religious pluralism is one that has civil consequences... also an urgent 
question: With how little pluralism can a polity exist and prosper without harming 
every one--including those who seek hegemony or monopoly-- within it?”209 Wade Clark 
Roof argues that America occupies a critical time, in which its national identity must 
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be rethought in light of increased religious and cultural diversity. He asks an implicitly 
prescriptive question: “Can Americans embrace a more widespread religious pluralism, 
one that communicates a genuine acceptance of an ever-expanding diversity of belief 
and practice? And religiously, can we as Americans rethink our identity and view 
ourselves as a ‘multireligious nation’ and not simply as Christian or Judeo-
Christian?”210  
Roof and Marty, along with Albanese, Starke and Fink, Lippy, Hutchison, and 
Eck, all assert the conception that American religious pluralism is the result of 
religious freedom and the actualization of liberal democratic ideals. They seem to 
assume that, as a consequence of distinct American values and commitments, 
embodied in American governance and especially the First Amendment, religions in 
America operate freely. Accordingly, the more diligently American ideals are upheld 
and actualized, the more diversity there will be, and if properly managed, the more 
pluralistic American society will be. Pluralism is a product and a source of democracy. 
It arises from American liberal values of individualism, rationalism, equality, and 
tolerance. Some, such as Eck and Hutchison, argue that diversity and pluralism are not 
synonymous, that pluralism requires an active, positive engagement with diversity. 
Thus, while religious freedom might result in greater religious diversity, it is pluralism 
that truly allows this partnership of freedom and diversity to flourish, which then 
results in the flourishing of American liberal democracy. 
While I have highlighted a network of discursive practices constructed through 
academic texts, the discourse of religious pluralism is not isolated to the academy. 
These sentiments of pluralism are also found in the texts and talk of civic 
organizations and government initiatives, for which the salience of the discourse of 
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pluralism is instructive for addressing religious difference, protecting religious 
freedom and fostering a public culture of religious tolerance. Examples of civic 
organizations and government initiatives on the local level include the Interfaith Youth 
Core, a non-profit organization in Chicago that organizes service projects for high 
school and university students from diverse religious backgrounds. Its mission 
statement proclaims building religious pluralism as a “bridge of cooperation,” 
“creating positive, meaningful relationships across differences, and fostering 
appreciative knowledge of other traditions.211 Moreover, illustrative of the relationship 
between the academy and public sphere, its founder and executive director Eboo Patel, 
who holds a PhD in the sociology of religion, teaches courses on interfaith cooperation 
at local seminaries and universities and publishes articles on the method and rationale 
of this work in academic journals.212 
On the national level, the President’s Interfaith and Community Service 
Challenge is a government initiative sponsored by the White House and the 
Department of Education that emphasizes “interfaith cooperation and community 
service – ‘interfaith service’ for short – as an important way to build understanding 
between different communities and contribute to the common good.”213 The Interfaith 
Youth Corps is one of many partners in this project. The initiative is part of the White 
House’s Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, a project aimed to 
encourage community service. On its website, a statement by President Barack Obama 
explains, that the office does not “favor one religious group over another – or even 
religious groups over secular groups,” that its goal is to “work on behalf of those 
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organizations that want to work on behalf of our communities, and to do so without 
blurring the line that our founders wisely drew between church and state.”214 It offers a 
forum through which religious organizations and institutions may come together in 
service to liberal governance and it is informed by the ideology of religious pluralism, 
as it simultaneously promotes these ideals. As I argue, the discourse of religious 
pluralism— characterized by its positive view of religious plurality as a form of 
common good, frequently represented as an extension of the promise of American 
liberal democracy— has become a normative mode by which to address religious 
diversity, religious freedom, and social harmony in the public sphere.  
3.4 The Critique of the Discourse of Pluralism 
Thus, the normative model of religious pluralism, prevalent throughout public 
discourse on religion and civil society as well as the discipline of religious studies, 
advocates for an appreciation of religion and positive engagement of religious 
difference as a remedy to social and religious tensions and as a means for promoting 
social cohesion. As Amanda Porterfield explains, the discourse of religious pluralism 
attributes to religion a positive role in society as it implies “that religion is common 
ground in a shared democratic culture” and “presumes that different traditions are 
intrinsically compatible; indeed, they are resources to be drawn upon for national unity 
and strength.”215 It also assumes that religion is a universal human experience and a 
sufficient category by which to compare that experience. In other words, religious 
pluralism is better than both religious uniformity and shared irreligion. 
As the discourse of religious pluralism has developed over the past half century, 
many scholars now question the assumptions, practices, and politics underlying its 
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normativity. How is it that religious difference has been construed as a problem that 
religious pluralism is set to solve? Moreover, how does religious pluralism, with its 
ostensible objectives of engaging and understanding religious difference, actually 
involve a process of imagining and ordering those differences? While religious 
pluralism claims to celebrate and affirm difference, does it simultaneously promoting 
a hegemonic unity and engage in unseen sociopolitical work? These are a few of the 
questions that inform critiques of the discourse of pluralism. 
 Pamela Klassen and Courtney Bender point out in the introduction to After 
Pluralism that religious pluralism more accurately functions as a historically, 
politically, and theologically situated doctrine than a universal model. It operates as a 
set of tools, projects, and political claims. Along these lines, I have argued that 
religious pluralism is a formally non-political discourse that functions as a rhetorical 
practice of liberal governance, a mode of governmentality, as it works to orchestrate 
social cohesion—and manage religion— within a liberal framework. Now I want to take 
a closer look at this discourse to bring to the surface some of its discursive practices 
that are embedded with particular power dynamics, reproduce liberal norms and serve 
a regulatory function: 1) the process of defining religion and the delineation of 
difference; 2) the assertion that religious difference can be negotiated through 
education and dialogue; and 3) the equation of pluralist values with liberal American 
civic values. 
3.4.1 Essentializing Religion and Delineating Difference 
Religious pluralism seeks to describe the phenomenon of religion and a 
landscape of religious diversity. At the same time, it normatively positions its subject, 
religion, as both discrete and sui generis, which relies on a liberal, secularized 
definition of religion. In this sense, religion, as Winnifred Fallers Sullivan observes, 
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becomes defined as essentially private, individual, chosen, and belief- and text-based.216 
While pluralism celebrates the diversity of religions, it simultaneously subjugates them 
under the unified category of “religion.”217 In this way, the practice of describing 
religion coincides with the construction of religion. Yet, “religion” is frequently not 
explicitly defined. Instead its meaning is implied; since religion is putatively a universal 
aspect of human experience, we all know what “religion” is. 
Jonathan Z. Smith points out that “Religion is not a native term; it is a term 
created by scholars for their intellectual purposes and therefore is theirs to define.”218 
In a similar fashion, Russell McCutcheon and Timothy Fitzgerald argue that the 
scholarly process of defining the term is laden with veiled politics. Russell McCutcheon 
posits that the field of religious studies is dominated by a sui generis approach to 
religion, which positions religion as an autonomous, universal aspect of human 
experience and ignores its historically contextual and situated nature.219 It tends to 
privilege the authority of religious experience and insider accounts of religion in the 
study of religions, which McCutcheon finds problematic because they cannot be 
empirically verified or tested. It attributes an essence to religion that cannot be 
reduced to any other factor and refuses the possibility that religious phenomenon 
could be explained by nonreligious means. McCutcheon is concerned about definitions 
of religion centered on the notion of the sacred, which for him suggests a latent 
theological agenda, thus shifting the study of religion from a descriptive to a 
normative exercise.  
                                            
216 Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 8. 
217 Klassen and Bender, “Introduction: Habits of Pluralism.” 
218 Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. 
Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 269–84. 
219 McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of 
Nostalgia. 
 85 
Timothy Fitzgerald shares McCutcheon’s concern about an essentialist 
definition of religion that conceptualizes religion as a universal phenomenon, “a 
natural and/or a supernatural reality in the nature of things that all human individuals 
have a capacity for, regardless of their cultural context,” which is embedded with 
Protestant theological assumptions.220 Like McCutcheon, Fitzgerald argues that religion 
is not a cross-cultural category but a Western Eurocentric construct, part of “a wider 
historical process of western imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism” and 
involves “establishing the naturalness and ideological transparency of capitalist and 
individualist values.”221 He criticizes the nebulous nature of the study of religion, which 
“imposes on non-western institutions and values the nuance and form of western ones, 
especially such popular distinctions as those between religion and society, or between 
religion and the secular, or religion and politics, or religions and economics.”222 He 
critiques the comparative religions or world religions model that assumes any one 
religion “is an entity with an essence that can be described and listed with other such 
entities.”223 Thus for Fitzgerald and McCutcheon, the study of religion is compromised 
by use of an essentialist, sui generis definition of religion that functions to reproduce 
liberal Protestant assumptions and values. Daniel Dubuisson offers a similar critique, 
asking, “Is Western anthropology, religious anthropology in particular, in its quest for 
the Other and for our very humanity, capable of discovering anything but itself—that 
is, anything other than its own categories and its own ways of conceiving the world?”224 
While I want to highlight the limitations of the category of religion, I do not 
concur with Fitzgerald’s assertion that the category of religion is too limited for use or 
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that religious studies should be rethought as cultural studies (though I do agree that 
cultural studies offers insightful and effective disciplinary tools for the analysis of 
religion). Here I want to borrow concepts from Thomas Tweed’s theory of religion and 
point them toward the political. As Tweed notes, broad categories “are theoretical 
constructs that function as more or less useful interpretive tools. We should not be 
surprised that they fail to conform to the full range of historical or contemporary 
cases. And their effectiveness is not challenged when we find some instances that do 
not seem to ‘fit.’”225 By effectiveness, Tweed refers to how successfully these categories 
function within a particular framework or intellectual exercise. Rather, I understand 
the “effectiveness” of these categories as involving the work they do in constructing 
certain social and political realities. More precisely, I want to explore the ways in which 
the construction of the category of religion both represents and reproduces certain 
political and social power dynamics. The history of the construction of religion, 
embedded in colonial power dynamics, is not reason to abandon religion as a category. 
Moreover, to abandon this category would be to deny our own historicity, to suggest 
that somehow the endeavor of the study of religion could transcend historical 
limitations. We are ‘stuck’ with this category, as Tweed notes.226  
Rather than abandoning the category, I agree with those scholars of religion who 
argue that one must work in constant awareness that the way one defines religion is 
never neutral and that it always reproduces and constructs certain social relations and 
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realities. As Talal Asad argues, “there cannot be a universal definition of religion, not 
only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but 
because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes.”227 Thus, 
it is incumbent upon scholars of religion to illuminate the relationship between 
discursive practices and material realities.  
The dominant discourse of pluralism—both in its academic and broader social 
forms—privileges essentialist definitions of religion. Klassen and Bender assert that 
often pluralism defines religions “more coherently than historical or ethnographic 
accounts might warrant.”228 These normative definitions of religion may seem to serve 
some practical utility. They assume discrete and distinctive boundaries around 
religions, which facilitate the study of religion and the tasks of delineating these 
boundaries, identifying differences, and describing the landscape within them. For the 
purposes of pluralism, dialogue and engagement of religions are made much easier 
when religious communities, which represent religious traditions, are clearly 
demarcated. It is much more difficult to talk about how to study, teach about, or 
interact with religions when there is no consensus on the term “religion” or means of 
identifying religions. If the goal is finding common ground, as Eck argues, then points 
of comparison, which might contain commonality or overlap, appear to be necessary. 
Yet, the confines of the discrete, observable boundaries that pluralism requires 
of religions place significant limitations on pluralism as a framework for the study of 
religion, which may result in obscuring rather than illuminating its subject. Both 
Klassen and Bender describe how their ethnographic research of Canadian and 
American religious communities failed to fit into these neat models of well-defined 
religious traditions. Rather, they found far more instances of border-crossings, 
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borrowings, appropriations, and transformations. As they point out, the hegemony of 
religious pluralism often insists that hybridity and mixtures lack authenticity and 
legitimacy.229 Subsequently, those deemed aberrant become excluded from public 
discourse on what counts as “religious.” Moreover, these marginalized religious 
individuals and groups must also struggle with the ways in which “religion” gets 
defined and delineated by the processes of recognition that they must negotiate with 
legal structures and other secular institutions.  
Salient examples of negotiating these processes of recognition and 
representation can be found in Native American struggles for religious freedom. Tisa 
Wenger writes about a number of cases in which Native Americans have applied the 
non-native term “religion” to various aspects of their own traditions in order to gain 
legal protections. She points out that “religion” is not a static concept. Its boundaries 
are “always contested and changing” and in the U.S., “that designation is generally 
desirable because it affords constitutional protection.”230 She explains: 
The category of religion, as it continues to be understood in mainstream 
American culture, is a product of Euro-American (and primarily Protestant) 
historical development and leaves little space for the integrated, communal, and 
land-based qualities of indigenous traditions. To make the case for religious 
freedom, Indians have had to represent their traditions according to prevailing 
concepts of what counts as religion.231 
 
Wenger argues that the dominant notion of religion is embedded with liberal norms, 
“taken to imply separation from a ‘secular’ sphere and is understood as exclusively a 
matter of individual conscience.”232 As such, applying religion to Native American 
traditions and practices can result in misrepresentation and the transformation of 
these traditions in response to the pressures of liberal norms. Yet Wenger does not 
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argue for a return to a idealized past. These appropriated notions of religion and the 
sacred have become integrated into Native American cultures; they “have become 
indigenous ones, and Indians have actively reinterpreted them to fulfill indigenous 
needs.”233 Rather, Wenger’s analysis illuminates ways in which essentialist definitions 
of religion fail to account for the complex historical, social, and political dynamics in 
the production of religion in America. 
North American liberal democracies tend to recognize and accommodate some 
forms of religion—liberal forms—more readily than others. Moreover, the view of 
religions as distinct and separate is also a product of differentiation, which is deeply 
intertwined with secularization. Courtney Bender writes that 
in order for religions to be free, they must be differentiated, both from each 
other and, more importantly, from the elements of society that would regulate 
them and keep them from being free. In fact, we could argue that our current 
political and sociological uses of pluralism depend upon—and demand evidence 
of—religion’s differentiation from other parts of social life.”234  
 
A focus on religions as distinct and separate can easily overlook the forces of 
sociopolitical processes in constructing religious boundaries and differences. 
Pluralism functions as a set of tools or tactics for responding to, as well as 
ordering and disciplining, “other” or “different” religions. As it establishes norms, it 
also defines what constitutes acceptable deviance from those norms. As an example of 
this regulatory practice, Rosemary Hicks writes about her ethnographic research with 
the community related to the Park51 project, a proposed Islamic community center in 
lower Manhattan that generated considerable controversy. She explains that the 
religious leaders involved in this project, such as Imam Feisl Abdul Rauf, were 
motivated by a desire to promote pluralism and to increase Americans’ understanding 
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of Islam. As Hicks explains, this endeavor to participate in pluralist discourse “involved 
translating Islamic beliefs and practices in light of previous narrative templates and 
into terms recognizable within legal, political, and economic structures that had 
developed over time in changing relationship to certain varieties of Protestantism.”235 
Thus, in the pluralist framework, different traditions are welcomed in the public 
sphere once they have been reshaped in light of liberal norms. Subsequently, Hicks 
argues, the discourse of pluralism acts to both construct and discipline diversity, 
positioning the boundaries of what can be tolerated and how.236 The practices of 
pluralism are “as much about reifying difference and autonomy as about confusing or 
challenging such claims,” as Klassen and Bender make clear.237  
At the same time, the dominant discourse on pluralism positions itself as a 
universal model, and in doing so, it masks its historically and politically situated 
formation, its relationship to liberal discourse and its privileging of Protestant norms. 
All the while, it appoints certain beliefs and customs as civilized and respectable and 
others as primitive or harmful. Difference itself gets naturalized. Discursive practices 
function to construct “difference” as having an essential reality, rather than being the 
product of political processes and power dynamics. Wendy Brown argues that 
individuals believe they must tolerate difference without ever questioning the ways in 
which differences have been “socially and historically constituted and are themselves 
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the effect of power and hegemonic norms, or even of certain discourses about race, 
ethnicity, sexuality, and culture.”238  
By claiming that it advocates for inclusivity, acceptance, and tolerance, the 
dominant discourse of pluralism hides the ways in which it establishes deviance and 
marginalizes those who fall outside the boundaries of inclusivity. Its discourses of 
inclusion simultaneously construct discourses of exclusion. Thus, it regulates the 
presence of the “other.” As Klassen and Bender point out, pluralism “articulates and 
naturalizes the very boundaries of difference that it seeks to diminish, overcome, or 
mediate.”239 Moreover, in this way, the discourse of pluralism functions as a discourse 
of liberal tolerance. McCutcheon argues that pluralists such as Eck fail to recognize 
that “the difference between pluralism and tolerance is merely rhetorical.”240 The 
processes of defining religion and demarcating difference, which are largely 
unacknowledged and unseen in pluralist discursive practices, accomplish the 
regulation of tolerance, among other effects. 
3.4.2 Negotiating Difference through Education 
Pluralist discourse continually prescribes education about religion as the tactical 
remedy to the problem of religious intolerance, isolationism, and indifference. 
Advocates for religious pluralism, such as Eck and Patel, often call for a move beyond 
mere tolerance of other religions to a deeper respect and understanding. Calls for 
understanding are followed by arguments for increased education about religion and 
the cultivation of “religious literacy.” For such theorists of religious pluralism, religion 
and/or religious diversity are not the problem or source of conflict. Rather, it is a lack 
of understanding about religion and religious differences. The discourse of religious 
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pluralism often assumes that religious differences, if not properly ordered and 
disciplined, are inherently and naturally sites of conflict and hostility. As an example 
of this practice, Diana Eck states, “Religious pluralism is a challenge of faith for each 
and every religious tradition…  Religious difference can be threatening and attitudes 
toward the religious other can be fraught with stereotypes.”241 Pluralism is then 
positioned as a tactic for managing this antagonism to achieve peaceful coexistence. By 
framing religious diversity as a problem in this way, pluralism then constructs its own 
utility as a solution.  
Better education about religion, and more specifically, education structured by a 
pluralist framework, is then offered as the tool by which pluralism is used to remedy 
the problems of misunderstanding. Given its intention to foster social cohesion that 
affirms religious diversity, pluralist approaches to the study of religion tend to take a 
sympathetic view of religion and present it as a resource and an asset. Moreover, these 
approaches often work to legitimate their position, warning their audiences that 
religion must be taken seriously and attributing a sense of social urgency to their 
agenda. As Amanda Porterfield argues, the pluralist approach to the study of religion 
then “accentuates the positive social aspects of religion and draw attention to the ways 
that religion draws people together in community” and “encourages idealized 
representations of religion that deflect skepticism and social criticism of religion.”242 
Work such as Eck’s demonstrates that pluralism as an interpretive framework “tends 
to lift up the most inspiring and socially constructive aspects of religion, and downplay 
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those aspects that fall short or fail to harmonize.”243 Those that fall short are 
characterized as distortions and not representative of the true essence of religion.  
In recent years, the importance of understanding diverse religions has been 
framed by the notion of “religious literacy.” On the surface, the discourse on religious 
literacy concerns itself with knowledge about religions. The concept refers to what one 
knows about religion. In a conventional sense, the term ‘literacy,’ derived from ‘literate’ 
refers to being educated or learned. Yet in this discursive practice, religious literacy 
entails more than what one knows about religion. It becomes an ideal condition for 
civic engagement. Stephen Prothero, whose book of the same name brought the 
concept of religious literacy into greater prominence, defines it first as “the ability to 
understand and use the religious terms, symbols, images, beliefs, practices, scriptures, 
heroes, themes, and stories that are employed in American public life.”244 It concerns 
utility, how one is able to use that knowledge in civic life: “the ability to participate in 
our ongoing conversation about the private and public powers of religion.”245 Prothero 
states his goal as “to help citizens participate fully in social, political and economic life 
in a nation and a world in which religion counts.”246 
Prothero presents the concept in terms of a civic problem: “our descent into 
religious ignorance.”247 Americans know very little about religions, including their own, 
and this illiteracy compromises their abilities to be effective citizens in a liberal 
democracy. To be effective, one must be educated and informed. Prothero argues that 
both American and international politics cannot be understood without some basic 
knowledge of religion. As he says, “Religion is implicated in virtually every issue of 
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national and international import.”248 And he does not merely describe this social 
problem. He also prescribes a solution to this problem—religious literacy, as the 
product of education, adding that “teaching about religion is first and foremost a civic 
enterprise.”249  
Prothero juxtaposes religious knowledge and religious ignorance and claims 
that religious ignorance is dangerous.250 In the introduction of his book, he argues for 
the importance of religious literacy with a number of examples of violent conflict in 
which “religious ignorance proved deadly”—including the Branch Davidian conflict at 
Waco and the post 9-11 killing of Sikh man mistaken for a Muslim, both of which he 
attributes to religious illiteracy. He follows up these anecdotes stating “The moral of 
this story is not just that we need more tolerance. It is that we need better education.” 
251 He states, “Religious illiteracy makes it difficult for Americans to make sense of a 
world in which people kill   and make peace in the name of Christ or Allah.”252 Yet it is 
worth asking whether religious literacy really enables one to understand religiously 
motivated violence. Prothero’s statement assumes that religious difference is a source 
of conflict without addressing the complex political dynamics involved in conflicts.  
Religious literacy, as described by Prothero, refers to a basic, elementary knowledge of 
religions that supports a particular view of the common good. It is not meant to be a 
rigorous academic exercise, nor does it aim to produce scholars of religion. Does 
knowing the basic tenets and practices of a few religions equip one to understand the 
function of religion in society, including the complexities of its sociohistorical 
construction? I argue that, instead, religious literacy works to reproduce pluralist 
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norms and becomes a prescriptive, normative tool for shaping how religions ought to 
function in a religiously diverse society. 
Education and the social construction of power relations 
With any discourse, education plays an important role in its construction, 
reproduction, and transmission. There is a relationship between the construction of 
knowledge and power in which the construction of knowledge is used as a regulatory 
and disciplinary tactic. Ania Loomba contends that “the growth of modern Western 
knowledge systems and the histories of most ‘disciplines’ can be seen to be embedded 
within and shaped by colonial discourses.” Moreover, pointing to the historical 
relationship between scholarship, academic fields, such as anthropology, and 
colonialism, Loomba argues that “all discourses are colonial discourses.”253 Historically, 
studying, examining, and classifying the ‘other’ have served to establish dominance. 
Similarly, Tracey Leavelle argues that “the power to collect and classify information 
and to impose clear structures of knowledge and meaning” has always been crucial for 
effective colonization.254 In Orientalism, Edward Said maintains that “to have 
knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it,” particularly 
when “such a thing” is objectified and viewed as fundamentally stable.255 Said describes 
the colonial discourse(s) of Orientalism, continually produced from the eighteenth 
century through contemporary times, as a complex network of discursive practices 
that involve “a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, 
manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative or novel) 
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world.”256 The architects of this Orientalist discourse claim to describe “other” realities, 
while they function to legitimate inequitable power dynamics, domination, and 
subjugation.  As such, this discourse has “less to do with the Orient than it does with 
‘our’ world.”257 In the social sciences today, while there exists a greater critical 
awareness of these hegemonic discourses, practices of identification and the 
management of difference have been shaped in manifold ways by the legacies of 
colonialism.  
Leavelle writes that within the dynamics of pluralism, Native American religions 
have been expected to reveal and explain themselves in order to engage with other 
religions. Yet, as Leavelle points out, the assumption that those engaged in practices of 
pluralism have the right to know other religions is rooted in implicit colonial 
ideologies, including definitions of acceptable difference and the control of the 
production of knowledge and meaning. He argues that contrary to pluralist claims, 
dialogue and discussion are not always possible. Moreover, the pluralist quest for 
knowledge, so commonly assumed to be benevolent and progressive, can instead be 
exploitative and oppressive.258   
Leavelle’s work highlights how pluralist arguments for the importance of 
education about religion for transmitting pluralist values and fostering social cohesion 
make certain epistemological assumptions, which are not neutral or universal, but 
historically and socio-politically constructed. Rooted in liberal norms, they work to 
reproduce those norms, presupposing an autonomous individual and a kind of 
depoliticized equality. They assume that the each of us ought to know the other; that 
one has the right to know the other. They imagine that the pursuit of this knowledge, 
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the construction of this knowledge, will be beneficial and benevolent. They take for 
granted that the construction of this knowledge will take place on a level playing field, 
on neutral ground. They tend not to acknowledge the power and politics involved in 
the construction of knowledge, that the acquisition of knowledge for one person may 
mean the exploitation and violation of another person or group. Thus, in the dynamics 
of pluralism, the promotion of education about religion in the name of understanding 
and engagement may function to reproduce liberal norms and lay out how difference 
ought to be acknowledged and negotiated, while perpetuating neo-colonial tendencies 
of classification and otherness, especially if that education does not include a critical 
lens.  
3.4.2 Pluralist values as American values: shaping civic identities 
As it works to regulate the role of religion in civil society, pluralism equates 
pluralist values with American civic values—that is to say, liberal values— and 
prescribes a particular view of American civic identities, primarily a form of liberal 
multicultural citizenship. The narrative of religious pluralism imagines America as a 
uniquely diverse, multicultural nation. A good American citizen is a pluralist, one who 
appreciates and affirms this diversity, believes that this diversity makes America great 
and views this diversity as deeply intertwined with the foundational American value of 
religious freedom. Within the pluralist narrative, a good citizen not only accepts the 
existence of religious difference, but also actively engages it-- tries to learn about 
religious difference and create relationships across differences. In this vein, Eck writes, 
“Pluralism is much more than the simple fact of diversity. Pluralism not a given, but an 
achievement. It is engaging that diversity in the creation of a common society.”259 This 
engagement involves allowing for difference while finding common ground. This 
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common ground creates the social cohesion for a unified American society. As an 
example, in On Common Ground, a digital format classroom resource on pluralism and 
world religions, Eck advocates for the creation of a “civic we” and argues that:  
pluralism in America is clearly based on the common ground rules of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution: “no establishment” of religion and the “free 
exercise” of religion... E Pluribus Unum, “out of many, one,” envisions one 
people, a common sense of a civic “we,” but not one religion, one faith, one 
conscience. Unum does not mean uniformity. Perhaps the most valuable thing 
people of many faiths have in common is their commitment to a society based 
on the give and take of the civil dialogue at a common table.260 
 
However, pluralist values, many argue, negotiate a hegemonic power dynamic. 
Advocates of pluralism, such as Eck, argue that pluralism presents a progressive 
alternative to the older assimilationist “melting pot” model of tolerance. While that 
may be true, the dominant discourse on pluralism raises its own questions. What does 
a “civic we” entail? If it requires coming together to the proverbial table, then it must 
exclude those with exclusivist worldviews who are not interested in dialogue and 
common ground with others of different religions. If it does not require giving up 
differences, then what serves as a unifying bond? Who determines what should unite 
“us?” What does the participation in this “civic we” mean if the terms of participation 
have already been defined by someone else? These questions illuminate the regulatory 
nature of the liberal discourse of religious pluralism. 
 I have attempted here to distinguish and situate the discourse of religious 
pluralism within the larger social practice of regulating religion as a practice of liberal 
governance. I have worked to show the dominant discourse of religious pluralism as an 
ideological practice that sustains particular relations of power and domination. I have 
argued here that the discourse of religious pluralism works to define acceptable and 
normative religion, essentially that which is private, voluntary, and individually 
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oriented or which affirms liberal norms. Normative religions may find an acceptable 
public position in so far as they generally promote social cohesion within a liberal 
democracy. From the pluralist perspective, this requires affirmation and respect for 
diversity and difference. For religions or religious individuals that do not share the 
pluralist ethos, but instead express an exclusivist ethos or epistemology, pluralism 
extends tolerance, so long as the exclusivist religion is positioned as primarily private 
and individually-oriented. The act of toleration necessarily entails defining these 
religions as deviant from dominant liberal norms.  
Thus, the discourse of religious pluralism is not neutral or universal. It is 
particular, situated, and embedded with politics, specifically the politics of liberalism. 
Yet, its discursive practices work to mask its politics and dissociate it from its 
historical contingency along with the powers that have produced and shaped it. It is 
seldom identified as a political discourse, giving it a depoliticized quality. This also 
reinforces its hegemonic tendencies. Hegemonic discourses are most effective when 
they are so naturalized that few see the underlying dynamics of power. Pluralism is a 
pervasive discourse that promotes a political framework through a process that is 
largely unseen and often takes the form of common sense. From here I will focus my 
attention on one genre of the discourse of religious pluralism, the world religion 
textbook. By using Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis, I will look at the ways in 
which the discursive practices found within these textbooks construct pluralism as an 
essential element and ethos for a liberal American public sphere. 
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Chapter 4: The World Religions Textbook: Genre and Discourse 
 
 In this chapter, I turn my task to crafting my method from the theoretical 
questions I have raised. Before I discuss method, I want to detail how I have centered 
on world religions textbooks as a discursive site, examining the textured relationship 
between the world religions textbook as genre and discourse. I will look at the 
textbook as a discursive genre, followed by a brief look at the construction of the 
category of world religions and its intertextual relationship with religious pluralism.  
 In chapter two, I discussed a social theory of critical discourse analysis that 
illumines how texts and talk—discourse— shape social and material realities, 
especially the modes by which discourse processes negotiate normativity, or latently 
construct and support certain systems of dominance. To this theory, I added the 
concept of governmentality to fashion a conceptual framework that elucidates the 
ways in which discourses not seen as political are enmeshed in the enactment of 
governance, or the regulation of society, especially by legitimating liberal norms. From 
this conceptual framework, I have argued that the discourse of religious pluralism is a 
depoliticized discourse that implicitly reproduces liberal norms and operates as a 
mode of governmentality. This discourse dominates the academic study of religion and 
functions to prescribe a regulated role for religion in civil society. In the previous 
chapter, I looked at ways in which this discourse is produced by scholars within the 
academic study of religion. Now in this and subsequent chapters, as I center my focus 
on world religions textbooks, I look at how the discourse of religious pluralism is 
transmitted through these textbooks. 
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4.1 The Textbook as a Genre 
 Fairclough defines a genre as a means by which discourses become enacted. 
Genres are “diverse ways of acting, of producing social life, in the semiotic mode.”261 
Thus, among its many functions, the textbook is a discursive genre. Before I detail the 
method by which I approach my textbook analysis, I want to look at the significance of 
the textbook as a genre and the ways in which the textbook enacts discourses and 
operates as a mode of representation. 
 The social theory of critical discourse analysis and the social constructionist 
framework I have elaborated are centrally concerned with what constitutes knowledge; 
and education is a process through which knowledge is produced and transmitted. 
Schools not only prepare individuals with skills for eventual jobs and their entries into 
the labor market, but also serve as sites for social, political, and cultural formation.262 
Education has played a pivotal role in the forging of collective meaning and identity, 
the creation of nations and the production of citizens: 
Historically subjects were transformed into citizens through the teaching of 
history, geography and the language of the nation. People were anchored in 
illustrious pasts, in particular territories, and in the grammar of (national) self-
recognition and the logic of collective reassurance. Thus, peasants were turned 
into Frenchmen; Bavarians, Hessians or Westphalians were turned into Germans; 
English, Scots, and Welsh into British; and Irish, Germans, Mexicans, and 
Chinese into Americans.263 
 
Schools and universities are sites in which questions of identity and what it means to 
be a modern citizen are negotiated. They function “to reproduce the national culture 
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across generations” and to do “the work of boundary maintenance.”264 I contend that 
not only do history and geography classes involve themselves in the formation of 
citizens, but also introductory religious studies classes-- especially the world religions 
course and its textbooks-- engage in this practice of cultural production. 
 The textbook is a tool and a symbol in education and the construction of 
knowledge. The textbook represents a source of authority and legitimate knowledge. 
Its purpose is both to elaborate and condense standard information in a field, or 
discipline. Illustratively, the term is also used as an adjective to denote that something 
is typical, characteristic or conforming to norms; a person exhibiting common, typical 
symptoms of an illness can be said to have a “textbook case” of such illness. Thus, to 
label a book as a textbook is to give that book authority in the production of 
knowledge. 
 Textbooks are commonly found throughout classrooms from primary to 
secondary to post secondary education. They can serve as a useful teaching tool in an 
introductory classroom. There are a number of features common to the genre, which 
makes the textbook distinct from other kinds of academic texts. A textbook is often 
structured as “a ready-made package for instruction and learning” that can frame an 
entire course and serve as the sole text if needed.265 As such, it is often more 
pedagogically oriented than most academic texts, including didactic tools such as 
discussion and review questions, illustrations, charts, figures, glossaries, and lists of 
additional resources. Many textbooks also include accompanying instructor’s manuals 
and supplemental websites. Stylistically, a textbook aims for clarity and accessibility in 
order to engage readers with no or little prior exposure to the discipline. Strausberg 
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and Engler point out that textbooks are “the one specimen of academic literature 
where lack of originality in content seems permissible. At the same time, they have to 
be sufficiently distinctive from each other to compete on the market – and a good 
textbook is more difficult to write than many would think.”266 
Though textbooks may offer benefits and convenience, they also have their 
critics, many who brand textbooks as dry, bland, boring, lacking in creativity and 
reductionist. As evidence of the disdain textbooks often receive from scholars, John 
Issitt, an educational theorist studying textbooks, begins an essay in which he reflects 
on this study by first explaining why one would want to study textbooks at all. He 
acknowledges that “as teaching vehicles textbooks are scorned by many in the teaching 
profession as poor and insufficient and as assuming a basically passive learning 
style.”267 This passive learning style often results in a poor learning experience, in 
which textbooks can “represent a painful continuity, a form of certified ‘official’ 
knowledge to be referred to when the need arises, to be regurgitated at examination 
time and to be negotiated in learning exercises.”268 Yet they remain a ubiquitous 
presence in the classroom.  
Issitt discusses the textbook as a genre that carries typically hidden power 
dynamics. He argues that textbooks are embedded with the epistemological 
assumption that they “lay a definitional claim to the knowledge they contain” and, 
subsequently, they have a “status, a bona fide status with a potential for universal 
application.”269 By their very character, textbooks engage in processes of 
depoliticization. As Issitt points out, they tend to mask the situated perspective of the 
author or authors and instead aim for an “authorial monotone of expositionary 
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clarity,” which further maintains their claims to “objectivity and political neutrality.”270 
Moreover, textbooks tend to present their disciplines as discrete and coherent domains 
of study, forgoing discussions of theoretical issues on the margins, and thereby 
functioning “to create, trace and maintain the boundaries of a discipline by inclusion 
or exclusion of subjects and by expressing a disciplinary discourse that lays claim to a 
particular terrain of ideas.”271 Thus the politics of textbooks are also camouflaged by 
its rhetorical practices and subsequently, with little to no acknowledgement, 
“discourses are produced, experts are canonized, histories are written and learning is 
subject to the ideological impulses of the time.”272 
 Michael W. Apple and Linda K. Christian-Smith argue that education is never 
neutral and always situated, forming an “indissoluble couplet” with power. Textbooks 
function to reproduce hegemonic power dynamics, in which “what counts as legitimate 
knowledge is the result of complex power relations and struggles among identifiable 
class, race, gender/sex, and religious groups.”273 They are an important site for the 
transmission of ideologies and the production of power as knowledge:  
They signify—through their content and form—particular constructions of 
reality, particular ways of selecting and organizing that vast universe of possible 
knowledge… they participate in no less than the organized knowledge system of 
society. They participate in creating what a society has recognized as legitimate 
and truthful.274  
 
Yet, the politics of textbooks are complex. Even with the hegemonic power dynamics 
embedded within textbooks, Apple warns against viewing textbooks as monoliths of 
oppression, “as totally carrying its politics around with it,” but instead as dependent 
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on the “network of social and ideological relations it participates in.”275 Textbooks can 
“depower and empower at different moments.”276 Apple points out that while 
historically education has been used as a tool for the production of citizens and 
regulation of society, the denial of education has also been a regulatory tool. Thus, 
“textbooks can be fought against because they are part of a system of moral 
regulation. They can be fought for both as providing essential assistance in the labor 
of teaching and as part of a larger strategy of democratization.”277 This portrayal of 
contradiction and complexity in textbook analysis is apt for my project here. The world 
religions textbooks I analyze do not appear oppressive or ideological to most readers. 
In fact, many claim an empowering objective and progressive purpose. My aim is to 
investigate how this progressive, democratizing agenda moves in tension with the 
depoliticized, regulatory activities in which these texts engage.  
4.2 The World Religions Paradigm and Its Critics 
 “World religions,” much like pluralism, is an ostensibly descriptive category 
embedded with prescriptive norms. It is a term used in the study of religion to order a 
plurality of religions, often on a global scale. Some further distinguish the term “world 
religions” as referring to “major” or statistically significant religions of the world. At 
times, it indicates a comparative or phenomenological approach to the study of 
religion.  
 I have previously discussed the problem and limitations of the essentialist, sui 
generis definition of “religion.” Predictably, the category of “world religions,” which 
relies on a sui generis notion of religion, is plagued with many of the same problems 
and limitations. Much like “religion,” “world religions” is frequently left undefined, let 
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alone viewed in light of the social, cultural, and political currents that have created and 
shaped it. As a modifier, world religions assume hierarchies of dominance or even 
superiority. It is a designation of comparison that posits an obscured norm. Not only 
does it assume well-defined and easily identified boundaries of religions, but it also 
serves to mark those boundaries. Thus, as I will go on to elaborate, the category of 
world religions functions to define and order difference and establish “the other.” In 
this sense, it performs many of the regulatory discursive practices of religious 
pluralism and serves as an extension of this discourse. 
 Tomoko Masuzawa writes about the hegemonic power dynamics deeply 
embedded in the category of world religions and its processes of classification and 
categorization. She relates the category as foundational to the discourse and practices 
of the study of religion. Moreover, she identifies world religions discourse as ancillary 
to the ideology of religious pluralism. She names the discourse of religious pluralism, 
or “the pluralist doctrine,” as now “the ruling ethos of our discourse on religion, 
scholarly and nonscholarly.”278 She argues that the pluralist doctrine is exemplified in 
world religions discourse. As Masuzawa points out, the genealogy of world religions is 
embedded within the development of the modern discipline of religious studies. It is a 
conceptual framework that operates as a process of ordering difference, “an effective 
means of differentiating, variegating, consolidating, and totalizing a large portion of 
the social, cultural, and political practices observable among the inhabitants of regions 
elsewhere in the world.”279  
 The concept “world religion” has roots in the European study of religion. It 
originally referred to Christianity as a singular universal religion or religion of the 
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world (Weltreligionen), to be distinguished from indigenous religions particular to one 
ethnicity, place or land (Landesreligionen).280 “World religion” in this sense could be 
distinguished from “religions of the world,” that is, other religions.281 At the turn of the 
nineteenth century, other religions began to be recognized as also having universal 
significance— first Buddhism, followed by Islam (or Mohammedanism), and later, 
Judaism. Thus “world religion” became plural. However, the category was selectively 
applied; everything else was pejoratively labeled paganism, heathenism, idolatry or 
polytheism.  
Masuzawa argues that “world religions,” with roots in the notion of Christian 
universality and supremacy, never moved far from that heritage. Instead, it became the 
foundation of a discourse that asserted the existence of the phenomenon of religion, 
which was defined and measured by the norms of Christianity. In this sense, the 
discourse of world religions only succeeded in masking notions of Christian 
supremacy within the modern study of religion and never succeeded in transcending 
them. As Masuzawa explains, “certain ideological underpinnings of the older 
hierarchical discourse did not so much diminish and disappear as become 
unrecognizable under the new outlook of the pluralist ideology—or supposed 
democracy—of world religions.”282 Masuzawa deconstructs and dismisses the implicit 
assumption that the discourse of world religions marks a “turn away from the 
Eurocentric and Eurohegemonic conception of the world, toward a more egalitarian 
and lateral delineation.”283 Rather it functions as a discourse of secularization and 
othering.284  Embedded with the veiled legacies of imperialism and colonialism, the 
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study of religion has historical roots in the study of colonized societies and in the 
legitimation of European dominance. Timothy Fitzgerald also argues this point, that 
religion, an “ideological product,” 
was assumed to have its analogue in colonial cultures, and if religions could not 
be found then they were invented, along with western individuals, law courts, 
free markets, and educational systems. 'Religion' was part of the complex 
process of establishing the naturalness and ideological transparency of 
capitalist and individualist values.285  
 
The world religions discourse-- and the study of religion with which it is associated—
has functioned to naturalize and reproduce Orientalist, neo-colonial classifications of 
sameness and otherness. 
 Masuzawa acknowledges the ubiquity of the world’s religions course in the 
academic study of religion, as “a standard designation for an introductory survey 
course commonly found in the religious studies curricula of many North American and 
British universities, colleges, and increasingly, secondary schools.”286 While world 
religions courses might lack the scholarly rigor found in upper level or graduate 
courses, they remain among the most popular course offerings in religious studies 
departments, the “bread-and-butter” courses of many departments that provide large 
numbers of enrollees, which then translate to funding. These courses are not only 
discursive sites or cultural products, but also economic commodities, which adds 
layers of complexity to an analysis of the norms they reproduce, one which I will not 
examine in detail here. An American Academy of Religion survey of the 1999-2000 
academic year showed that world religions courses make up 5.5 percent of the total 
number of course offered by religious studies departments, making them the sixth 
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most frequently taught course in the discipline.287 A follow up survey of the 2004-2005 
academic year showed that world religions courses had increased by 14% and risen in 
ranks to the fifth most frequently taught course.288 Moreover, both surveys include 
numbers for an introduction to religions course as distinct from the world religions 
course.289 Given that many introduction to religions courses are essentially structured 
as world religions courses and use world religions textbooks, the number of courses 
that use the world religions paradigm, as well as world religions textbooks, is likely 
greater than the initial survey results suggest.290  
 Criticisms of the world religions course, and world religions textbooks, abound. 
Many scholars approach the course with ambivalence. Many chide the broad, expansive 
nature of the introduction to world religions course or textbook, which covers such a 
range that no scholar of religions could ever be an expert in all its subject matter, and 
subsequently leads to omissions, distortions, and imprecisions. As Mark 
Juergensmeyer writes: 
The one course that we have all learned to hate is the World Religions Survey. Its 
seemingly endless parade of introductions to now this religion, now that one, 
has become a caricature of the worse of liberal arts education: a superficial 
overview that routinely and mindlessly imposes a Western model of human 
culture on the rest of the world.291 
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When asked to review the accuracy and rigor of world religions textbooks, scholars of 
religion tend to find their own area of specialization woefully misrepresented or 
inadequately developed. Weaknesses and shortcomings include “the exclusion of 
women, of ‘minority religion’ in favor of the ‘big five’ or ‘big six,’ and the usually poor 
or nonexistent treatment” of indigenous religions as well as “the absence of historical 
context and a surprisingly naïve—often implied—definition of religion.”292  
 Joanne Punzo Waghorne, a scholar of Chinese religions argues that many world 
religions texts lack a sufficient grasp of historiographical issues in the construction of 
Chinese religions, such as “Confucianism” and “Daoism,” and in the process distort 
rather than elucidate the traditions they seek to present.293 Selva Raj, a scholar of South 
Asian religions points to the problem of labeling Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and 
Sikhism as Indian religions, while ignoring the long presence of other religions, such as 
Christianity and Islam, in the region. Raj argues for a region-centered approach to 
world religions rather than one centered on traditions.294 Robert Baum, a scholar of 
African religions highlights the problematic ways in which world religions textbooks 
treat African religions, typically throwing them together with Native American and 
Australasian religions under the umbrella term of primal, indigenous or tribal 
religions. These religions are then described as prehistoric, “suggesting the viewpoint 
of an earlier generation of anthropologists, namely, that contemporary indigenous 
peoples are a kind of living laboratory in which we can witness the ways of the West’s 
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prehistoric ancestors.”295 Baum goes on to conclude that in the world religions 
textbooks that do address African religions (many completely exclude them), “many of 
these scholars make factual errors, almost always in the direction of minimizing the 
complexity of African cultures or the subtlety of African religious systems.”296 Kay A. 
Read, an ethno-historian of Mesoamerican religions, discusses the implications of 
creating “miscellaneous” religions, which are left out of “the hierarchy of important 
traditions.” Plagued with inaccurate stereotypes of so-called primitive peoples, the 
“miscellaneous category”, Read argues, reproduces norms and assumptions of 
colonialism, essentially defining two-thirds of the world as “The Not-West” and turning 
them into “a people without history.”297 Read contends that these textbooks reflect the 
ongoing struggle of the West: 
On the one side, there is a desire to hide an ongoing history of violence—the 
primary purpose of modernist, progressive histories. On the other side, there is 
a longing for harmonious social relationships in an often fragmented and 
frightening world and a deep concern about serious environmental problems—
the romantic critique of hierarchies and technologies.298 
 
Read points to the complex issues of identity and “interlocking histories” that easy and 
discrete categorizations of religions gloss over or hide. She advocates for world 
religions textbooks and courses that problematize the category of world religions, as 
well as comparison itself, and work to illuminate both the historical contexts of the 
religions under examination and the study of religion itself.  
 Masuzawa describes the world religions course as a largely unmanageable 
survey without the aid of “the scholastically untenable assumption that all religions 
are everywhere the same in essence, divergent and particular only in their ethnic, 
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national, or racial expressions.”299 Russell McCutcheon shares Masuzawa’s critical 
concerns and he applies this critique to the world religions textbook. He laments the 
“discursive dominance” of sui generis religion manifest in the ways in which most 
world religions textbooks assume that the most pressing issue to be addressed within 
religious studies is the problem of religious plurality, rather than problematizing the 
category of religion itself.300 The textbooks instead assert that the existence of many 
religions can create problems for social cohesion. The objective of the textbook then is 
to help students understand these religions in order to generate respect and contribute 
to social harmony. These textbooks do not begin by scrutinizing the construction of 
their subject, as McCutcheon advocates, but rather assume religion as an ahistorical, 
universal aspect of human experience. They prioritize and promote intuitivism and 
insider’s perspectives based on the assumption that religion is not only ahistorical but 
also a fundamentally shared or essentially human characteristic. 
 Drawing from Fitzgerald, McCutcheon concludes that many world religions 
textbooks exhibit characteristics tantamount to “an ecumenical theology of religious 
pluralism:”  
the use of vaguely defined and subjective comparative categories (e.g. the 
ultimate, the sacred, feelings, mystery); a methodology that can be characterized 
as sympathetic, or descriptive, hermeneutical intuitivism; an emphasis on the 
study of the personalistic and nonfalsifiable contents of religious experiences, a 
prioritized insider’s perspective301 
 
McCutcheon argues that this “ecumenical project… can also be described in political 
terms as but one specific instance of the liberal effort to domesticate and homogenize 
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diversity.”302 Masuzawa makes a similar argument as she elaborates a historical 
continuity between world religions discourse and the discipline of comparative 
theology. She argues that religious pluralism and world religions discourse assume 
that “any broadly value-orienting, ethically inflected view point must derive from a 
religious heritage. One of the most important effects of this discourse is that it 
spiritualizes what are material practices and turns them into expressions of something 
timeless and suprahistorical, which is to say, it depoliticizes them.”303 Essentially, 
McCutcheon and Masuzawa argue that the discourses of religious pluralism and world 
religions reorder diverse social practices in latently Protestant terms. 
 McCutcheon explains the significance of the world religions course as a primary 
site for the construction of dominant, sui generis discourses:  
the modern discourse on religion, articulated within an institutional locale, is 
continually reconstituted in such courses. In other words, the odds are rather 
high that if a student ever takes a course in the study of religion—whether the 
student majors in the field or not—it will be introduction to world religions304 
 
McCutcheon then laments the weaknesses of such courses: “Although the health of the 
institutionalized study of religion may in large part depend on the number of students 
in its courses, the theoretical approach to religion that will attract such enrollments is 
not necessarily the most productive, contemporary, critical or sophisticated.”305 While 
this sympathetic approach, characterized by a facile and manufactured coherence, may 
not serve to produce the critical rigor McCutcheon would prefer to see, it does function 
successfully in the construction of another narrative—that of an America unified in its 
properly regulated diversity. By focusing on pluralism as a mode of governmentality, I 
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offer a new perspective on the analysis of world religions textbooks, building from 
previous studies along the way.  
I have argued that the academic study of religions is dominated by pluralist 
discourse, especially when the study of religion is distilled into its most ostensibly 
accessible package-- the introductory religions course and the world religions textbook. 
I have also argued that the discourse of religious pluralism is infused with veiled 
liberal norms, that it functions to legitimate and reproduce liberal governance and the 
liberal regulation of religion in the public sphere. Thus, I argue, world religions 
textbooks may reproduce these liberal norms. Yet, these textbooks typically do not 
include explicit discussions of liberalism. They do not explain liberal theory and 
discuss its basic principles of moral autonomy, individual liberty, and equal rights. 
They do not explain how these liberal principles frame the study of religion. Rather, 
the discourse of religious pluralism frequently present in these textbooks is 
depoliticized; it is presented as universal, ahistorical, and naturalized. Its politics and 
its historical emergence are hidden from view. Thus my aim here in this textbook 
analysis is to render the hidden visible. Moreover, I consider whether these unseen 
liberal assumptions, which position and prescribe religions as discrete, private, and 
voluntary, may serve more to regulate the role of religion in civil society and affirm 
well-regulated diversity than to actually illuminate the lived realities they seek to 
describe. The world religions textbook, while presented as a neat package of 
information about a variety of systems and ways of life called religion, is also a tool for 
ordering society.  
4.3 Critical Discourse Analysis: From Theory to Method 
My method is informed by the social theory of critical discourse analysis, 
primarily the work of Norman Fairclough, which entails a theoretical perspective that 
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“gives rise to ways of analyzing language or semiosis within a broader analysis of the 
social process.”306 Fairclough points out that critical discourse analysis has no well-
defined and dominant method. As much a theory as a method, it is not a set of tools or 
techniques that can be interchangably transferred from one analysis to the next, but 
rather an approach to theorizing and framing an analysis. In my analysis, I have used a 
qualitative, interpretive approach, rather than the quantitative content analysis 
employed by many textbook analyses. This qualitative approach allows for greater 
sensitivity to the nuances and dynamics of the texts.  
My approach begins with identifying and describing the social order or practice I 
am problematizing and its semiotic aspect, or the ways in which it produces meaning 
through signs and symbols. This involves looking at the textured relationship between 
discourse, or ways of representing, and genre, ways of enacting. My analysis entails 
exploring the network of practices within which the discourse is located as well as a 
structural analysis that includes parsing interdiscursive and intertextual relationships 
and ideological practices, such as the reification of social norms.  
The central social order or practice that I problematize here is the hegemonic 
regulation of religion in American society as a means of legitimating liberal norms and 
securing the dominance of liberal governance. I am interested in the ways in which the 
rhetoric of liberalism touts individual freedoms as a foundational value, while it 
simultaneously works in other ways to implicitly manage, regulate, and limit many of 
those freedoms. I argue that this social practice is represented through the discourse 
of religious pluralism; thus this discourse is a semiotic aspect of this social practice. 
And, more specifically, I look at world religion textbooks as a genre of this social 
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practice, or a particular way of “(inter)acting discoursally.”307 By parsing the intertextual 
and interdiscursive relationships, as well as the ideological practices, that shape these 
texts, I aim to better understand how the regulation of religion in civil society is 
enacted and naturalized. I look at how these textbooks mediate and transmit other 
domains for learners, especially the liberal public sphere. As I problematize these 
practices, I want to think about approaches to engaging these texts and 
reconceptualizing this discourse in ways that illuminate the ambivalence and 
complexity involved in religious diversity in the U.S. 
In the previous chapter, I theorized and described the dimensions of the 
discourse of religious pluralism, including its historical development and its 
contemporary production within the academic study of religion. Methodologically, I 
aimed to elaborate the social processes and structures that “give rise to the 
production” of the texts and situate the context in which “which individuals or groups 
as social historical subjects, create meaning in their interactions with texts.”308 I also 
identified discursive practices that perform a regulatory function, with attentiveness to 
the ways in which the governmental practices of the discourse of religious pluralism 
are unseen and taken for granted, thus highlighting the ideological effects of these 
practices in the construction of meaning, which stabilize and naturalize conventions.  
As I direct my analysis to world religions textbooks, I am not focused on the 
immediate or apparent meaning of a textual passage. Rather, I look to understand the 
discursive practices that have produced the text. Texts work to construct and 
reproduce the order of things, which can involve describing, classifying, and 
                                            
307 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, Second Edition (Harlow: Pearson Education, 
2010), 75. 
308 Ruth Wodak, “What CDA Is about-- a Summary of Its History, Important Concepts and Its 
Development,” in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer 
(London: Sage Publications, 2001), 3. 
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representing the world around us in ways that reinforce a dominant social order. A 
text “instructs us how to see the world, how to differentiate parts within it, and 
thereby provides the means by which we can engage with the world.”309 Accordingly, as 
I analyze these world religions textbooks, I look at what the text says, as well as what it 
does not say. Better understanding the content of the textbooks is not the primary aim 
of my analysis. My focus is not so much on all the information a textbook elaborates 
about, for instance, religious realities in South Asia and the factual accuracy or 
scholarly rigor of this information. Rather, I am interested in the power dynamics 
involved in the ways in which this information is presented-- how it constructs its 
subject, how it reproduces ideologies, as well as the larger social order in which it is 
produced.  I am looking for patterns and recurring key elements and asking how they 
function in the production of meaning. 
My analysis involves looking at the ways in which these texts address the 
reader, the kind of social realities they describe and the ways in which they prescribe 
that the reader should respond to these realities. I look at the wider discourses 
reflected in these descriptions, especially the intertextual and interdiscursive 
relationships between discourses of pluralism, world religions, liberalism, and 
tolerance, and consider how they have come to be seen as natural accounts of the 
world.  
I approach my analysis by looking at two interrelated dimensions: 1. meaning-
making and 2. discursive strategies. I ask some broader conceptual questions about 
ways in which these textbooks produce meanings that reproduce or transform a social 
order and involve the discursive construction of the discourse of religious pluralism, 
                                            
309 Lindsay Prior, “Following in Foucault’s Footsteps: Text and Context in Qualitative Research,” 
in Approaches to Qualitative Research, ed. Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Patricia Leavy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 321. 
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the legitimation of liberal norms, and the regulation of the role religion in liberal 
society. I simultaneously investigate the discursive strategies these texts use in these 
processes. Here, I also draw from the critical discourse analysis work of Theo Van 
Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak, especially their methods for analyzing discursive strategies 
of recontextualization and legitimation.  
 I approach my data with a series questions for each of these textbooks: 
1. How does the text construct normativity?  
Ultimately, I aim to explore how the discursive practices of the text shape a 
normative social order—a liberal social order—including a normative liberal 
conception of religion. I ask how religion is defined. Is the definition explicit or 
implicit? Is it essentialist or critical/historical? Does the book use a traditional 
world religions approach? Does it make assumptions about human nature and the 
nature of religion based on liberal ideas and values, such as individualism, liberty, 
rationality, egalitarianism, voluntarism, and secularism? Does it assume that 
religion is separate and differentiated from other elements of social life, such as 
the political and the economic? Does it make assumptions or claims about 
legitimate or authentic religion and religious authority? Does the book make 
assumptions about who has the authority to best understand or speak for a 
religion? How is difference defined? 
2. How does the text legitimate a particular role for religion within a liberal social 
order?  
How does the text define the relationship between religion and society? How does it 
describe the purpose of the book and the rationale for the study of religions? Does 
the book discuss methodology and theoretical issues in the study of religion? How 
are assumptions about the nature of religion and its role in society revealed in 
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these methods? Does the text designate certain ways of thinking about religions as 
legitimate and authoritative and others as problematic? What are the politics at 
work in the ways these texts represent religions? 
As I navigate these questions, I examine strategies involved in the discursive 
construction of liberal norms for religion. I draw from an approach developed by Van 
Leeuwen and Wodak, which Fairclough incorporates into his work, and focus on the 
discursive practice of recontextualization. Fairclough defines recontextualization as a 
“relationship between different (networks of) social practices—a matter of how 
elements of one social practice are appropriated by, relocated in, the context of 
another.”310 Discursive practices involve representation—the re-presenting of some 
social practice. This always takes place outside the original context of the social 
practice being represented. Thus, representation involves recontextualization. 
Moreover, this recontextualization always entails a process of transformation. The 
process of representation and recontextualization changes the original practice in 
some way and “what exactly gets transformed depends on the interests, goals and 
values of the context into which the practice is recontextualized.”311 I use this concept 
of recontextualization to think through the ways in which the category of religion 
takes a range of social practices and re-presents them according to liberal and latently 
Protestant norms, such as defining the religious experience or personal belief of 
individuals as the core of all religions. 
 I draw from several theorists of critical discourse analysis to identify types of 
discursive strategies. I look for some of the strategies described by Wodak, De Cillia, 
and Reisigl including constructive strategies and perpetuation and justification 
                                            
310 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research, 222. 
311 Van Leeuwen and Wodak, “Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse Historical 
Analysis,” 96. 
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strategies.312 Constructive strategies serve to build a particular role for religion. For 
example, one constructive strategy I examine is the construction of the “we” group in 
these textbooks. The “we” group posits commonality in religious experience and in the 
study of religion. It often uses emotive language to invite identification in the pluralist 
ethos. Perpetuation and justification strategies engage in legitimation, a discursive 
practice that aims to explain and solidify why social practices must be the way they 
are.313 Practices of legitimation function to maintain, support, and reproduce the social 
and institutional order and serve as a continual reinforcement of what is viewed as 
constituting objective knowledge, as well as objective social reality and one’s place in 
it.  
 Van Leeuwen elaborates several types of strategies of legitimation.314 The three 
types that I use for my analysis include: 1. authorization, 2. moral evaluation, and 3. 
rationalization. Authorization involves legitimation “by reference to the authority of 
tradition, custom and law, and of persons in whom institutional authority of some 
kind is vested.”315 Moral evaluation legitimates through references to value systems, 
often “linked to specific discourses of moral value.”316 Finally, rationalization entails 
legitimation by “reference to the goals and uses of institutionalized social action, and 
to the knowledge society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity.”317 
Van Leeuwen explains that, in practice, these types of legitimation strategies often 
work in combination to naturalize practices and power arrangements within a social 
                                            
312 Rudolf De Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Ruth Wodak, “The Discursive Construction of National 
Identities,” Discourse and Society 10, no. 2 (1999): 160–163. 
313 As Van Leeuwen and Wodak point out, “This ‘why’ again is never intrinsic to the practice, but 
has to be construed in discourse.” Van Leeuwen and Wodak, “Legitimizing Immigration Control: 
A Discourse Historical Analysis,” 98. 
314 Van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,” 92. 
315 Ibid. 
316 Ibid., 97. 
317 Ibid., 92. 
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order. I use his discussion of these strategies to scrutinize the ways in which the 
discursive practices of these textbooks legitimate a particular role for religion within a 
liberal social order. 
 As I engage in this textbook analysis, moving between broader questions of 
context and discursive strategies, I begin by looking at the ways these textbooks 
broadly situate religion. In chapter 5, I give considerable attention to prefaces and 
introductions as spaces in which authors set out to explain to their readers their task 
and their purpose, as well as concluding chapters as spaces in which authors aim to 
shore up the coherence of their narratives. In chapter 6, I focus on textbook chapters 
on Buddhism and Islam, two traditions that reveal the discursive strategies that 
legitimate liberal governance most clearly. I focus on the most poignant and 
illuminating examples and discussions from these six textbooks.  
4.4 Compiling My Body of Data 
 Having briefly situated the world religions textbook as a genre and discursive 
site, as well as having described my method, I now want to apply this theoretical 
framework to a discursive analysis of the regulatory and disciplinary practices found 
within currently circulating world religions textbooks. The field of textbook studies is 
largely focused on textbooks used in public schools, often examining the relationship 
between the content of textbooks, schooling, and public discourse.318 The world 
religions textbooks I examine do not fit so easily within this scope of inquiry, largely 
because they are not commonly used in American public schools. Unlike countries 
such as the United Kingdom and Australia, religious studies courses are not often 
                                            
318 For an overview of the field of textbook analysis, including dominant methods of the field, 
see Falk Pingel, UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision, 2nd ed. 
(Braunschweig: Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, 2010). 
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offered in public high schools in the U.S.319 When the topic of religion is addressed in 
public schools, it typically arises in the study of other disciplines, such as social 
studies, geography, world history, or literature. To be clear, my study is not an 
examination of how religion is taught in American public education. My study 
examines textbooks used in introductory religious studies courses. These courses are 
found in private high schools, colleges, and universities. For this study, I do not engage 
in a corpus analysis, that is a quantitative analysis of a large sample of textual data to 
determine widespread frequency of linguistic or content patterns. Rather, my study 
aims at depth and richness.  
 My data set involves six widely used world religions textbooks, which I assert 
are typical or representative of this genre. Rather than arbitrarily choosing textbooks, I 
have selected these six textbooks by conducting a short survey of members of 
Religious Studies in Secondary Schools (RSiSS), an American professional organization 
for secondary school teachers of religion. The organization’s mission statement reads: 
RSiSS is a coalition of public and private secondary school teachers working in 
conjunction with the Council for Spiritual and Ethical Education. We are 
committed to the idea that education is not complete without the academic 
study of the world's religious traditions and the ethical values, literatures, and 
cultures so inextricably linked to them.320 
 
RSiSS holds an annual teacher training institute on teaching world religions, among 
other activities. The annual summer institutes, convened each year since 1997, focus 
on a particular area, such as Buddhism, Islam or religion and ecology. They are 
facilitated by a well-established scholar in that area of study. Members of RSiSS 
primarily teach religion through introductory courses at the secondary school, or high 
school level. Some also teach introductory college courses. Given that textbooks 
                                            
319 As one exceptional case, since 2000, a world religions course has been offered in public high 
schools in Modesto, CA. See Emile Lester, Teaching about Religions: A Democratic Approach for 
Public Schools (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011). 
320 http://www.rsiss.net/index.html 
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occupy a prominent position in introductory courses, I chose to conduct my survey 
with this organization because its members are focused on teaching religion at this 
introductory level. 
 This survey asked secondary school teachers of religion to list up to five world 
religions textbooks that they have used in their classrooms and how many times 
(semesters, terms or years) they have used them. They were also asked: 1. if they have 
a favorite and why; 2. if they particularly dislike one and why; 3. if they use other texts, 
such as primary texts or articles; 4. the title and grade/level of the course in which 
they use these texts; and 5. whether their institutional setting is best described as a 
public school or a private school, and if the latter, secular or faith-based.321 There were 
57 participants who responded to the survey; however, only 37 completed the 
questions about their preferred textbooks.322  
 In response to the first question, 24 different textbooks were listed, most only 
listed once. Additionally, several participants also listed books that are not textbooks 
that they use in their classes. Seven textbooks were listed by multiple respondents. In 
order of popularity, they include: 1. Mary Pat Fisher, Living Religions, 2. Huston Smith, 
The World’s Religions 3. Jeffrey Brodd, World Religions: A Voyage of Discovery, 4. T. 
Patrick Burke, The Major Religions: An Introduction with Texts, 5. William Young, The 
World’s Religions, 6. Phillip Novak, The World’s Wisdom: Sacred Texts of the World’s 
                                            
321 In June 2012, members of RSiSS were contacted by the executive director of the organization 
via email and provided with the information letter and a link to Survey Monkey, where the 
survey was hosted. I anticipated minimal risks. The survey was anonymous. Participants were 
asked to list textbooks used in their classrooms. They were also asked for minimal descriptive 
information about the context in which they use the textbooks-- name of course, grade or age 
group in the course, type of school. All of this information was merely descriptive and likely 
publicly available through their institutions. Participants also had the option to name a 
textbook as their favorite and describe reasons, as well as name a textbook as their least 
favorite and describe why. In these questions, though participants had the option to express 
opinions that could have included criticisms, as an anonymous survey, these opinions could not 
be traced back to any one individual. Moreover, even critical remarks would likely have had no 
more risks than those encountered in expressing opinions in everyday professional life. 
322 See appendix for detailed results. 
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Religions, and 7. Jacob Neusner, ed, World Religions in America. While I aimed to 
identify five most frequently used textbooks, the Burke, Young, Novak, and Neusner 
texts were all listed at the same frequency. I have excluded the Novak text from my 
data because it is not traditional textbook, but rather a compendium of primary 
sources meant to accompany Huston Smith’s The World’s Religions. Thus, my data set 
now includes six textbooks. 
 In response to the question “Do you have a favorite 'World Religions' textbook? 
If so, which one and why?,” many respondents either answered no or reiterated the 
text they had previously listed. Among the more detailed responses, some were 
actually criticisms rather than descriptions of preference, such as “Smith, World 
Religions - addresses big concepts without too much detail. Not found any general text 
useful for high school level course--text still to be written” and “I don't teach the 
‘World Religions’ model because I think it skims and essentializes. If I had to use a 
textbook, I would use Fisher's Living Religions. Instead, I give my classes a more narrow 
focus and use monographs written by Religious Studies scholars (see above).” One 
respondent stated, “No. None are great for high school kids. They are either too 
difficult or too simplistic.” Another respondent shared dissatisfaction with world 
religions textbooks: 
Not yet. I've been teaching World Religions now for four years, and have used 
three different textbooks! Like the Fisher due to it being comprehensive but it's 
too much for my one-semester format. Prothero is pretty cool because it's more 
"edgy" and goes against the "perennial philosophy" idea and it's also readable in 
just a few weeks but it's also not "textbook" enough for some students. Looking 
forward to trying the Partridge because it's written by a variety of scholars. 
 
Several expressed satisfaction with Mary Pat Fisher’s Living Religions. One described 
the text as having the “best scholarship, helpful features.” Others called it “broad 
based, accessible, interesting” and said it “acknowledges complexity and diversity 
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within traditions, covers the positives and negatives, gives examples of individuals 
living their faiths.” Another stated: 
 Mary Pat Fisher's is fabulous because she provides enough info about each 
religion that you can grasp the basic ideas but she also explicitly is committed 
to religious pluralism and mutual understanding which is where I am coming 
from. I like that she includes New Age movements and her intro on why 
religions and the issues in contemporary America and the world set the context 
for why we are doing this study. Huston Smith is my hero (along with Karen 
Armstrong) but their work either assumes more knowledge than my students 
have or are difficult to read at that age. 
 
A couple of respondents expressed gravitating between the Fisher text and the Huston 
Smith text, stating “I like to use Smith a lot as a supplement for the Eastern Religion 
sections of other textbooks. This will be my first year using Fisher because I found the 
other three lacking” and “Every year our teachers are split between the Illustrated 
World Religions (Smith) and Living Religions and we continually go back and forth.” 
 Respondents who listed the Brodd textbook as their favorite said “I've been 
happy with Brodd's. The amount of detail is about right, and my students like it” and 
“it provides a basic objective overview of the world's major religions and it is easy for 
high school students to grasp.” One respondent explained a preference for the Burke 
textbook: “The Burke text is my favorite because (1) it is generally accurate and fair, (2) 
it has primary texts bound in the same text, (3) it is not idiosyncratic the way Smith is, 
and (4) it is reasonably priced.” 
 There were very few responses to the question “Do you have a least favorite 
'World Religions' textbooks? If so, which one and why?.” One respondent stated: “I 
think that they all essentialize traditions and minimize the relationship between 
religion and other parts of human experience (politics, language, literature, culture, 
gender, race, etc.).” Another said, “Huston Smith because it is too narrow in its 
perspective, not showing enough of the diversity within traditions.” A third respondent 
stated: 
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 At this point: no. Each text I have looked at (and I have looked at around 7-8 
texts!) has its own strengths and weaknesses. I think, for a comprehensive 
textbook, my least favorites are ones that are just so expensive! Mary Pat 
Fisher's text is almost 100.00. I also need to say that I think her text is the 
weaker of the major texts. 
 
Notably, all respondents said that they use other texts in addition to the textbooks.  
 In response to the question about the title of the course and grade level, 
respondents indicated that the textbooks were used in courses titled: “World 
Religions” (19), “Comparative Religions” (3), “Global Religions” (2), “Humanities” (2), 
“Introduction to Religion” (1) and “Catholic Studies” (1). Grade levels included 10th – 
12th grades (24), 9th grade (6), middle school (3), and college (3). While membership in 
RSiSS is open to both private and public secondary school teachers, all respondents 
listed their institutional setting as private, described as parochial/faith-based (15), 
secular (13), and other (7). 
 From the results of this survey, my textbook analysis includes 1. Mary Pat 
Fisher, Living Religions, 2. Huston Smith, The World’s Religions 3. Jeffrey Brodd, World 
Religions: A Voyage of Discovery, 4. T. Patrick Burke, The Major Religions: An 
Introduction with Texts, 5. William Young, The World’s Religions: Worldviews and 
Contemporary Issues, and 6. Jacob Neusner, ed, World Religions in America. In the 
following chapter, I explore these six textbooks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 127 
Chapter 5: Six World Religions Textbooks 
In this chapter, I examine these six textbooks through the tools of critical 
discourse analysis. As I detailed in the previous chapter, Tomoko Masuzawa has 
deconstructed the taken-for-granted category of world religions. She argues that the 
category of world religions seemingly epitomizes pluralism and tolerance, yet it 
originated as a means of solidifying the superiority and dominance of the West, as 
embodied by Christianity, and continues to carry this legacy. In this textbook analysis, 
I look for the ways in which these texts reproduce this pluralist discourse as well as 
these historical politics of domination. I argue that, while overt messages of Christian 
superiority may have faded, these textbooks exemplify and universalize a liberal 
worldview, upon which Protestant norms neatly map.   
As I investigate how these texts reproduce discourses of religious pluralism and 
liberalism and how these function as regulatory discourses, I explore both elements of 
content and discursive strategies in these texts; that is, I look at both what the texts 
say and how they say it, and then I consider the implications of these practices. I 
evaluate how the texts construct normativity and formulate a particular role for 
religion in society. I consider discursive strategies of recontexualization, construction, 
and legitimation. I also examine interdiscursive relationships between discourses of 
world religions, pluralism, and liberalism. In this chapter, I focus on highlighting 
relevant textual sections that discuss religion and why we should focus on it. In the 
next chapter, I look specifically at those sections dealing with Buddhism and Islam to 
illustrate my points.  
5.1 A Brief Description of Six Textbooks 
First, I want to begin with a brief description of each of the six textbooks in my 
analysis, including brief biographical information about each textbook’s author. I also 
 128 
recognize that each text is the result of a collaborative process; it does not reflect only 
the singular perspective of its associated author. Each includes acknowledgments of a 
number of scholars who served as advisors. Moreover, the Neusner text includes 
essays by multiple authors. Thus, each text is the product of intertextuality; each is 
composed of layers of texts. Moreover, the extent of the collaborators, editors, and 
advisors’ influence and representation in the texts is largely unseen.  
Additionally, beyond these textured contributions, each text is also constrained 
by the parameters of its medium. While there is considerable diversity among the six 
authors of these texts— ranging from an author who established a libertarian 
organization to another author who has spent decades communally living and working 
on an ashram in India— the spectrum of perspectives presented in these texts does not 
reflect such diversity. As textbooks, these texts are bound by the standards of 
publishers that seek a broad, introductory audience. Textbooks are commodities, 
products designed to appeal to consumers. They are among the more profitable of 
academic publications. Thus, the authors’ presentation of information must meet this 
criterion of broad, introductory appeal. Notably, as my text analysis reveals, liberal 
norms and ideology also characterize the genre of the world religions textbook. This 
supports my argument that they fit rather seamlessly into a liberal world order, i.e., 
the one supported by mainline American culture. 
Huston Smith, The World’s Religions, San Francisco: HarperOne, 1991. 
The World’s Religions was written by Huston Smith, a scholar of religions who received 
a PhD in philosophy from University of Chicago in 1945 and taught at MIT, Syracuse 
University, and University of California Berkeley. In 1958, Smith wrote The Religions of 
Man, which was published in a new edition with the new title, The World’s Religions, in 
1991. His biographical statement calls it “a seminal textbook in the field of 
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comparative religions,” an apt statement given its continuous publication over 55 
years.323 Smith’s influence extends beyond academia. For example, he was the subject 
of a 1996 Bill Moyer’s documentary, “The Wisdom of Faith with Huston Smith,” a five-
part overview of his life and work shown on PBS. Among other awards and honors, 
Smith received the AAR Martin E. Marty Award in the Public Understanding of Religion 
in 2004. The current edition of The World’s Religions boasts more than two million 
copies sold. It ranks first among Amazon.com’s Best Sellers in Comparative 
Religions.324 The World’s Religions is the oldest among the textbooks I analyze and 
easily the most widely read and influential of these texts. Its popularity has led it to be 
labeled “the book” by a deputy publisher at HarperOne who was quoted in a 2007 
Publisher’s Weekly article on popular religion textbooks.325 The current edition of the 
book, published by HarperOne, is xvi +399 pages in length, not including a 
supplemental section at the end that accompanies the 50th anniversary edition.  
Mary Pat Fisher, Living Religions, 8th Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson 
Prentice Hall, 2011. 
 
The first edition of Living Religions was published in 1991, the same year Smith 
released The World’s Religions (the revised edition of The Religions of Man). Published 
by large textbook publisher Pearson, a ninth edition will be released in 2014. It ranks 
#3 among Amazon.com’s bestsellers in Comparative Religions.326 The current edition is 
xvi +558 pages in length, divided into thirteen chapters. Unlike the other textbook, 
Living Religions does not have an author’s academic biography, complete with degrees 
                                            
323 “Syracuse University Archives: Collections and Personal Papers - Faculty Papers: Huston 
Cummings Smith,” accessed May 11, 2013, 
http://archives.syr.edu/collections/faculty/smith_bio.html. 
324 This ranking was accurate as of August 12, 2013; however, bestseller lists change regularly. 
<http://www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/books/12783/ref=pd_zg_hrsr_b_1_4_last> 
325 Donna Freitas, “In Search of the Perfect Textbook (and Those Who Use Them),” Publishers 
Weekly, October 29, 2007, 11. 
326 This ranking was accurate as of August 12, 2013; however, bestseller lists change regularly. 
<http://www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/books/12783/ref=pd_zg_hrsr_b_1_4_last> 
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and university positions held. In her published works, Fisher lists her affiliation as the 
Gobind Sadan Institute for Advanced Studies in Comparative Religions.327 Located in 
New Delhi India, Gobind Sadan is an “international interfaith community” rooted in the 
Sikh tradition, founded by Baba Virsa Singh. The Gobind Sadan Institute for Advanced 
Studies in Comparative Religions was started in 1990 and its mission is “the diffusion 
of knowledge of various religions with particular reference to common principles 
underlying different faiths as they promote universal brotherhood, peace, amity, and 
respect for human rights.” The institute’s website also describes its work as “focused 
on critical areas of theology and religious history often neglected by the mainstream” 
and “a clear mandate to recognize the presence of the ‘spiritual’ or the ‘mystery’ in 
shaping our traditions, rather than simply reducing religion to a social science.”328 
Fisher’s personal biography, included in the textbook and listed on the Pearson 
website, states that she “writes about all religions, not only from academic research, 
but also from her experiences with religions around the world” and that her 
perspective has been influenced by her experience living in the interfaith community of 
Gobind Sadan. While Fisher does not offer her own academic credentials, she includes 
in the preface an extensive list of established scholars of specific religions who she has 
consulted for the book as well as a significant list of professors teaching world 
religions courses who have reviewed the text. 
Jacob Neusner, editor, World Religions in America, 4th Edition, Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2009. 
 
This book is notable among the other books in my analysis in that it is an edited 
collection of essays, each on a different religion, each by a different author who is a 
                                            
327 The Pearson website also includes this biographical information. 
<http://www.pearsonhighered.com/livingreligionsforum/speakers.html#mary_pat_fisher> 
328 “Who We Are,” Gobind Sadan Institute for Advanced Studies in Comparative Religions, 
accessed April 4, 2013, http://gobindsadan.org/institute.html. 
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scholar of that religion. The book is also distinct among the six texts in that it centers 
on each “world religion” in the context of the United States. The first edition was 
published in 1994. The book has expanded considerably through its subsequent 
editions. Originally 271 pages in length with fourteen chapters, the current fourth 
edition is 462 pages in length, divided into six parts and twenty-two chapters, plus a 
preface and introduction by the editor, Jacob Neusner.329 The book ranked #6 among 
Amazon.com’s bestsellers in Comparative Religion.  
The book’s editor, Jacob Neusner, is Distinguished Service Professor of the 
History and Theology of Judaism, Bard Center Fellow, and Senior Fellow, Institute of 
Advanced Theology at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, NY. Perhaps the best-
known scholar of Judaism in the world, his biographical statement states that he has 
written or edited hundreds of books, and received numerous awards including ten 
honorary degrees and fourteen academic medals and prizes.330 
Jeffrey Brodd, World Religions: A Voyage of Discovery, 3rd Edition, Winona, MN: St. 
Mary’s Press, 2009. 
 
All other books in my analysis are geared toward an introductory college or 
university audience and often used in secondary classrooms as well. This book, 
however, is published by Catholic publisher Saint Mary’s Press and marketed as a high 
school textbook aimed at 11th and 12th grade secondary students.  It ranks in 
Amazon.com’s Top 100 Bestsellers in Comparative Religions.331 The book is 310 pages 
in length, divided into fifteen chapters, after a foreword. The author, Jeffrey Brodd, is a 
professor in the Department of Humanities and Religious Studies at Sacramento State 
                                            
 
330 “Bard Faculty: Jacob Neusner, Bard College” accessed September 15, 2013,  
http://www.bard.edu/academics/faculty/faculty.php?action=details&id=648. 
331 This ranking was current as of August 12, 2013; however, ranking data changes regularly. 
<http://www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/books/12783/ref=pd_zg_hrsr_b_3_4_last#5> 
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University. He received a PhD in Religious Studies from the University of California, 
Santa Barbara, where he studied with Ninian Smart. 
T. Patrick Burke, The Major Religions: An Introduction with Texts, 2nd Edition, 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 
 
The Major Religions: An Introduction with Texts by T. Patrick Burke was 
published first in 1996 and in a 2004 second edition by Blackwell Publishing. While the 
textbook does not currently rank within the Amazon Bestsellers in Comparative 
Religions, it was important enough to be included in a 2005 special double issue of 
Religious Studies Review devoted to world religions textbooks.332 It also received an 
endorsement, though qualified, in Judith Berling’s Understanding Other Religious 
Worlds: A Guide for Interreligious Education.333 The book, xix +380 pages in length, is 
organized into an introduction and three subsequent sections, with three chapters in 
each section.  
Burke’s biographical statement in the textbook and on the publisher’s website 
states only that he was “for many years Professor of Religion at Temple University.” He 
holds a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Buckingham, UK, and a 
doctorate in theology from the Ludwig-Maximilians University in Munich. Among the 
authors surveyed, Burke is most explicit about his commitment to liberalism. Before 
his world religions textbook published in 1996, he published No Harm: Ethical 
Principles for a Free Market (Paragon House 1994). In 2002, he founded the 
Wynnewood Institute, an independent, academic non-profit organization that “seeks to 
promote the understanding of Western civilization, the free society and the free 
market” and takes an approach rooted in “classical liberalism combined with 
                                            
332 Mark MacWilliams, “Religion/s between Covers: Dilemmas of the World Religions Textbook, 
Introduction,” Religious Studies Reviews 31, no. 1 & 2 (April 2005): 1–3. 
333 Judith A. Berling, Understanding Other Religious Worlds: A Guide for Interreligious Education 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004), 132. 
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conservatism.”334 Burke’s biographical statement on the Wynnewood Institute website 
includes the statement: “In 2002, in response to the events of 9/11, he conceived of 
establishing a research institute concerned with the encounter between Western 
civilization with its concept of the free society and the traditional Muslim world. This 
has become the Wynnewood Institute.”335 Burke also contributed to the Encyclopedia of 
Libertarianism in 2008.336 
William A.Young, The World’s Religions: Worldviews and Contemporary Issues, 3rd 
Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2010. 
 
Published by Pearson, The World’s Religions: Worldviews and Contemporary 
Issues ranks in Amazon’s Top 100 Bestsellers in Comparative Religions.337 The book is 
xiv + 433 pages in length, divided into four sections and nineteen chapters. The author, 
William A. Young, is Emeritus Professor of Religious Studies at Westminster College in 
Fulton, MO, where he also served as university chaplain for twenty years.  He holds a 
PhD in Religious Studies from University of Iowa and a Master of Divinity from 
McCormick Theological Seminary. His other publications include introductory 
textbooks An Introduction to the Bible: A Journey into Three Worlds (in its 6th edition), 
and Quest for Harmony: Native American Spiritual Traditions.338 
Henceforth, I will refer to each book by the last name of the author, or 
author/editor in the case the Neusner text.  
 
 
                                            
334 “About the Institute,” The Wynnewood Institute, accessed June 15, 2013, 
http://www.wynnewood.org/Home/About-the-Institute.aspx. 
335 “About Thomas Patrick Burke,” The Wynnewood Institute, accessed June 15, 2013, 
http://www.wynnewood.org/Home/Officers-and-Board/About-Thomas-Patrick-Burke.aspx. 
336 Ronald Hamowy, ed., The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism (London: Sage Publications, 2008). 
337 This ranking was current as of August 12, 2013; however, ranking data changes regularly. 
<http://www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/books/12783/ref=pd_zg_hrsr_b_3_4_last#5> 
338 “Faculty and Staff,” Westminster College, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.westminster-
mo.edu/facstaff/Pages/directorydetails.aspx?ListID=558B06FC-8047-4578-B40E-
C113A449E520&XID=89 
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Table 1: Textbooks chapters, listed by appearance339 (Section headings are underlined.) 
 
Brodd Burke Fisher Neusner340 Smith Young 
1.Studying 
the World’s 
Religions  
2. Primal 
Religious 
Traditions  
South Asia:  
3. Hinduism 
4. Buddhism 
5. Jainism 
6. Sikhism  
East Asia: 
7.Confucian-
ism  
8. Taoism  
9. Zen 
Buddhism 
10. Shinto  
The Ancient 
West: 
11. Ancestors 
of the West 
12. Judaism  
13. 
Christianity 
14. Islam 
15. Religion 
in the Modern 
World 
Introduction  
I.The Religions of 
Indian Origin:  
1. Hinduism  
2. Buddhism  
3. Sikhism  
II. The Religions 
of Chinese Origin: 
4.Traditional 
Chinese Religion 
and Confucianism 
5.Taoism  
6. Chinese 
Buddhism  
III. The Religions 
of Semitic Origins:  
7. Judaism  
8. Islam  
9. Christianity 
1. Religious 
Responses 
2. Indigenous 
Sacred Ways  
3. Hinduism 
4. Jainism 
5. Buddhism 
6. Daoism and 
Confucianism  
7. Shinto and 
Zoroastrianism  
8. Judaism 
9. Christianity  
10. Islam 
11. Sikhism  
12. New 
Religious 
Movements  
13. Religion in 
the Twenty-
First Century 
Introduction 
I: In the Beginning  
1. Native Americans and 
Their Religions  
II: Christian Foundations 
of American Religions  
2. Protestant Christianity*  
3. The Religious World of 
African Americans  
4. Catholics*  
5. The Religious World of 
Latino/a and Hispanic 
Americans  
6. Orthodox Christianity*  
III: Other Monotheistic 
Traditions in America  
7. Judaism* 
8. Islam*  
9. The Baha’i Faith*  
IV: More Recent Arrivals  
10. Hinduism*  
11. Buddhism*  
12. East Asian Religions 
in Today’s America  
V: Made (or Re-made) in 
the USA:   
13.Apocalyptic 
Communities: Seventh 
Day Adventists and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses**  
14. Metaphysical 
Communities: Christian 
Science and Theosophy**  
15. New Thought  
16. The Church of 
Scientology 
17. Nature Religions: 
Neopaganism and 
Witchcraft  
18. The Latter Day Saint 
(Mormon) Religion*  
19. The Unification 
Church  
VI: Issues in American 
Religion  
20. Religion & Women  
21. Religion & Politics  
22. Religion & Society  
1. Points of 
Departure 
2. Hinduism 
3. Buddhism 
4.Confucianis
m 5. Taoism  
6. Islam  
7. Judaism  
8. Christianity 
9. The Primal 
Religions 
10. A Final 
Examination
341  
 
I. Introduction  
1. An Introduction to 
Religion and the Study 
of Religion  
II. The World’s 
Religions: Histories 
and Worldviews  
2. Indigenous 
Religions 
3. Hinduism 
4.Theravada Buddhism 
5. Jainism 
6.Confucianism 
7. Daoism 
8. Mahayana 
Buddhism (The Great 
Vehicle) and Vajrayana 
Buddhism (The 
Thunderbolt Vehicle)  
9. Shinto 
10. Judaism 
11. Christianity 
12. Islam 
13. Sikhism 
14. New Religious 
Movements: Renewal 
and Innovation  
III. The World’s 
Religions and 
Contemporary Ethical 
Issues:  
15. The Ecological and 
Economic Crises: 
Humans and 
Resources  
16. War and Capital 
Punishment: Society 
and Violence  
17. Abortion and 
Euthanasia: Life and 
Death  
18. Gender and Sexual 
Orientation: Roles and 
Identity  
IV. Conclusion  
19. The Future of the 
World’s Religions 
 
                                            
339 I have listed and numbered each chapter as it appears in its respective text. I have also 
included larger categorical headings when used.  
340 * The full title of these chapters ends with “in the World and in America;” ** The full title of 
these chapters begins with “World Religions Made in the USA” 
341 The “50th Anniversary Edition” (HarperOne 2009) includes a supplementary “Plus” section 
with a Theosophical Society-sponsored lecture given by Smith in Chicago in 2002 and an 
interview of Smith published in the Buddhist magazine Shambhala Sun in July 1997. 
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Table 2: Comparison of religions covered by each text 
 
 
Burke 
 
Brodd Fisher Neusner Smith Young 
Indigenous  
Religions 
No “Primal 
Religious 
Traditions” 
“Indigenous 
Sacred Ways” 
“Native 
Americans 
and their 
Religions” 
“The Primal 
Religions” 
“Indigenous 
Religions—Quest 
for Harmony” 
Christianity Yes Yes Yes Protestant; 
African 
American; 
Catholic; 
Latino/a & 
Hispanic 
Yes Yes 
Judaism Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Islam Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hinduism Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes; also 
contains 
“Appendix on 
Sikhism” 
Yes 
Buddhism Buddhism; 
Chinese 
Buddhism 
Buddhism; 
Zen 
Buddhism 
Yes Buddhism; 
East Asian 
religions 
Yes Theravada 
Buddhism; 
Mahayana and 
Vajrayana 
Buddhism 
Jainism No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Sikhism Yes Yes Yes No No; 
“Appendix on 
Sikhism” 
included in 
Hinduism 
chapter 
Yes 
Confucian-
ism 
Yes Yes Yes, with 
Daoism 
Yes, with 
East Asian 
religions 
Yes Yes 
Daoism Yes Yes Yes, included 
with 
Confucianism 
Yes, with 
East Asian 
religions 
Yes Yes 
Additional 
Religions 
None Shinto; 
“Ancestors 
of the 
West” 
Shinto and 
Zoroastrianism; 
New Religious 
Movements 
7 chapters 
on New 
Religious 
Movements 
None Shinto; New 
Religious 
Movements 
Topical 
chapters 
None “Religion in 
the Modern 
World” 
“Religion in the 
Twenty-First 
Century” 
Religion & 
Women;  
Religion & 
Politics;  
Religion & 
Society  
“A Final 
Examination” 
“The Ecological & 
Economic Crisis;” 
“War & Capital 
Punishment;” 
“Abortion & 
Euthanasia,” 
“Gender & Sexual 
Orientation;”  
“The Future of the 
World’s Religions” 
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5.2 Analyzing the Texts: the Construction of Normativity 
While these texts are different from one another in many ways, each constructs 
normativity, the complex and typically unseen process of establishing norms, or 
certain discursive and social practices, as standard, dominant, and natural. As I look 
for patterns in the texts that reveal discursive strategies of recontextualization, 
construction, and legitimation, I also parse out interdiscursive relationships.  
5.2.1 Interdiscursivity 
Texts are historical. They absorb and are built out of previous texts. Any given 
text is a palimpsest; the encountered text sits at the forefront of a layered and often 
concealed interdependent relationship with other texts, discourses, social practices 
and structures. Interdiscursivity, a concept used in discourse analysis, refers to the 
ways in which discourses draw from and overlap with each other, such as how the 
discourse of pluralism draws from the discourse of liberalism. A related concept, 
intertextuality, concerns ways in which a given text enfolds other texts. For example, 
many world religions textbooks reveal lingering influences of pivotal texts in religious 
studies, such as the work of Eliade and Smart, even when they do not explicitly 
acknowledge this influence. Interdiscursivity and intertextuality speak to the fact that 
discursive practices have an interdependent relationship that constitutes, defines and 
transforms them. Thus, texts always take or render from other contemporary and 
historically prior texts and discourses.342  
Interdiscursive relationships also involve processes of recontextualization 
through which texts from one discourse are reoriented and reinterpreted in the context 
of another discourse. Accordingly, interdiscursivity does not mean that one discourse 
is replicated in another, but rather reworked and rearticulated in the new context. 
                                            
342 Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, 40. 
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Fairclough describes these processes of articulation, disarticulation, and rearticulation 
as leading to discursive change—“disarticulating existing orders of discourse and 
rearticulating new orders of discourse, new discursive hegemonies.”343 These discursive 
changes are always rooted in previous or existing orders. They do not reflect new 
language or conventions, but rather new combinations of existing conventions, codes 
or elements, often involving interdiscursivity.  
While there may be several discourses at work in these textbooks, I focus on the 
interdiscursive relationship between pluralism and liberalism situated within the world 
religions framework of these texts. Liberal discourse contains many variants, yet 
retains a set of common features. The most prominent facet of liberal discourse 
permeating these texts is an individualistic anthropology. Liberalism, through varying 
arguments, asserts the primacy of an autonomous and rational individual, equal to all 
others, and endowed with natural rights to life and liberty. This anthropology is 
foundational to modern conceptions of religion and the public sphere.  
The category of religion developed along with the European social 
transformation that is modernity, shaped by the processes of the Enlightenment, the 
Protestant Reformation, and the rise of liberalism and the nation-state. Modernization 
led then to “the construction of religion as a new historical object: anchored in 
personal experience, expressible as belief-statements, dependent on private 
institutions, and practiced in one’s spare time.”344 Many scholars argue that the 
contemporary study of religion involves projecting this modern concept back in time 
so that “religion” now appears to be a necessary aspect of human experience that has 
                                            
343 Ibid., 97. 
344 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 207. 
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always existed.345 The interdiscursive relationship of pluralist and liberal discourses is 
rooted in this construction of religion that relies on liberal norms.  
As I have argued, pluralism is an ideology that broadly entails a commitment to 
recognize, value, and attempt to understand perceived religious differences. While 
some scholars use pluralism interchangeably with plurality or diversity, I argue that 
the term carries prescriptive norms and thus should not be seen as synonymous with 
diversity. Rather pluralism works to define and order religious diversity. In this sense, 
pluralism is just one possible response to religious diversity. As I discussed in chapter 
four, Masuzawa situates the discourse of world religions within the larger discourse of 
religious pluralism. She argues that world religions discourse has been shaped by a 
pluralist ethos. While this discourse has at times purported to engage in a scientific 
study of religion, it has roots in comparative theology and its efforts to identify or 
construct a universal spiritual tendency, which was uncritically defined and measured 
by the norms of Christianity.346  
The dominant practices of the discourse of pluralism posit a number of claims: 
religion is important; religion is a positive force in the world; religious plurality or 
diversity is good; and therefore religion and religious diversity ought to be respected—
even celebrated and nourished. Finally, pluralism claims that, in order to appreciate 
the goodness in religion and religious diversity as well as cultivate respect for them, 
religion ought to be understood. As I will go on to show, these discursive practices, 
evident throughout the textbooks in my study, work to normatively position and 
                                            
345 See, among others, Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Religious Studies; Dubuisson, The Western 
Construction of Religion; Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or How European 
Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism. 
346 Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or How European Universalism Was Preserved in 
the Language of Pluralism; Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Religious Studies. 
 139 
regulate the role of religion in the public sphere and naturalize a social order 
organized by liberal norms. 
5.2.2 Defining religion 
In the case of the texts in my study, the construction of normativity starts with 
each book’s position as a textbook. The genre of the textbook is not neutral; it is 
embedded with its own particular discursive practices, rules and conventions. Thus, it 
follows that the discourse of pluralism may follow different rhetorical and discursive 
practices in a textbook than it will in another genre, such as a scholarly or newspaper 
article or in a political speech. As characteristic of the textbook genre, world religions 
textbooks present themselves as a source of authority and legitimate knowledge. These 
textbooks define not only the study of religion but also the subject of their study—
religion itself. Either explicitly or implicitly, these textbooks normatively position their 
subjects.  
As I have previously discussed, the process of defining the term religion is 
complex and burdened with typically veiled politics. Definitions perform normative 
functions; that is, they prescribe boundaries and engage in processes of determining 
inclusion and exclusion. As I analyze these textbooks, I look at how they define 
religion, whether these definitions are clearly labeled as definitions and how the 
process of defining takes place both implicitly and explicitly. I consider how the texts 
explain or identify the nature of religion, whether religion has an essence and what this 
essence entails. I also look at whether the text makes assumptions or claims about 
legitimate or authentic religion and religious authority, as well as how the text defines 
or constructs difference.  
My intent here is not to argue that these texts should explicitly define religion or 
that there is an ideal definition of religion. Rather, my goal is to illuminate the politics 
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involved in defining religion, the ways in which definitions, always “the historical 
product of discursive processes,” both reflect social structures and simultaneously 
construct them.347 I look at how definitions involve recontextualization.348 Definitions 
are discursive practices and they entail a process of representation. They take an 
amalgam of social realities and practices and re-present them as religion. This 
representation always takes place outside the original context of the social practices 
being represented. Thus, representation requires recontextualization. Moreover, this 
recontextualization always entails a process of transformation. The process of 
representation and recontextualization changes the original practice in some way and 
“what exactly gets transformed depends on the interests, goals and values of the 
context into which the practice is recontextualized.”349 In my analysis, I argue that this 
context is the intertwined relationship of pluralism and liberal discourse, which I 
explore along with its “interests, goals, and values.”  
All six textbooks are structured by a world religions framework. In each of these 
textbooks, the process of defining religion begins before any clear discussion or 
explanation of definitions. It begins with the world religions framework itself. Each 
textbook is organized into chapters by religion. This organizational framework is also 
a discursive strategy that positions each religion as an autonomous, established, and 
clearly demarcated tradition. It naturalizes the boundaries between each religion. This 
discourse assumes that there is such a phenomenon as religion, found throughout the 
world in many forms that are diverse, yet comparable. It is a practice of 
recontextualization into a liberal context.  It also establishes a hierarchy, asserting 
                                            
347 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 29. 
348 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research; Van Leeuwen and 
Wodak, “Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse Historical Analysis.” 
349 Van Leeuwen and Wodak, “Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse Historical 
Analysis,” 96. 
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positions of importance, privilege, and dominance for those religions included, while 
implicitly marginalizing religions that are excluded. The world religions framework 
places all religions in a dialogue. This assumes a certain comparability and equality 
among the traditions. It assumes, as Dubuisson proffers, that “Christianity, in its 
capacity as the religion of the West, is the homologue or equivalent of Chinese Taoism, 
Siberian shamanism, or Indian Buddhism.”350 World religions are framed as discrete, 
coherent, and autonomous traditions that lend themselves to commensurate 
comparison. The very structure of these textbooks communicates values of 
pluralism.351  
In these textbooks, I argue, the discursive practices of defining and positioning 
religion are constructive strategies. They build and emphasize sameness, inclusion, 
and unity under the category of religion. They attempt to persuade and invite 
identification. At the same time, these strategies establish difference and exclusion. 
They make claims for what counts as legitimate religion and what is deviant. 
The six textbooks in my study give little attention to the definition of religion 
and the complex theoretical issues involved in this process. Remarkably, most do not 
address the issue of definitions at all. Only Fisher and Young include a paragraph or 
two discussing the definition of religion and the construction of the category of 
religion; and only the latter text attempts to give an explicitly identifiable definition of 
religion.  
Young problematizes “religion,” although briefly. He asks, “If such diverse 
phenomena are ‘religious,’ is there any common denominator that enables us to 
                                            
350 Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion, 9. 
351 I discussed the world religions model in the previous chapter. This critical description here 
draws from Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or How European 
Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2005) and Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Religious Studies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). 
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distinguish religion from other human endeavors?”352 He also acknowledges scholarly 
arguments that “it is impossible to define religion in general,” that such efforts are 
always subject to “the bias of a particular religious or nonreligious point of view” and 
that “religion” may be a Western category “imposed on other cultures.”353 However, he 
stakes his position in favor of defining religion, albeit with a recognition of its 
limitations. Citing Jonathan Z. Smith, he asserts that “a definition of religion in general 
is not only possible but essential to the study of religion. A definition may reflect the 
bias of its author, but readers have a right to know the basic perspective taken in a 
presentation on a subject, especially one as controversial as religion.”354 Young then 
sets about to establish a working definition, noting that “such definitions are not 
intended to capture the true essence of religion but rather intend only a framework for 
distinguishing and understanding religion.”355 He settles on the definition: “Religion is 
human transformation in response to perceived ultimacy.”356 While Young goes on to 
unpack this definition, what he means by “human,” “transformation,” and “ultimacy,” 
he does not situate his definition within a socio-historical trajectory. 
Fisher also acknowledges the complex theoretical issues involved in defining 
religion. She points to the constructed nature of categories such as Christianity and 
Buddhism, stating that each is “an abstraction that is used in the attempt to bring 
some kind of order to the study of religious patterns that are in fact complex, diverse, 
ever-changing, and overlapping.”357 She states: “Religion is such a complex and elusive 
topic that some contemporary scholars of religion are seriously questioning whether 
                                            
352 William A. Young, The World’s Religions: Worldviews and Contemporary Issues, 3rd Edition 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2010), 3. 
353 Ibid., 2. 
354 Ibid., 4. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Ibid., 3. 
357 Mary Pat Fisher, Living Religions, 8th Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 
2011), 1. 
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‘religion’ or ‘religions’ can be studied at all. They have determined that no matter 
where and at what point they try to define the concept, other parts will get away.”358 
Fisher introduces the reader to a certain amount of ambiguity and complexity 
regarding the definition of religion and does not attempt to propose a precise 
definition. Nonetheless, as she goes on to describe the qualities and nature of religion 
in the introductory chapter and throughout the text, she establishes a tacit definition 
that positions religion as primarily about the individual, spirituality, and goodness– 
points to which I will return later. 
As they address definitions of religion, the Young and Fisher texts take similar 
approaches. They essentially argue that religion is difficult to define because it is so 
complex. Subsequently they subtly assert the actuality of the phenomenon contained 
by the category of religion–we may not know how to name it, but we know that it 
exists. In doing so, they reify the category of religion. Moreover, definitions involve 
establishing boundaries and delimiting meaning. As Young and Fisher present their 
readers with a pluralistic picture of religion as diverse, intricate, and vast, they ignore 
the ways in which the act of defining establishes certain norms and positions certain 
perspectives and practices as dominant and others as marginal. They advise the reader 
to beware of easy definitions, but they do not advise the reader to look for the ways in 
which certain definitions establish and mark certain interests. 
Regardless of whether a textbook clearly and explicitly defines religion, it still 
engages in a process of normatively positioning its subject, which in effect presumes a  
definition. All six textbooks in my study assume that the term ‘religion’ is familiar to 
the reader, that it requires scant or no definition. They generally assume their study 
should begin with descriptions of each religion and its various components, such as its 
                                            
358 Ibid., 2. 
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history, myths, symbols, scriptures, and rituals, rather than a discussion of how these 
various social practices came to be identified as religions. They assume the existence 
of religion as a discrete phenomenon and begin by asserting its universality and 
importance. All six texts share common discursive practices that work to define and 
construct the category of religion. As I will go on to elaborate, these practices position 
religion as an essential part of the human experience involving transcendence and 
spirituality. The prominence of spirituality, in turn, emphasizes the individual and the 
individual’s relationship to the transcendent, which subsequently functions to situate 
religion as primarily private and voluntary. 
Religion as universal and ubiquitous  
Many texts make clear claims that religion is an autonomous, universal aspect of 
human experience for which individuals have the capacity, regardless of their cultural 
contexts. Under the section heading “Why Are People Religious?,” Young asserts the 
ubiquity of religion. He states: 
Most people in the world are religious. Given our definition, one could easily 
argue that all people and groups are religious, for everyone seems to engage at 
some level in transformation in response to some perceived secular or spiritual 
ultimacy. Indeed, one scholar has coined the phrase homo religiosus as a way of 
expressing his contention that we are the species that is by nature religious 
(Eliade 1969:8). Readers may wish to reflect on or discuss the question of the 
universality of religion, now or later in their study. Another, equally interesting 
question, is ‘Why are people religious?’359 
 
Here, Young seems to construct a definition of religion so broad that it will encompass 
all people, thus supporting the claim that all humans are religious. While he 
acknowledges that one might question the universality of religion, he offers no 
discussion of this question. Rather, he moves on to the question of why people are 
religious, to which he gives considerable attention. He sums up the universal 
significance of religion stating, “Religion is pervasive, and, from what we are able to 
                                            
359 Young, The World’s Religions: Worldviews and Contemporary Issues, 6. 
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gather about the earliest evidence of human life, it always has been. Anyone seeking to 
understand the world in which he or she lives must confront religion seriously.”360 The 
Neusner text also maintains the universality of religion, specifically in the American 
context, stating: 
Most Americans are religious. They believe in God. They pray. They practice a 
religion. They explain what happens in their lives by appeal to God’s will and 
word and work, and they form their ideal for the American nation by reference 
to the teachings of religion: ‘one nation, under God.’ This statement, from the 
Pledge of Allegiance, describes how most Americans view our country. 
Americans act on their religious beliefs. Nearly all Americans (92.5 percent) 
profess belief in God… Religiosity is a fundamental trait of the American people 
and has been from the beginning.361 
 
Multiple texts, including Smith, Fisher, Young, and Brodd, convey the 
pervasiveness of religion by employing a common rhetorical practice and begin with 
illustrative descriptions of a number of individuals engaging in different ritual, prayer 
or devotional practices deemed “religious.” Smith describes the religious activities of 
many people he has known around the world and tries to synthesize this multiplicity, 
stating: 
What a strange fellowship this is, the God-seekers in every land, lifting their 
voices in the most disparate ways imaginable to the God of all life. How does it 
sound from above? Like bedlam, or do the strains blend in strange, ethereal 
harmony? Does one faith carry the lead, or do the parts share in counterpoint 
and antiphony where not in full-throated chorus?362 
 
He concludes: “We cannot know. All we can do is try to listen carefully and with full 
attention to each voice in turn as it addresses the divine.”363 Smith claims that these 
disparate practices hold commonalities and share in the universal quest that is 
religion, emphasizing the ubiquity of this phenomenon. At the same time, he frames 
this introduction to diverse religions in implicitly Christian terms of “fellowship” and 
                                            
360 Ibid., 7. 
361 Jacob Neusner, “Introduction,” in World Religions in America: An Introduction, ed. Neusner, 
Jacob, 4th Edition (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 1. 
362 Huston Smith, The World’s Religions (San Francisco: HarperOne, 1991), 2. 
363 Ibid. 
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“God-seeking” and emphasizes historically Christian values of universalism and 
transcendence. 
The introductory chapter of the Fisher text also begins with a phenomenological 
description of individuals around the world engaging in various sorts of ritual or 
devotional practice. Fisher then states “These and countless other moments in the lives 
of people around the world are threads of the tapestry we call ‘religion.’”364 By placing 
the term religion in quotation marks, she alludes to the constructed nature of the 
category. Still, the metaphor of the tapestry functions much like the Smith example, 
building commonality, connecting diverse and even disparate social practices under 
the category of religion, and stressing that this phenomenon is ever-present. 
At the same time, the Fisher text, the most recently updated of all six texts in 
this study, seems to simultaneously deemphasize the notion of the universality of 
religion in its current edition. Under the section titled, “Why are there religions?,” the 
text states, “In many cultures and times, religion has been the basic foundation of life, 
permeating all aspects of human existence. But from the time of the European 
Enlightenment, religion has become in the West an object to be studied, rather than an 
unquestioned basic fact of life.”365 Notably, in an earlier edition of the text, an abridged 
version based on the fourth edition, the section titled “Why are there religions?” began 
with the question “Why is religion such a universal aspect of human life?” Thus, it 
seems that a process of revision has led to a more nuanced treatment of the category 
of religion that recognizes it as one possible feature of human life rather than a 
universal way of being human.366 
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The Brodd text also uses a descriptive rhetorical device. Rather than describing 
a number of individuals engaged in diverse religious practices, he gives quotations 
from four different articles in the June 22, 2007 issue of the New York Times. In 
response to these articles (on Muslim practices of veiling in Britain, yoga in Times 
Square, biblical stories in a film, and sectarian conflict in Iraq), Brodd declares they are 
“compelling evidence that the world’s religions are part of people’s everyday world. We 
cannot call ourselves informed citizens without having at least a basic knowledge of 
them.”367 
Not only do these textual examples position religion as universal, they also work 
to justify and legitimate the task of the textbooks. As they work to construct their 
subject, religion, they underscore its importance. They argue that religion is universal, 
essential, and an irreducible piece of the human experience, so much so that the 
human experience cannot be fully understood without an understanding of religion. 
This also justifies the significance of its study for the student and legitimizes the field 
of religious studies as an important and necessary project. 
The essence of religion: transcendence and spirituality 
 Another common discursive practice among these texts entails the assertion of 
an essence of religion, an irreducible, fundamental nature or core of religion that 
cannot be reduced to any other factor or explained by nonreligious means. For many 
texts, this essence relates to transcendence and spirituality. This discursive practice 
often involves first making a claim that religion is an essential part of the human 
experience, followed by a description of some primary qualities of this essence. While 
these texts name various dimensions of religion, they frequently stress that at the core 
of religion lies spirituality, which tends not to be clearly defined but generally seems to 
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concern an individual’s relationship with the transcendent. Older texts such as Smith 
tend to describe the transcendent in terms of God. More recently published or updated 
texts such as Young and Fisher, in effort to be more inclusive, shy away from the use 
of the term God, noting its Christian history and connotation. Instead they opt for 
terms such as “transcendent” and “ultimate.” Yet, the theological valence remains. 
The Brodd text offers an example of positioning religion as a universal 
phenomenon through an emphasis on spirituality. He contends that “religion begins 
with mystery,” an essential part of the human experience involves questioning that 
mystery and the meaning of existence and ultimate reality, and “by responding to the 
questions, religion provides a way of living and dying meaningfully amid the 
mystery.”368 He states: 
We are self-conscious beings. Along with being physical, rational, and emotional, 
we have the capacity for self-reflection; we have a conscience; we can ponder 
our own nature. We are spiritual (although the term spiritual is open to 
interpretation). And by virtue of our spirituality, we ask—and answer—life’s 
most basic questions. Because these questions are more or less pertinent to 
each religious tradition, they can be organized into a kind of framework for 
studying the world’s religions.369 
 
For Brodd, religions speak to the inherently spiritual nature of humanity. This 
establishes a common ground for comparison. It also tells readers that this study is 
personal as well as useful and salient to their lives.  
 Burke also locates spirituality at the core of religion and characterizes this 
essence in terms of transcendence. 
Some people find religion puzzling. They do not see any grounds to believe that 
it is true, they do not observe that it fulfills any very useful function, and they 
do not understand why it should arouse the ardent passion that it often 
does…To gain an understanding of religion and its role in human life, perhaps 
one place to start might be with what we may call the spiritual dimension of life. 
Although it is not easy to describe this in words, it is the aspect of life that rises 
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above our usual preoccupation with our individual selves, transcending our 
personal needs and desires.370 
 
Burke’s explanation of spirituality, “the spiritual dimension of life,” is not merely 
descriptive, but prescriptive as well. It is a constructive discursive strategy that 
advocates for the value of spirituality. Another example states:  
Our outlook on life is spiritual when we look at things from a broader, a less 
self-centered, a more impartial or universal perspective, where we become 
detached from our ego and are no longer concerned with our own personal fate, 
at least in this life. The spiritual dimension of life is sometimes described as 
having the perspective of eternity, because when we are inclined to get wrapped 
up in some urgent present concern, such as achieving a promotion or obtaining 
possession of some material object, it asks us to disengage ourselves from the 
present moment and consider how important this particular thing will be in a 
hundred years, or perhaps a thousand. Even those most skeptical about religion 
often see the nobility of such a state of detachment from the narrow confines of 
the self. For a mature person the spiritual side of life is more important than the 
material.371 
 
Burke links this “spiritual side of life” with transcendence. He explains: 
The diagnoses which the major religions provide, and the remedies toward 
which they point, do not lie within the field of ordinary human experience, but 
are transcendent, that is, they point to a realm of being beyond our ordinary 
experience, a realm which can often be described as supernatural. However 
closely they may pay attention to the details of human living, it is the realm of 
the transcendent which ultimately concerns them. This marks them off from 
diagnoses of the human condition made solely in terms of this life and this 
world, such as Marxism, which are therefore not included here, even though 
there may be some superficial resemblances.372  
 
For Burke, this weight given to transcendence as a common factor among religions also 
works to define and exclude what does not count as religion, in this case, Marxism and 
other worldviews focused “solely in terms of this life and this world.” 
Fisher continually indicates ways in which all religions touch on or point to 
something ultimate and transcendent. In the text’s introduction, she states: “All of 
religion shares the goal of tying people back to something behind the surface of life—a 
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greater reality, which lies beyond, or invisibly infuses, the world that we can perceive 
with our five senses.”373 She contends that this essence of religion is situated outside 
empirical evidence: “Because religions involve the unseen, the mysterious, these 
leaders’ teachings are not verifiable by everyday physical experience.”374 
Subsequently, in her sympathetic approach to religion, she situates this core of 
religion as inherently good and positive. Again she argues that it is universal among 
religions, with such statements as: “Many people of broad vision have noted that many 
of the same principles reappear in all traditions. All religions teach the importance of 
setting one’s own selfish interests aside, loving others, harkening to the divine, and 
exercising control over the mind.”375 Thus, negative manifestations of religion 
represent a distortion or a veering away from the essence of the religion. As she 
explains her sympathetic approach to the study of religion in the preface, she states: 
“Distinctions are made between the basic teachings of religions, none of which 
condones wanton violence, and the ways in which religions have been politicized.”376 
 Smith also describes an ahistorical essence of religions that transcends the 
distinctions of cultures and histories. He states, “Every religion mixes universal 
principles with local peculiarities.”377 The word “peculiarity” can mean particularity. 
However, it can also mean oddity or idiosyncrasy; thus, by using this term, Smith 
suggests that the particularities of religion are partial or secondary expressions-- or 
even distortions-- of their essence. He then continues to explain this tension between 
universal principles and local peculiarities: 
The former, when lifted out and made clear, speak to what is generically human 
in us all. The latter, rich compounds of rites and legends, are not easy for 
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outsiders to comprehend. It is one of the illusions of rationalism that the 
universal principles of religion are more important than the rites and rituals 
that feed them; to make that claim is like contending that the branches and 
leaves of a tree are more important than the roots from which they grow. But 
for this book, principles are more important than contexts, if for no other 
reason than that they are what the author has spent his years working on.378  
 
Despite his defense of the value of the peculiarities of religion, he suggests that its 
essence, which he has privileged over particularity, is of greater value to the reader. 
The chief reason I find myself returning to the world’s great wisdom traditions 
is for help on issues I have not myself been able to circumvent. Given the 
essential similarity in human nature—we are all more human than otherwise—I 
assume that the issues engage the readers of this book as well.379 
 
He also acknowledges tensions, ambiguity and ambivalence in religions, as he explains: 
 
 The full story of religion is not rose-colored; often it is crude. Wisdom and 
charity are intermittent, and the net result is profoundly ambiguous. A balanced 
view of religion would include human sacrifice and scapegoating, fanaticism and 
persecution, the Christian Crusades and the holy wars of Islam. It would include 
witch hunts in Massachusetts, monkey trials in Tennessee, and snake worship in 
the Ozarks.380 
 
He then, however, goes on to justify why these aspects of religions are not important 
for his study. He argues that his book does not address these tensions because the 
book is about “values” and “the empowering theological and metaphysical truths of the 
world’s religions,” which he argues are “inspired.”381 The reader can assume here that 
Smith is suggesting these values are inspired by God or ultimate reality. He then 
juxtaposes the inspired truth of religions with religious institutions, which Smith calls, 
“another story.” He states: “Constituted as they are of people with their inbuilt frailties, 
institutions are built of vices as well as virtues.”382 With this statement, Smith suggests 
that religious institutions are flawed human constructions that do not always 
adequately represent the truth, or essence, of religions, nor do they capture Smith’s 
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attention. Rather, Smith is interested identifying a universal wisdom expressed by 
these religions. He argues that “when religions are sifted for those truths, a different, 
cleaner side appears. They become the world’s wisdom traditions.”383 This raises the 
question of what constitutes wisdom for Smith. Here, liberalism provides the 
foundation for Smith’s notion of wisdom. The liberal anthropology asserts a universal 
human nature rooted in reason. Individuals differ only in so far as they are socialized 
differently. Hence, culture becomes secondary. This parallels Smith’s approach to what 
is universal in religions (wisdom) and what is peripheral or arbitrary (peculiarities.) 
Religion as individual and private 
These discursive practices that maintain an essence of religion also tend to 
orient this common human experience around the individual. They position religion as, 
first and foremost, an individual pursuit. The Burke text offers one example of framing 
religion in terms of the individual. Burke states that religion “has to do with the soul” 
and he explains the soul as “that deep dimension of each person’s identity and 
character” and “the most important aspect of us, what makes us uniquely ourselves.”384 
Thus, religion has to do with individual identities. Smith claims that his book is “about 
religion alive” and goes on to describe religion alive as something intangible, universal, 
and beyond empirical evidence, as an essentially personal and private experience: 
Religion alive confronts the individual with the most momentous option life can 
present. It calls the soul to the highest adventure it can undertake, a proposed 
journey across the jungles, peaks, and deserts of the human spirit. The call is to 
confront reality, to master the self… authentic religion is the clearest opening 
through which the inexhaustible energies of the cosmos to enter human life. 
What then can rival its power to inspire life’s deepest creative centers?385  
 
Religion is about the self; religion is about the individual and her or his experience 
with the transcendent. Fisher also emphasizes the individual. She explains in her 
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preface that she does not want to present religions as monoliths, stating “Religion is 
not a museum piece.”386 Rather, she aims to situate religion as living, dynamic, and 
diverse by giving prominence to individual experiences. She states:  
This approach follows real people into the depths of their search for meaning, 
order, and inner peace in a world that may otherwise seem chaotic and 
sometimes violent. Therefore, in addition to exploring various scholarly 
perspectives, we will try to listen carefully to individuals of all faiths as they tell 
their own stories.387 
 
This discursive practice also functions to privilege religion as an individual experience. 
It highlights the subjective, individualistic side of religion and presents religion as a 
quest for authenticity, a key liberal ideal “that each of us has an original way of being 
human.”388 
The notion of religion as private experience is infused with liberal assumptions. 
Fitzgerald argues this has implications “for philosophical concepts of individual 
autonomy, for economic activity, for ideas about rationality, civil society and human 
rights, and for the development of the institutions of representative government.”389 As 
Fitzgerald argues, defining religion in this way rests on theological assumptions of a 
universalized “natural religion,” in which private spiritual experience gives rise to “the 
religions;” these assumptions “valorize the primacy of individuals over institutions.”390  
Moreover, framing religion as an individual pursuit then asserts that: “the truly 
religious consciousness is private, that religion is defined in terms of some special 
kind of experience had by individuals, and that the institutional forms of ritual, liturgy, 
and church are merely secondary social phenomena that are either not in themselves 
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religious or are religious in a secondary, derivative sense.”391 This works to solidify 
liberal norms. 
5.2.3 Constructing the reader 
Not only do these texts construct religion, they also assert a notion of a 
normative student of religion. They assert ideals of how the reader ought to think and 
respond. World religions textbook authors assume their readers are students new to 
the study of religion, the most likely audience for an introductory textbook. Yet, why 
the student is drawn to the subject in the first place may not be so clear. Huston Smith 
assumes his reader is a neophyte, unfamiliar with the field, and with the potential to 
be confused by jargon and too much emphasis on theory and method. He seems to 
assume that his reader is seeking truth, wisdom, and understanding rather than 
methods and tools for the academic study of religion. Or perhaps his concern is not 
with the reader’s interest, but rather his own insistence that ahistorical, timeless 
wisdom and values are the most significant and beneficial by-products of a study of 
religion.   
Smith makes other assumptions about his reader that function to establish 
normativity. By asserting who the likely student of religion is, describing this student’s 
normative position, Smith simultaneously establishes who and what are “other.” He 
begins to delineate lines of difference. Smith assumes that his reader is at least 
Western and likely American. He acknowledges this assumption and clearly states: “the 
book is incorrigibly Western in being targeted for the contemporary Western mind.”392 
Specific references to “witch hunts in Massachusetts, monkey trials in Tennessee, and 
snake worship in the Ozarks”, as well as cities such as Montgomery, Alabama, and 
personages such as President Eisenhower suggest that he imagines “Westerners” as 
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Americans. His mention of the “contemporary Western mind” implies that there is 
some common thread running through the Western experience. While he does not 
explain or name this common thread, assuming that the reader already knows and 
understands it, he clearly imagines that this common culture is liberalism, with its 
basic principles of moral autonomy, individual liberty, equal rights, and secularism. 
Smith also assumes that his reader is at least Christian, and likely Protestant, as 
evidenced in his explanation of why he has chosen not to highlight too much diversity 
in each religion: 
Put the matter this way: If you were trying to describe Christianity to an 
intelligent and interested but busy Thailander, how many denominations would 
you include? It would be difficult to ignore the differences between Roman 
Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Protestant, but you would probably not get into 
what separates Baptists from Presbyterians.393 
 
Later in his introduction as he explains the importance of understanding “other” 
religious perspectives and worldviews, he lists religions such as Buddhism and 
Hinduism as examples of “other,” further buttressing his implicit assumptions that 
Christianity, the most widespread religion in the U.S., is the normative starting point 
for his readers.  
This normative perspective is further evident through his chapters on these 
“other” religions in which he frequently attempts to explain their “universal” wisdom 
through references to Western culture. In the chapter on Hinduism, Smith opens with a 
number of examples of how Hinduism is relevant to “Westerners”— a quote from Max 
Müller explaining the importance of intellectual histories from India, an anecdote 
about how Robert Oppenheimer, an American scientist involved in developing the first 
nuclear bomb, found wisdom in the Bhagavad Gita, and brief description of how 
Mahatma Gandhi influenced Martin Luther King, Jr. Clearly, Smith understood his 
                                            
393 Ibid., 3. 
 156 
audience to be Americans who needed persuading of Hinduism’s salience to the 
Western world. Finally, in the chapter on Buddhism, he tells the story of Gautama 
Siddhartha’s enlightenment and includes a comparison to Jesus, though Christianity 
has not yet been introduced in the text: “The records offer as the first event of the 
night a temptation scene reminiscent of Jesus’ on the eve of his ministry.”394 
Ostensibly, Smith assumes his reader is already familiar with Christianity. 
The Smith text was initially written in 1958, a time when it was not so 
improbable to assume that most Americans were familiar with Christian ideas. The 
Brodd text at times also suggests a normative reader, with statements such as 
“Learning about Hinduism depends first on understanding a perspective of reality—the 
universe, human beings, and the divine—that is fundamentally different from common 
Western perspectives.”395 Given that the text is published by a Catholic publisher, it is 
likely that Brodd imagines his reader as Catholic. Notably, the Neusner text, which 
begins by emphasizing the diversity of American religions, contains statements in 
multiple essays that suggest a normative “Judeo-Christian” reader. The essay on 
Buddhism, written by Malcolm David Eckel, begins with the suggestive statement that 
“If you have never thought of religion without thinking of God, or if you think that a 
religion has to have clear boundaries that separate insiders from outsiders, then you 
will be intrigued and challenged by your encounter with Buddhism.”396 The essay on 
Islam, written by John Esposito, continually compares Islam to Judaism and 
Christianity, with statements such as “Muslims worship the same God who is revered 
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by Christians and Jews”397 and “Just as Moses in Judaism and Jesus in Christianity hold 
a special place as messengers and models for their communities, Muslims believe that 
Muhammad is the revealer of God’s will for two reasons.”398 These comparisons are not 
merely functions of comparative rhetoric; they work to suggest a normative reader, 
one who will likely view and understand these religions from a Christian or Jewish 
perspective. 
The normative “we” 
All of the texts in this study also form their readers through constructive 
discursive strategies that function to create a “we” group. The first-person plural 
pronoun “we” is complex; its reference at times can be vague and unclear. It can 
include “I + you,” “I + he,” “I + she,” “I + they,” “I + you + they” and more variations. 
Linguists often make a distinction between “addressee-inclusive” and “addressee-
exclusive” uses of “we.” At times, the references cannot be clearly identified.399  
In these world religions textbooks, I have noted a pattern of use of the pronoun 
“we,” as well as the correlated first-person possessive pronoun “our(s),” as a persuasive 
device that invites identification with a normative group and simultaneously 
establishes the “other.” In these samples, “we,” or “our,” is both addressee and speaker 
inclusive. It is used frequently in descriptions of “religion” that position the category 
as essential and universal. It prompts the reader to personally relate to the experience 
of religion. At times, this identification is then used to compel the reader to experience 
a sense of empathetic understanding for the “other,” i.e., adherents of other religions. 
Often it is employed along with prescriptive, moralizing claims. The discursive building 
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of the “we” group simultaneously produces and maintains the discourse of pluralism 
and the pluralist ethos. Numerous textual examples of this practice can be found in all 
six textbooks. Each in its way promotes cosmopolitanism, hinged upon the universal  
extension of liberal moral values of individualism and egalitarianism, and constructs a 
religious reader who is open-minded, welcoming of difference, globally committed, 
socially aware, and personally engaged. 
In the Fisher text, several examples of this constructive discursive practice 
appear in the introductory chapter. A section titled “Why are there religions?” includes 
responses to this question in sub-sections. Under the sub-section, “Functional 
Perspective: Religion Is Useful,” Fisher writes about religions that “They [religions] are 
found everywhere because they are useful, both for society and for individuals. 
Religions ‘do things’ for us, such as helping us to define ourselves and making the 
world and life comprehensible to us.”400 Here, Fisher reinforces and legitimates her 
claims about the ubiquity of religion by persuading the reader to identify with the 
universal experience of meaning making that religion provides. At another point in this 
section, she states: “We may look to religions for understanding, for answers to our 
many questions about life.401 In these textual samples, the construction of this “we” 
group appeals to the reader to understand religion not only as a universal human 
experience, but also as a personal experience and part of a quest for authenticity, all of 
which reproduce liberal norms of individualism. Burke uses “we” and “us” in a similar 
way: 
Each of the major religions has a message about the human condition; each 
points to something that it views as fundamentally wrong and unsatisfactory 
about our ordinary existence; each offers a diagnosis of the cause of that 
unsatisfactoriness and points to a possible remedy. By doing this religions 
provide a framework of meaning for human life. Every event in our lives and 
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every action that we take have some kind of relationship to that framework, 
which tells us what its ultimate significance is for us.402 
 
Smith’s use of “we” simultaneously establishes the religious outsider, while promoting 
empathetic identification with that outsider: 
We shall never quite understand the religions that are not our own. But if we 
take those religions seriously, we need not fail miserably. And to take them 
seriously we need do only two things. First, we need to see their adherents as 
men and women who faced problems much like our own. And second, we must 
rid our minds of all preconceptions that could dull our sensitivity or alertness 
to fresh insights. If we lay aide our preconceptions about these religions, seeing 
each as forged by people who were struggling to see something that would give 
help and meaning to their lives; and if we then try without prejudice to see 
ourselves what they saw—if we do these things, the veil that separates us from 
them can turn to gauze.403 
 
Here, Smith reinforces the notion of religion as a universal human experience, shared 
by “men and women who face problems much like our own.” This passage also 
suggests that there is a common essence of religion, which provides an entry point for 
understanding. It encourages tolerance and promotes a pluralist ethos. 
Brodd also constructs a normative “we” group to promote understanding 
religious diversity as a civic project. He writes:  
What can we hope to gain from a broad study of the world’s religions? For one 
thing we can strive to become more knowledgeable about their responses to the 
most fundamental religious questions asked by human beings all over the 
world… That, in turn, can enrich us in our roles as citizens of the global 
village.404 
 
Similarly, Young uses “we” to highlight the globalized context of today’s world:  
If the human species is to survive, we must learn to live together and cooperate 
in solving the environmental and political problems we face. The key to 
cooperation is understanding the ‘other.’ How can we hope to understand other 
peoples unless we are willing to study their religions, their responses to 
perceived ultimacy? It may sound melodramatic, but it is arguably true that our 
future depends on peoples’ willingness to understand sympathetically other 
peoples’ religions.405 
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Here, Young asserts pluralism—the “willingness to understand sympathetically other 
peoples’ religions”—as a norm. He does not offer it as one of multiple approaches to 
understanding and managing religious diversity. Rather, he entreats his reader to view 
the task of pluralism as urgent and incumbent upon the global citizen. Moreover, he 
implicitly constructs his normative reader against conservative, exclusivist members of 
religious communities who do not share sympathy or respect for other religions and 
secularists who think that religion has waning social significance or ought to fade 
away. 
Neusner’s use of “we” also makes claims for civic norms. Yet where Brodd and 
Young frame their arguments in more global terms, Neusner is distinctly nationalistic:  
America is a huge and diverse country, and the secret of its national unity lies in 
its power to teach people to respect one another, not despite difference but in 
full regard for difference. We like one another as we are, or, at least, we try to. 
And when we do not succeed, we know we have failed our country.406 
 
Here, Neusner does not use “we” to refer to a broad human condition. In this case, 
“we” specifically references Americans. It also works to persuade the reader to identify 
with a particular conception of an American citizen, one who is tolerant and pluralist. 
In a coercive turn similar to Young’s, Neusner does not offer pluralism as one 
possibility among many. Rather, Neusner makes clear that if the reader does not share 
this view of tolerance and pluralism as the foundation of good American citizenship, 
then the reader has “failed our country.” This passage also provides an excellent 
example of the limitations of liberalism, the illiberal tendencies that pluralism, as a 
liberal discourse, cannot avoid. Pluralism, which advocates for the respect for 
difference, simultaneously discredits and disparages political conceptions of difference 
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that diverge from liberal norms of tolerance and pluralism. Despite its rhetoric, 
pluralism cannot accommodate all differences.  
5.2.4 Delineating difference 
The aforementioned discursive practices work to normatively construct 
subjects, recontextualize and connect diverse social practices under the category of 
religion, and build commonality and identification with a sympathetic approach to the 
study of religion. As they work to identify sameness, they simultaneously delineate 
difference. They mark the boundaries of religions and establish the “other.”  
Otherness, Jonathan Z. Smith argues, “is an ambiguous category. This is so because it 
is necessarily a term of interrelation. ‘Otherness’ is not so much a matter of separation 
as it is a description of interaction.”407 This interaction is a political exercise and, more 
precisely I argue, an exercise of governmentality, of regulation. J.Z. Smith also points 
out “Difference is rarely something simply to be noted; it is, most often, something in 
which one has a stake. Above all, it is a political matter.”408 In the case of these 
textbooks, the delineation of difference serves varying purposes. At times, it reinforces 
the dominance of a particular group, primarily Christian and Western. At other times, 
it supports a normative construction of religion that relies on liberal values such as 
individualism, universalism, and tolerance. Always, it involves regulation.  
 Discursive practices of defining difference involve naming, classifying, and 
ordering. An overt example in the Smith textbook includes descriptions that exoticize 
and reveal Orientalist tendencies of classification. He explains to the reader, who he 
has normatively positioned as an Anglo American Christian,409 that the study of world 
religions will involve the strange and unfamiliar: “We are about to begin a voyage in 
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space and time and eternity. The places will often be distant, the time remote, the 
themes beyond space and time altogether. We shall have to use words that are 
foreign—Sanskrit, Chinese, and Arabic.”410 This passage is another example of the 
constructive discursive strategy of building the “we” group, which simultaneously 
establishes a shared identification, while marginalizing those who have been placed 
outside the norm. While plenty of people speak Chinese or Arabic as their native 
languages, this discursive strategy recontextualizes these languages as foreign. Those 
included in “we” clearly are not speakers of Chinese or Arabic. The latter group, is 
casually marked as “other.”  
Other examples of defining difference do not involve such a palpable 
classification of the “other” as foreign. Rather, difference is established simultaneously 
with the process of identifying sameness. This is endemic to social processes of 
classification, which always involve various arrangements of dividing and combining. 
In order to identify equivalences, certain differences must be overlooked. And, 
conversely, to name differences, certain equivalences must be subverted. What is 
notable, then, is how these equivalences and differences represent certain interests 
and power dynamics.411 As one example, Burke sets up categories, based on geographic 
regions of origin, by which to classify religions and order the textbook. 
Taking them overall, it might be said that within each family the resemblances 
between one religion and another are for the most part more striking than the 
differences, while between religions belonging to different families the 
differences typically stand out more strongly. These three families of religions 
can be viewed as offering three fundamentally different alternatives in the 
understanding of human life and the world.412 
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This classification constructs fixed boundaries between religions. Accordingly, Burke 
contends that religions of Semitic origin share a common understanding of human life 
and the world that differs significantly from the understanding shared by religions of 
Indian origin, Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism. This suggests a kind of simplistic 
essentialization of religious differences. It assumes that religious beliefs are the 
primary determinant of one’s worldview and ignores diversity of cultures. One might 
argue that Syrian Christians in India share a more similar view of the world with Sikhs 
in India than say, Presbyterians in the United States, or that American Zen Buddhists 
share more in common with American Reform Jews than they do with Theravadan 
Buddhists in Burma. Thus, Burke’s ordering of his textbook serves to minimize this 
diversity and nuance while defining difference in a particular way. It also reinforces his 
essentialist definition of religion. 
At another point in his introduction, Burke discusses the categorization of 
religions, with the caveat that categories “should not be understood too rigorously, 
since most religions are complex and present exceptions to almost every rule we try to 
impose on them, but simply as indications of the direction in which a religions or some 
portion of it tends.”413 He then goes on to discuss “universal and particular” religions, 
reproducing the nineteenth century world religions taxonomy described by Masuzawa, 
which distinguished universal, thus “world,” religions from local religions and once 
named Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam as uniquely universal religions of the 
world.414 Burke states: 
Some religions understand themselves as addressed to the whole human race; 
their aim is to embrace all of mankind and they actively desire converts. These 
are sometimes called universal religions. This is not to imply that they actually 
do embrace all human beings, which is obviously not true, but that this is their 
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ideal. Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam are universal religions in this sense. 
Other religions have no such universal aim, but understand themselves existing 
only for a particular people, tribe, or nation. They usually do not especially 
desire converts. These religions may be called communal, tribal, ethnic, or 
national religions. Judaism and Hinduism are examples. Not all religions fit 
easily into these distinctions: the Confucian and Taoist traditions, for example, 
neither aim explicitly to embrace the whole of mankind, nor consider 
themselves in principle restricted to the Chinese people.415 
 
Thus, here Burke defines differences and sameness in ways that reinscribe historical 
world religions discourse. 
5.3 Analyzing the Texts: Methods, Rationales, and Strategies of Legitimation  
The world religions textbooks analyzed here engage in practices that work to 
construct and perpetuate dynamics of authority, designating some ways of thinking 
about and describing religions as legitimate and authoritative, and others as deviant or 
problematic. At one level, these discursive practices draw upon the genre of the 
textbook. Endemic to the genre, textbooks represent sources of authority; thus the 
information and claims they present are conveyed as standard and definitive. In other 
words, many readers will assume that claims about religions or approaches to its study 
found within a textbook are authoritative by virtue of its genre. 
At the same time, the world religions textbooks analyzed here make a number 
of claims that function as discursive strategies of legitimation. Each of these six 
textbooks makes a case for why one should study religion. They all argue that religion 
is important, which then makes its study important. Of course, it is a common 
convention for any text to include some explanation of why it is useful or meaningful 
and the contribution it makes to a broader field of knowledge or scholarship. However, 
I contend that, in these six textbooks, the arguments for the importance of religion are 
not mere literary convention, but function as discursive practices of legitimation. They 
work not only to justify the importance of their task, the study of religion, but also to 
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establish the authority and legitimacy of pluralism and liberalism, which in turn 
supports a liberal social order. These discursive practices are mechanisms of liberal 
governance. I look at how these discursive practices overlap with the process of 
defining and normatively positioning religion as well as how these practices work to 
prescribe and delineate the role that religion should play in civil society.  
Here, I draw from Van Leeuwen’s framework for analyzing the way discourses 
construct legitimation. Among Van Leeuwen’s multiple categories of legitimation, I 
look especially at rationalization legitimation, which Van Leeuwen further breaks down 
into instrumental rationalization, which references the utility of a social practice, and 
theoretical rationalization, which focuses on “some kind of truth, or ‘the way things 
are.’”416 I also examine instances of moral evaluation legitimation, in which discursive 
practices hint at particular moral values and discourses, but in an obscured way that 
works toward naturalization.417 Through examining discursive practices of legitimation, 
I identify and assess the ways in which these textbooks aim to solidify and establish 
the authority and legitimacy of pluralism and liberalism. 
5.3.1 Methodological positions 
Each text explains in some way how it approaches the study of religion, how the 
book is organized, what is included, and what is left out. These accounts reveal 
fundamental assumptions about the nature of religion and its role in society. They 
contribute to the work of normatively positioning religion. They also often work to 
legitimate their task.  
The Smith text is remarkable among the other texts in this study in the ways it 
very clearly outlines a sui generis conception of religion and a pluralist approach to its 
study. From early in the introduction, Smith makes clear that his textbook is not 
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comprehensive, but has a normative agenda. He states “This book is not a balanced 
account of its subject.”418 Rather, he tells the reader, he organized the text and chose 
the most important aspects of religion that the reader should know based on 
“relevance to the interests of the intended reader.”419 These imagined interests include 
salience to “the modern mind,” “religions’ contemporary expressions,” and 
“universality,” all of which support his rationale that “the ultimate benefit that may 
accrue from a book such as this is help in the ordering of the reader’s own life.”420 
While he describes this “benefit” in terms of the individual, it is fair to assume that 
Smith believes the “ordering” of the individual—the individual’s moral formation—will 
contribute to a greater social good. Thus, the normative agenda of his text involves 
shaping a particular social order. Given that the text was written in 1958, a time when 
pluralism and multiculturalism were less widespread social values, Smith had 
transformative aims. His text should be seen as an effort to naturalize a new (for its 
time) cosmopolitan view of religious diversity. 
As Smith explains the structure of the textbook, he constructs an essentialist 
definition of religion, which positions religion as having an immutable essence that is 
universal, transcendent and exists outside history. He states: 
This is not a textbook in the history of religions… Historical facts are limited 
here to the minimum that is needed to locate in space and time the ideas the 
book focuses on. Every attempt has been made to keep scholarship out of sight 
– in foundations that must be sturdy, but not as scaffolding that would obscure 
the structures being examined.421 
 
He argues that “history” and “scholarship” could obscure the aspect of religion he 
wants to illuminate—this universal essence. Rather, he wants the book to be accessible: 
“The study of religion can be as technical and academic as any, but I have tried not to 
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lose sight of the relevance this material has for the problems that human beings face 
today.”422 He states: 
I have deleted enormously, simplifying where historical details seemed to be 
slowing the pace and obscuring the essential… These liberties may lead some to 
feel that the book ‘sits loose in the facts,’ but historical accuracy is not the basic 
issue. Religion is not primarily a matter of facts; it is a matter of meanings423 
 
This passage offers an example of theoretical rationalization legitimation. Smith 
asserts that religion is not about “facts,” but about “meanings.” He does not elaborate 
this claim, but rather implies that this is just the way things are. Moreover, he implies 
that this truth is a corrective to those who might be overly focused on historical 
details. This statement works to legitimate his pluralist approach as the ideal way to 
truly know and understand religions. For Smith, this emphasis on meaning reflects his 
universalist assumptions. Facts involve particularities, which Smith deems to be of 
secondary importance. Meaning involves universal wisdom, which, ideally, the reader 
will engage and allow to shape his or her moral formation. 
Smith essentially argues that religion—having a universal and transcendent 
essence—can be understood as existing outside social, historical and political 
structures, and is perhaps even better understood in this way. Smith is not concerned 
that the scholarship he wants to keep out of sight and its discursive processes form 
their subject, religion. Smith makes clear that one can learn about religion with no 
knowledge of theory and method. Moreover, he suggests that theory and method 
actually get in the way of truly understanding religion. Positioning religion in this 
essentialist way detaches religion from history. It obscures the social, political, and 
cultural contexts of religion and the discursive processes involved in its construction.  
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Yet, Smith aligns his approach with honoring the essence of religion: “Even the 
subtlest way to patronize religion will be avoided, the way that honors it not for itself 
but for its yields—its contributions to art, or to peace of mind, or to group cohesion.”424 
Smith freely admits that he offers only a positive account of religions, not a “balanced 
account”. He calls his concern “the world’s religions at their best.”425 He claims that he 
does not use a comparative approach:  
Finally, this is not a book on comparative religions in the sense of seeking to 
compare their worth. Comparisons always tend to be odious, those among 
religions the most odious of all. So there is no assumption here that one religion 
is, or for that matter, is not, superior to others. ‘There is no one alive today,’ 
Arnold Toynbee observed,’ who knows enough to say with confidence whether 
one religion has been greater than all others.’ I have tried to let the best in each 
faith shine through by presenting it in the way I have found its most impressive 
adherents envisioning it. Readers may press on with comparisons if they wish to 
do so.426  
 
This paragraph involves moral evaluation legitimation. Terms such as “odious” and 
“best” assert moral value. Yet, the criteria and means for making these moral claims 
are not made explicit, nor are they debatable. As Van Leeuwen describes these types of 
claims, “They trigger a moral concept, but are detached from the system of 
interpretation from which they derive, at least on a conscious level.”427 The ambiguity 
of these claims raises questions. Smith has just told the reader that comparisons are 
problematic, not merely questionable, but “odious,” hateful, reprehensible—terms that 
suggest immorality. Surely, the neophyte reader does not want to engage in immoral 
activities. Yet, the word “best” is a term of comparison. Smith wants to claim that he 
does not engage in comparison, that he has situated all religions as equally valuable 
and as sharing universal truth and wisdom. Again, Smith engages in a number of 
interpretive moves that necessarily involve evaluation, comparison, and processes of 
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delineating differences and equivalences. The discursive practices in this paragraph 
work to legitimate his pluralist approach. Taken as a whole, the aim of the Smith text is 
not to instruct the reader in the academic study of religion, but to foster enhanced 
understanding and respect for religious diversity. Smith wants to create pluralists, 
firmly centered in liberal values of individualism (autonomy, authenticity, etc.), 
universalism, and cosmopolitanism.  
The Young text claims its approach to be “historical, comparative, and—above 
all–phenomenological.”428 Young identifies this approach as “descriptive,” as distinct 
from an “evaluative” approach. He explains evaluative approaches, such as religious or 
philosophical methods, as “seeking to judge the truth of religion or religions. They 
want to know whether the claims of individual (or the religion in general) have merit, 
and seek to establish criteria for assessing them.”429 He then contrasts descriptive 
approaches as “designed not so much to make judgments about the truth of religion or 
religions as to understand religion and the role religions play in human life.”430 The use 
of the term “descriptive” implies a kind of neutrality and obscures the complex and 
situated dynamics involved in the interpretive process required for description. Young 
encourages the reader “to the maximum degree possible, to put aside their own 
assumptions about the truth of religion or religions, and seek to understand the 
variety of religions studied in this book on the religion’s own terms.”431 Young’s 
instruction is rooted in the phenomenological concept of “bracketing,” which involves 
suspending one’s own judgment in order to understand a phenomenon. This approach, 
however, raises unresolved questions about how one identifies a religion’s “own terms” 
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as well as how one approaches religion in a way that does not involve a process of 
interpretation filtered through a particular socio-historical lens. 
The phenomenological method, popularized in the discipline of religious studies 
by scholars such as Mircea Eliade and Ninian Smart, is common in world religions 
textbooks. Along with Young, Brodd and Fisher also explicitly frame their textbooks 
with this approach. All reference either Eliade or Smart, appealing to this expertise for 
legitimation of their methods. Fisher lists a number of methodological approaches for 
the study of religion that the text employs and emphasizes phenomenology, which she 
describes as:  
an appreciative investigation of religious phenomena from the perspective of 
practitioners and believers—an ‘insider’s’ rather than an ‘outsider’s’ point of 
view… This approach follows real people into the depths of their search for 
meaning, order, and inner peace in a world that may otherwise seem chaotic and 
sometimes violent. Therefore, in addition to exploring various scholarly 
perspectives, we will try to listen carefully to individuals of all faiths as they tell 
their own stories.432 
 
This explanation of a phenomenological approach reveals and reinforces her tacit 
definition rooted in liberal norms and primarily about the individual, spirituality, and 
goodness. It frames religion as a personal quest for “inner peace” juxtaposed against a 
world that can be “chaotic” or “violent.” Throughout the textbook, Fisher continually 
positions religion as having an essence that is good; she dismisses incidences of 
religiously motivated violence or oppression as illegitimate distortions of religion. 
Thus, this description of the book’s methodological approach to the study of religion 
begins the work of supporting and legitimating this conception of religion. 
Notably, the Burke text takes a different position. He describes the 
phenomenological approach and then proceeds to critique it. He states: “It seems to 
imply all beliefs are equally valid and all practices are equally good, which it would be 
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folly to believe, and which arguably no one does believe.”433 While he does warn the 
reader that “it is wise to suspend judgment until we are certain we understand the 
matter sufficiently,” he also argues that “we do not think the question of evaluation 
should be swept entirely under the rug, as if everything taught and practiced by all 
religions was right and good.”434 At the end of each chapter, following between 15 – 30 
pages describing a particular religion, Burke asks the reader to evaluate the validity of 
the religion through discussion questions such as “What considerations might lead you 
to believe that the worldview of the Upanishads is valid?” and “What considerations 
might lead you to reject it as mistaken?”435 Burke does not provide final answers to 
these questions, but this practice serves to reinforce a particular model of religion. It 
positions religion as ahistorical, essentially belief-based, and a matter of individual 
choice based on “reasonableness.”  
The Neusner text also claims neutrality: “This book does not advocate religion, 
or any particular religion. Its purpose is only to describe and explain religion as an 
important factor in American society.”436 Yet, explaining religion as “an important 
factor in American society” is a situated within a larger liberal pluralist discourse. 
Moreover, his descriptive approach is consistent with a phenomenological method. In a 
section titled “How to Study about Other Religions,” Neusner list four different 
approaches: 1. exclusivist, 2. inclusivist, 3. pluralist, and 4. “empathetic interest in 
other people.” Neusner claims the book uses the fourth approach, which he explains as 
about: 
not whether religions are true (which in the end is for God to decide) but how all 
religions are interesting and important. We maintain here that every religion has 
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something to teach us about what it means to be a human being. Here we take a 
different path from the one that leads us to questions about religious truth. It is 
a path that carries us to a position of empathy for our fellow Americans, in all 
their rich diversity.437 
 
Here Neusner seems to associate pluralism with pluralist theology. However, his 
description of “empathetic interest” evokes features of the discourse of pluralism—
that all religions have value and deserve respect and that religious diversity is a social 
good to be celebrated. His use of the terms “interesting and important” serves a 
legitimating and persuasive function here. These terms are likely meaningful to the 
reader, who may encounter them without question and assume that he or she knows 
what is “interesting and important.” However, with closer inspection, the meaning of 
these terms is not clear. To whom are these religions interesting? And why are they 
important? Answering these questions involves establishing or identifying norms. 
Thus, without elaboration, these terms obscure as much as they reveal. They also 
function persuasively to encourage the reader to identify with Neusner’s claims 
without fully understanding their implications. 
5.3.2 Liberal religion and insider authority 
A related discursive strategy of legitimation found in several textbooks involves 
the privileging of the authority of religious experience and insider accounts of religion. 
This practice also relies on the phenomenological approach. I give it some focus here, 
because it engages in a particular kind of authorization legitimation that depends on 
personal authority while veiling the role of the author.  
The phenomenological approach holds that the best way to understand a 
religion is to look to how its adherents describe it, as exemplified in the passage from 
the Smith text discussed in the previous section, in which Smith explains his method, 
“I have tried to let the best in each faith shine through by presenting it in the way I 
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have found its most impressive adherents envisioning it.”438 Another example from 
Young states, “In the present study our basic approach is phenomenological. Our goal 
is to let each religion speak for itself, presenting it in a way that could be affirmed by 
the people who themselves perceive ultimacy in this matter.”439   
The preface of the Fisher textbook provides yet another example of this 
methodological orientation. In this case, it is clear that Fisher offers this approach as a 
transformative strategy, as a means for shifting the discourse: 
This book provides a clear and straightforward account of the development, 
doctrines, and practices of the major faiths followed today. The emphasis 
throughout is on the personal consciousness of the believers and their own 
accounts of their religion and its relevance in contemporary life… Old 
approaches to understanding and explaining religions are being increasingly 
challenged, so in this edition I have given special attention to sensitive issues 
raised by current scholarship and by voices from within the religions… Much 
more emphasis is being placed on cultural customs, popular spiritual practices, 
mixtures of religions, and varieties of religious ways, as opposed to distinct 
monolithic institutionalized religions, and this emphasis is reflected in new 
material woven through this edition. It is now more difficult to make sweeping 
generalizations about any religion, for they do not fit the facts that are coming 
to light.”440 
 
For Fisher, this approach counters an older view of religions as monolithic and 
internally consistent and coherent. It recognizes greater diversity and religion at the 
margins. Yet, it does not recognize the socially, culturally, and politically situated 
positions of insiders and the ways in which individual experiences of religion are 
shaped by myriad social variables and may or may not correspond to the experiences 
of others. It also suggests that religion has an essence that can only be known and 
understood through the experience of an adherent. Moreover, this emphasis on the 
privileged authority of adherents’ perspectives hides the process of representation and 
interpretation involved in presenting insider accounts.  
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Emphasizing insider accounts is not a neutral practice. It reflects interpretive 
decisions. Moreover, this practice further reinforces the notion of religion as primarily 
personal and individual, which perpetuates liberal norms and value. In this case, it also 
works as a strategy of legitimation. The adherent becomes the authority and whatever 
the adherent says must be true, because it reflects his or her own experience, which 
has been situated as the essence of religion. The insider account becomes insulated 
from critique, as does the obscured interpretive work of the author. This 
phenomenological approach works to legitimate its own authority. 
5.3.3 Taking religion seriously 
Another prominent discursive strategy of legitimation found throughout all six 
textbooks involves elaborating the significance of religion in the modern world. The 
textbooks make arguments for why religion itself is important, which in turn support 
claims for why the reader ought to better understand religions, legitimating the 
importance of the study of religion. Many texts proclaim that there is a particular 
urgency for understanding religion in the modern world. Calls to “take religion 
seriously” suggest that somehow religion has been disregarded, likely referring to the 
lingering effects of the secularization narrative, in which religion was positioned as 
waning and increasingly irrelevant. The authors of these texts argue that religion is 
salient because it is ubiquitous, affecting many areas of life. At the same time, it is 
often distorted or not well understood, which then leads to conflict. Thus, as the 
common argument goes, social cohesion is incumbent upon better studying and better 
understanding religion. These claims involve both rationalization and moral evaluation 
legitimation. They make a utilitarian case that the study of religion has an 
instrumental purpose; it meets a social need. These claims also contain an element of 
moralization. They suggest that the reader ought to better understand and respect 
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religious diversity in order to contribute to this greater social good, a liberal social 
order. 
In fact, the introductions of these six textbooks all make use of some form of 
this argument to legitimate their task. Brodd and Fisher emphasize religion’s 
pervasiveness and subsequent social significance as justifications for its study. Fisher 
states: “Nonetheless, this difficult-to-grasp subject is central to many people’s lives and 
has assumed great political significance in today’s world so it is important to try to 
understand it.”441 Brodd declares that “the world’s religions are part of people’s 
everyday world. We cannot call ourselves informed citizens without having at least a 
basic knowledge of them.”442 Young calls the study of religion “critical”: 
The study of religion is critical today because of its role in a variety of the 
arenas of human life: political, artistic, economic, to mention but a few. One 
need only look at a daily newspaper to see the influence of religion in politics. 
The events of September 11, 2001, brought home the role of religion in 
horrendous acts calculated to have profound political effects. However, religion 
has also been at the center of political movements that have improved the lives 
of people, such as the nineteenth-century campaign to end slavery in the United 
States.443 
 
Text samples from Neusner and Smith assert the importance of understanding religion 
for social cohesion. The Neusner text frames this argument in a specifically American 
context: 
We are trying to understand others and to explain ourselves in terms others can 
understand. That is the American way: to learn to live happily with difference, 
and not only to respect but to value the other. We teach the lesson that religion 
is a powerful force in shaping society, making history, and defining the life 
purpose of individuals and entire groups. That is why we want to understand 
religion—and, among the many true and valuable things about religion that 
there are to comprehend, that is what we in particular want in these pages.444 
 
The Smith text makes this argument in more global, cosmopolitan terms:  
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Those who listen work for peace, a peace built not on ecclesiastical or political 
hegemonies but on understanding and mutual concern. For understanding, at 
least in realm as inherently noble as the great faiths of humankind, brings 
respect; and respect prepares the way for a higher power, love—the only power 
that can quench the flames of fear, suspicion, and prejudice, and provide the 
means by which the people of this small but precious Earth can become one to 
one another… So we must listen to understand, but we must also listen to put 
into play the compassion that the wisdom traditions all enjoin, for it is 
impossible to love another without hearing that other. If we are to be true to 
these religions, we must attend to others as deeply and as alertly as we hope 
that they will attend to us.445 
 
These discursive practices legitimate the task of these textbooks, the study of religion, 
and not just any study of religion, but one specifically shaped by the framework of 
pluralism. Moreover, as these strategies of legitimation naturalize the tools and tactics 
of pluralist discourse, they support its regulatory role and naturalize a conception of 
religion rooted in liberal norms. 
5.3.4 Legitimate religion: separating the good from the bad  
A variation of this legitimating discursive practice involves an argument that not 
only is religion everywhere, but that it is frequently involved in conflicts. Often, as 
these arguments claim, these conflicts are the result of religion that has been distorted 
(i.e. violent extremists) or misunderstood (i.e. Islamophobia), and the study of religion 
is important to counter these tendencies. The process of determining what counts as 
authentic religion on one hand or distortions on the other results in the legitimation of 
certain norms. 
Several passages from the Fisher text exemplify this argument. Fisher asserts 
that authentic religion is inherently good; conflict involving religion is the result of 
religion being tainted or corrupted. A section in the introduction titled “Negative 
aspects of organized religions” states: “Tragically, religions have often split rather than 
unified humanity, have oppressed rather than freed, have terrified rather than 
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inspired.”446 Here Fisher juxtaposes negative manifestations with an implied ideal, 
presumably stemming from an asserted true essence. She states: “No religion has ever 
sanctioned violence against innocent people… Sadism, terrorism, wars over land and 
resources, political oppression, and environmental destruction can all be given a thin 
veneer of religious sanctification, thus obscuring their evil aspects.”447  
Fisher creates a dichotomy between good or authentic religion versus bad or 
corrupted religion. She argues that social structures and institutions are the source of 
the perversion of religion. She states: “Institutionalization of religion is part of the 
problem. As institutionalized religions spread the teachings of their founders, there is 
the danger that more energy will go into preserving the outer form of the tradition 
than into maintaining its inner spirit.”448 She implies that true and good religion is not 
institutional but personal and spiritual.  
Fisher’s arguments evoke the liberal idea of social differentiation, in which 
religion is relegated to its own sphere separate from the political and economic. Good 
religion is privatized religion. She repeatedly distinguishes the religious from the 
political. She argues for the importance of the separation of church and state to 
protect true religion and diversity: “When church and state are one, the belief that the 
dominant national religion is the only true religion may be used to oppress those of 
other beliefs within the country.”449 She asserts that where religious groups have 
become associated with politics, “such politicians then frequently legitimate their 
agendas by claiming they are defending religion. When religious groups are mobilized 
for political purposes, people oriented toward power rather than toward spirituality 
thus tend to be propelled into leadership roles, while still justifying their actions in 
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religious terms.”450 Reinforcing her essentialist notion of religion, Fisher implies that 
acts deemed “religious” must have some “spiritual” nature.   
While Fisher criticizes the institutional forms of religion for their distorting 
effects, she simultaneously presents a social movement, the interfaith movement, as 
the solution to religious conflict. Under a section titled, “The interfaith movement,” she 
asks “What can religions do to end the increasing political deadlock and hatreds 
between followers of various religions?” and answers: 
There is already an existing countercurrent growing in the world. At the same 
time that boundaries between religions are hardening in many areas, there has 
been an acceleration of interfaith dialogue—the willingness of people of all 
religions to meet, explore their differences, and appreciate and find enrichment 
in each other’s way to the divine.451 
 
Fisher sees the interfaith movement as a movement to help others understand the 
essence, thus goodness, of religion, which, it appears, she does not see as political. 
Fisher presents understanding as a tool for social harmony and cohesion. 
Moreover, she indicates that conflict in the world should motivate the reader with a 
sense of urgency for taking on this task of understanding. 
This is not the time to think of the world in terms of superficial, rigid 
distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ It is the time when we must try to 
understand each other’s beliefs and feelings clearly, carefully, and 
compassionately, and bring truly religious responses into play. To take such a 
journey does not mean forsaking our own religious beliefs or our skepticism. 
But the journey is likely to broaden our perspective and thus bring us closer to 
understanding other members of our human family.452 
 
In the text sample above, Fisher uses a constructive discursive strategy to emphasize 
sameness. The addressee and speaker inclusive possessive pronoun “our” works to 
build a “we” group (a strategy discussed in the previous chapter). Here, Fisher advises 
the reader to “try to understand each other’s beliefs and feelings” and in doing so, she 
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discourages the reader from focusing on difference, “us” and “them.” Thus, this 
passage implies that the proper study of religion—one motivated by compassion and 
“truly religious responses”—will lead the reader to see sameness and feel a kinship to 
“other members of our human family.” Yet, throughout the text, Fisher does not 
always focus on sameness. At many points, she delineates differences between 
legitimate, true religion on one hand and distorted, false religion on the other. For 
Fisher, the latter involves religious extremists, those with exclusivists worldviews that 
advocate or engage in violence, as well as those who use religion for political gain. 
Thus, I argue, the constructive discursive strategy used here functions as a mode of 
regulation. It invites the reader identify with a particular approach to the study of 
religion and positions this approach as one that will lead to a greater social good. 
5.3.5 The September 11 motif 
 Multiple texts also discuss religion and conflict through the motif of the attacks 
in America on September 11, 2001. These texts tend to position this event not just as a 
point in history, but as a symbolic event that encapsulates all that is dangerous about 
the distortion of religion—from the violent act attributed to religion to the religious 
and ethnic discrimination that followed this act. A view of these discursive patterns 
also shows work to establish and reinforce the parameters of good, legitimate religion. 
These texts tend to position authentic, legitimate religion as not just good but also 
peace-loving, nonviolent, spiritual and individualistic. They maintain that good religion 
supports the personal quest for authenticity and freedom. Moreover, they suggest that 
good religion belongs in the private sphere, outside the realm of politics, where it 
otherwise can be distorted. Some argue that violent acts that take place in the name of 
religion are distortions of that religion. So-called Muslim extremists are not 
authentically Muslim; they have allowed political beliefs to distort the essence of Islam, 
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which is inherently good. At the same time, those outside Islam who assume it is an 
inherently political and violent religion also have a distorted view. All assert that better 
education about religion—a properly ordered understanding of religion—provides a 
remedy to these distortions and the conflict they cause. 
At one point, Young states: “The events of September 11, 2001, brought home 
the role of religion in horrendous acts calculated to have profound political effects.”453  
For Young, this supports and justifies the need for the critical study of religion. 
Similarly, in a section titled “Religion After 11 September,” Fisher states: “The stunning 
attacks by terrorists on United States targets in 2001 brought instant polarization 
along religious and ethnic lines.”454 She goes on to write: 
Given the plurality of religions in the world and the extremism that some of 
their adherents are espousing, is a global ‘clash of civilizations’ inevitable in the 
future? As noted in Chapter 1, some observers are now saying that the real 
problem is not conflict among religions but rather a ‘clash of ignorance.’ Rigid 
exclusivist positions do not represent the heart of religious teachings. Whether 
state-sponsored or incited by militant extremists, violence finds no support in 
any religion. Thus there has been a strong outcry against fundamentalist 
violence by the mainstream religions from which militants have drawn their 
faith.455 
 
As previously discussed, the Fisher text presents conflict as the result of distorted 
religion, “a clash of ignorance,” which can be remedied by education and a better 
understanding of the essence of religion. 
The Burke text, however, takes a different approach. The preface of the second 
edition (published in 2004, eight years after the first edition) begins with the 
statement:  
The terrorist attacks carried out on the United States by radical Muslims on 
September 11, 2001, and the response of the United States and its allies against 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and against that of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, 
have raised urgent new questions about the ethical teachings of the major 
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religions, especially their attitude towards war and the use of violence, as well 
as about their relationship to the modern world.456 
 
Burke goes on to explain that, consequently, new sections have been added to most 
chapters on ethics and modern developments. At first glance, this passage seems 
similar to samples from other texts that point to the events of September 11 as 
justification for a better understanding of religion. Yet, in Burke’s chapter on Islam, he 
does not try to make a distinction between a distorted political Islam and an authentic 
peace-loving Islam. Rather, he simply claims that Islam sits in conflict with modern 
liberal society. He states: “Islam is not only a private or individual religion. Many of its 
laws can be carried out only in a Muslim society, where the civil law follows Islamic 
principles” and “Muslims of the most traditional sort cannot be content to live in a 
secular society in the Western sense, which provides freedom of religion to all.”457 He 
goes on to add that “At the present time, however, the general question of the 
relationship of Islam to society is the subject of much debate, and a growing number 
of Muslims, especially those living in the Western democracies, have adopted a more 
liberal viewpoint.”458 For Burke, unlike Fisher and Young, education about religion 
reveals a clash of civilizations that can only be remedied by the adoption of liberal 
norms. 
 In this chapter, I have analyzed how these six textbooks normatively construct 
their subject—religion—in ways that reproduce liberal norms. Using a pluralist 
framework, these discursive practices position religion as essentially private and 
voluntary, oriented around the individual pursuit of authenticity and the experience of 
a kind of universal, transcendent ultimate reality. In doing so, these practices reinforce 
liberal norms of secularism and situate the private sphere as the proper place for the 
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enactment of religion. I have also examined discursive strategies of legitimation that 
work to rationalize, authorize, and justify this prescriptive study of religion and 
naturalize its normative claims. Many texts present phenomenological methods that 
purport to be neutral and descriptive while obscuring interpretive decisions and 
prescriptive claims. Moreover, several texts legitimate the tools and tactics of pluralist 
discourse through claims about religion’s critical social importance and subsequent 
danger of distortion if not properly regulated and understood. The attacks of 
September 11 and the violent responses to them are very frequently used as examples 
of this danger. In all of these elements we see the legitimation of a liberal order, in 
which religion is defined as individualistic, non-political, essentially peaceful, tolerant, 
and privatized. In the following chapter, I continue my analysis of the interdiscursive 
relationships of pluralism and liberalism with regards to religion, focusing especially 
on the examples of Buddhism and Islam. I examine how these discursive practices 
function as a mode of governmentality and work to regulate the role of religion in civil 
society. 
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Chapter 6: Textbooks, liberal governance and the regulation of religion 
Analyzing how these texts advance an essentialist definition of religion as a 
universal and private phenomenon reveals a relationship between the discourses of 
world religions, pluralism, and liberalism. It uncovers assumptions about the nature of 
religion derived from liberal ideas and values, such as individualism, rationality, 
freedom, egalitarianism, authenticity, cosmopolitanism, and universalism. It brings to 
light discursive practices—of constructing a normative reader and delineating 
difference and equivalence—that naturalize these assumptions. Since the construction 
of normativity is a regulatory process, this analysis gives a glimpse of ways in which 
seemingly non-political discourses work to regulate and reinforce a liberal social order.  
In this chapter, I return to the concepts of interdiscursivity and intertextuality. I 
begin by considering the dynamics of depoliticization, or the obscuration of politics, at 
work in the discourse of pluralism. In the previous chapter, I looked at the ways in 
which these textbooks broadly situate religion. Here, I explore some of these discursive 
practices as they are applied to specific religions and found within chapters on these 
religions. For the sake of brevity, I do not elaborate an analysis of each chapter of 
every textbook in this study. Rather, I focus on the chapters on Buddhism and Islam. 
These religions, according to Tomoko Masuzawa, were the first to be granted “world 
religion” status, after Christianity.459 Examining the discursive practices operating in 
chapters on Buddhism and Islam offers a glimpse into the historical intertextual 
relationships that continue to shape the study of religions. I then move on to examine 
the ways in which the discursive practices of pluralism construct liberal subjects, aim 
to shape civic identities, and regulate religion in civil society. 
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6.1 Pluralism, textured discourses and veiled politics 
 Liberalism is a political theory and movement that works to manage difference 
and competing values. As John Gray writes, “The liberal problem—which is that of 
specifying terms of peaceful coexistence among exponents of rival, and perhaps 
rationally incommensurable, world-views—is no less pressing than in early modern 
times, when it appeared in Hobbes’s thought with a clarity and starkness that was 
never to be surpassed.”460 Generally, liberalism aims to address this problem by 
relegating these differences to the private sphere where diversity is most easily 
accommodated. At the same time, the public sphere requires a common culture, which 
must be that of liberalism. The liberal public sphere is frequently positioned as a 
neutral ground, while it is in fact situated, contextual, and—ironically—coercive. As 
Charles Taylor writes, “Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, but 
is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other 
ranges.”461 The situated nature of liberalism, however, stands in contradiction with its 
claims to universalism. Talal Asad points out, “Liberal politics is based on cultural 
consensus and aims at human progress. It is the product of rational discourse as well 
as its precondition. It must dominate the unredeemed world—if not by reason, then, 
alas, by force—in order to survive.”462 Thus, the liberal desire to protect and respect 
difference exists in tension with its totalizing and coercive tendencies. 
The dominant discourse of pluralism responds to diversity from within a liberal 
framework. It argues for the value and importance of a multiplicity of religions, as well 
as the protection of this multiplicity, so long as these religions can all respect a 
common public sphere and relegate their most meaningful differences to the private 
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sphere. Yet, pluralism does not often engage liberal discourse overtly. For example, the 
textbooks in this study construct these pluralist arguments in line with liberal 
ideology, but liberalism is never directly discussed or analyzed. Rather, it appears 
through the ways in which the texts describe the phenomenon of religion and 
elaborate how it ought to function in civil society. Through pluralist discourse, liberal 
norms are posited as if they were neutral, objective, and commonsensical, and 
pluralism is presented as a neutral position from which to view the phenomenon of 
religion. The relationship of these interwoven discourses is such that the political 
bearing of pluralism is largely obscured. Hence, pluralism operates as a discourse of 
depoliticization that “involves removing a political phenomenon from comprehension 
of its historical emergence and from a recognition of the powers that produce and 
contour it.”463 This depoliticizing tendency is endemic in the universalizing thrust of 
liberalism and reveals the largely invisible ways in which liberal norms permeate liberal 
societies, and function as an ideology. While liberalism may be a set of particular 
political theories, it also operates as a universalizing social order, maintained largely 
through discourses, forms of knowledge, and institutions that appear, on the surface 
at least, to be non-political. Liberalism achieves this all-encompassing hold so 
effectively by appearing to be natural and commonsensical.  
Here, I examine the practices of interdiscursivity and intertextuality at work in 
these textbooks, looking specifically at chapters on Buddhism and Islam in the world 
religions textbooks in this study. Through their ostensibly neutral, purportedly 
descriptive presentations of these two religions, these textbooks make a number of 
obscured prescriptive political claims. They establish certain norms and define 
difference. The discursive relationships revealed in this analysis also illuminate 
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historical continuities with hegemonic power dynamics of world religions discourse as 
well as the ways in which any given text always draws from prior texts and discourses.  
6.1.1 Buddhism: universal, rational, and spiritual 
In Masuzawa’s genealogy of world religions discourse, she sketches the 
evolution of the category of “world religion,” which was initially applied only to 
Christianity as a singular universal religion, and gradually expanded in scope to 
include other religions with purportedly universal significance. Buddhism was the first 
beyond Christianity to receive “world religion” status, followed later by Islam.464 Yet, 
this designation was contingent upon a European construction of Buddhism that 
ignored local practices and histories, while extrapolating a universal and transcendent 
essence and emphasizing “the singular intention of its founder toward something like 
a spirit of individual freedom and universal humanity soaring above the particularism 
of national tradition.”465 Essentially, this construction of Buddhism was shaped to 
reflect liberal norms. Donald Lopez reiterates these assertions and argues that the 
study of Buddhism was constructed as an object of Western knowledge in the era of 
European colonialism. As such, it represented the interests and perspectives of those 
involved in its creation. He writes: 
the Buddhism that largely concerned European scholars was an historical 
projection derived exclusively from manuscripts and blockprints, texts devoted 
largely to a ‘philosophy,’ which had been produced and had circulated among a 
small circle of monastic elites. With rare exception, there was little interest in 
the ways in which such texts were understood by the Buddhists of Asia, less 
interest in the ways in which such texts were put to use in the service of various 
ritual functions.466  
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Consequently, leading into the twentieth century, the Buddhism that dominated 
Buddhist Studies and joined the ranks of world religions was construed around 
universalist values, emphasizing the “dharma as a transcendent truth” and Buddhism 
as a “complete philosophical and psychological system, based on reason and restraint, 
opposed to ritual, superstition, and sacerdotalism.”467 This “putatively unitary object 
called ‘Buddhism’” was situated as transhistorical, transcultural, and “unchanged 
through the vicissitudes of time.”468 
 Samples about Buddhism in these textbooks reveal these universalist themes 
and the legacies of colonial modes of classification that linger in the world religions 
model. As products of the twenty-first century, many of these textbooks depart in 
some ways from these older practices by making some effort to emphasize diversity 
within Buddhism and avoid presenting it as monolithic. For instance, the Fisher text 
goes into great detail describing diverse Buddhist practices. The Brodd, Burke, Neusner 
and Young texts include multiple chapters on Buddhism, emphasizing regional and 
cultural differences. Yet, many texts still introduce Buddhism using terms that 
resonate with liberal norms of rationality, authenticity, and universalism, and 
consequently, traces of these older discursive practices of world religions discourse 
appear, revealing some historical continuities with nineteenth and twentieth century 
Buddhist studies.  
These texts describe Buddhism through comparisons to “Western” culture and 
religions, frequently emphasizing universalism and referencing liberal norms and 
values. For example, Smith’s chapter on Buddhism gives considerable attention to basic 
Buddhist beliefs or teachings as well as the life of the Buddha, whom he compares to 
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Jesus. It gives very little attention to particularities of Buddhist practices and cultures 
(in keeping with his earlier warning in the introduction that he is not terribly interested 
in the particularities of religions). He portrays the historical Buddha as “undoubtedly 
one of the greatest rationalists of all times, resembling undoubtedly in this respect no 
one as much as Socrates.”469 He elaborates a long list of qualities that encapsulate 
Buddhism, describing it as “empirical,” “scientific,” “pragmatic,” “therapeutic,” 
“psychological,” “egalitarian,” and “directed at individuals,” essentially framing 
Buddhism in terms of liberal values.470 
 The Burke text applies similar discursive practices when it describes Buddhism 
in decidedly Western terms:  
As we shall see, Buddhism is not a single unified religion, but exists in a variety 
of forms. All these forms, however, have at least one thing in common: an 
emphasis on the transitoriness of human life as we know it. Although in our 
hearts we may long for eternity, the unavoidable fact is that we are only 
temporary beings, and true spirituality begins with acknowledging that. All the 
varieties of Buddhism would agree with Shakespeare’s Prospero: ‘We are such 
stuff as dreams are made on, And our little life is rounded with a sleep.’ (The 
Tempest)471 
 
In another example of recontextualizing Buddhism in particularly Western and 
Christian terms, Burke states “How is the grace and mercy of the Buddha brought to 
bear on us individually? For devotional Mahayana it is not through our actions, but 
through our faith, our trust in the Buddha. Thus devotional Mahayana Buddhism 
developed a doctrine of salvation by faith alone.”472 Notably, terms such as “grace” and 
“mercy” have particularly Christian significance and “salvation by faith alone” is a 
distinctively Protestant theological doctrine. In a section on “Modern Developments,” 
Burke suggests that at its essence Buddhism is characterized by a timeless and 
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universal rationality that has allowed it to weather what might otherwise be the 
challenging forces of modernity: “The Buddhist world has been as yet little affected by 
the rise and success of science, with its emphasis on empirical verification… Similarly, 
Buddhism has been little affected by the rise of democratic forms of government, since 
it is not tied to any particular governmental order.”473 This characterization also 
reveals an essentialist definition of religion as separate from social and political reality. 
The Brodd text generally projects fewer explicit Western and Christian 
assumptions onto Buddhism. However, Brodd does introduce the chapter on Buddhism 
explaining: “In a manner very much like that of a physician, proceeding rationally and 
empirically, Gautama diagnosed the human condition and prescribed a cure. One way 
of understanding Buddhism, then, is as a therapy for living.”474 This concept of the 
Buddha as physician is not foreign to Buddhism. Within Mahayana Buddhism, for 
example, there is a tradition of a bodhisattva known as the Medicine Buddha. Yet, 
Brodd does not situate this notion within that specific context. Rather, the description 
of Buddhism as “therapy for the living” relies on modern assumptions about medicine 
as science and therapy as rooted in reason; it simultaneously evokes liberal norms and 
values of authenticity and self-actualization. It invites sympathetic understanding from 
the reader by framing Buddhism in universal—i.e. liberal—terms. 
In the Neusner text, the chapter “Buddhism in the World and in America,” 
written by Malcolm David Eckel, offers notably little about the particularities of 
Buddhist practices and cultures in the U.S., despite its title. Like other textbooks in this 
study, it also broadly characterizes Buddhism as a religion of peace and harmony. In 
the first paragraph of the chapter, for instance, Eckel states that Buddhism “has found 
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ways to exist side by side with other religious traditions without many of the great 
conflicts that have plagued religious life in the West.”475 
Early editions of the text offered only a few paragraphs to contextualize 
Buddhism. The most recent edition of the text (2009) now includes a timeline of events 
related to Buddhism in America, such as the establishment of the first Buddhist temple 
in San Francisco in 1853 and the founding of the magazine Tricycle: The Buddhist 
Review in 1991.476 However, with no explanation of these events, the reader is unlikely 
to understand their significance. The 2009 edition also includes two brief text boxes 
that give a more nuanced view of the complexities of Buddhist cultures and practices 
in the United States. In “The Contrast Between ‘Ethnic’ Buddhism and ‘Convert’ 
Buddhism in America,” Eckel distinguishes between American Buddhists whose 
traditions and practices connect them with an immigrant ethnic identity and those who 
have converted to Buddhism from Christianity or Judaism. He argues, however, that 
“the state of American Buddhism is far more complex than this simple distinction 
[between ethnic and convert] is able to express.”477 In “Who and Where Are the 
Buddhists in the United States?” Eckel explains that as part of this complexity, “it is 
difficult to ascertain accurately just how many Buddhist exist in this country. Making 
this even more challenging is the fact that some Buddhists self-identify as Buddhist 
and something else.”478 
These brief additions begin to represent a more multifaceted view of Buddhism, 
and Eckel makes a few other statements that aim to introduce complexity and 
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ambivalence into the study of Buddhism, such as his warning to the reader against 
essentializing Buddhism: 
Buddhists have been uncomfortable with any language suggesting that things 
have ‘essences.’ They insist instead that everything changes and nothing has any 
permanent identity, least of all a movement as complex and as varied as the one 
we call ‘Buddhism.’ It is better not to look for a single essence, but rather for a 
center of gravity or for lines of force around which Buddhist people have 
oriented themselves as they struggle to give meaning, depth, and texture to 
their lives.479  
 
However, Eckel’s chapter primarily elaborates broad Buddhist beliefs and doctrines, the 
“philosophy” of Buddhism, such as the Four Nobles Truths, the concept of 
impermanence and the doctrine of emptiness. Taken as a whole, it hones in on central 
tenets and common features. It is unclear how Eckel avoids essentializing Buddhism by 
focusing instead on a “center of gravity.”  
Moreover, Eckel engages in a process of “translating” Buddhism into terms that 
will be palatable to an imagined reader. He frequently describes Buddhism in ways that 
make clear he anticipates a non-Buddhist, likely Christian or Jewish, reader. He gives 
careful attention to aspects of Buddhism that may appeal to individual spirituality, 
such as in his explanation of “the spirit of nirvana” where he states: 
Is your job to do what God is pictured doing in the Jewish or Christian 
scriptures—to look into the primordial chaos of the day and make something 
new come into being?—Or is it to look closely at the fire of existence that has 
been burning from time without beginning and allow some of it to burn away? If 
you choose the second option you will find yourself become more meditative, 
more focused on the quiet moments of experience—the silent spaces between 
heartbeats—and you will feel some of the distractions of ordinary experience 
begin to slip away.480 
 
Here Eckel suggests to the reader that Buddhism can offer her or him a personal 
transcendent spiritual experience, of “quiet moments” with fewer “distractions of 
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ordinary experience.” He concludes the chapter with another appealing universalist 
image: 
Behind all of the modern variations in the Buddhist tradition, behind the 
processions of monks that wind through the filed of Southeast Asia to beg their 
daily food, behind the parry and thrust of a Japanese swordsman, behind the 
lines of children in California temple who chant to invoke the compassion of 
Amida, sits the figure of the Buddha,  a man whose serenity and quiet smile 
have for centuries symbolized the human aspiration for peace in the midst of 
suffering and the wisdom to see through the illusions of this world.481 
 
Thus, despite Eckel’s caution against essentializing Buddhism, he presents it as 
essentially a religion that represents peace and harmony. 
 While Eckel’s chapter on Buddhism predominantly emphasizes Buddhist 
philosophy and universalist themes, it is followed by a chapter on “East Asian 
Religions in Today’s America,” written by Robert S. Ellwood, that gives much more 
attention to diversity within Buddhism as well as its relationship with other religions, 
such as Confucianism, Daoism, and Shinto. Ellwood offers much more detail than the 
preceding chapter about the particularities of diverse Buddhist cultures. Notably, 
Ellwood closes the chapter with a nod toward its significance and utility. He states: 
By familiarizing themselves with these outposts of East Asia, Americans of all 
backgrounds, whether or not they are personally drawn to these religions, can 
learn about East Asia on levels inaccessible by most other means, make East 
Asian friends, and prepare themselves and their country for the pluralistic 
world of the twenty-first century.482 
 
Here Ellwood indicates that there is continuity between East Asian societies and their 
emigré populations in the United States. Thus, for example, to better understand 
Chinese Americans also leads to a better understanding of China. While aiming to 
promote pluralism, Ellwood, in effect, situates East Asian immigrant cultures outside 
American norms, suggesting that they will always in some ways remain “other.” 
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The Fisher text presents a complex and nuanced treatment of Buddhism, in 
which she aims to transcend the traditional monolithic world religions paradigm.  Yet, 
she is not able to escape its inherent universalism and essentialism, illustrating the 
tensions and ambiguities that often characterize intertextuality, or a text’s relationship 
to prior texts. Fairclough refers to this tension as “the heterogeneity of texts,” or “the 
diverse and often contradictory elements and threads which go to make up a text.”483  
The Fisher text reveals examples of articulation, disarticulation, and rearticulation—
discursive processes by which previous texts and discourses are both reproduced and 
transformed. Fisher’s lived religions approach intends to deemphasize timeless texts in 
favor of the particularities of lived religious experience—a departure from historic 
text/scripture-based approaches to world religions. Indeed, her chapter on Buddhism 
includes more description of particularities of Buddhist rituals and practices than any 
other textbook. The chapter shows attention to diversity within Buddhism and an 
effort to situate particular practices and beliefs within specific cultural contexts.  
At the same time, Fisher frames this chapter on Buddhism with the same 
universalist and essentialist notion of religion that carries through the other texts. In 
her introduction to the chapter, she begins by describing Buddhism in universal and 
individualistic terms, using the speaker and addressee-inclusive pronoun “we,” to 
persuade and invite identification from the reader. She states: “[Buddhism] held that 
liberation from suffering depends on our own efforts. The Buddha taught that by 
understanding how we create suffering for ourselves we can become free.” She writes 
that Buddhism requires “us” to “take responsibility for our own happiness and our 
own liberation.”484 This discursive practice works to universalize Buddhism in such a 
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way as to evoke a sympathetic response and suggest that Buddhism holds an essential 
wisdom available to all. It speaks to liberal values of autonomy, authenticity, and 
freedom.  
Fisher’s chapter on Buddhism includes three “feature boxes,” which reflect 
personal interviews conducted by the author—one about the His Holiness the 
Fourteenth Dalai Lama, one about “Life in a Western Monastery” featuring quotes from 
individuals at Zen Mountain Monastery in New York, and one about Karma Lekshe 
Tsomo, an American Buddhist nun.485 While each of these narrative accounts offers 
some detailed insights into particular individual experiences of Buddhism, a closer 
look reveals certain themes that form Fisher’s tacit definition of religion—
universalism, individualism, and voluntarism.  
In the feature box on the Dalai Lama, Fisher only includes quotations with 
universal significance, such as “By whatever name religion may be known, its 
understanding and practice are the essence of a peaceful mind and therefore a 
peaceful world” and “The best way to solve problems is through human understanding, 
mutual respect.”486 Fisher concludes this narrative declaring “His quintessentially 
Buddhist message to people of all religions is that only through kindness and 
compassion toward each other and the cultivation of inner peace shall we survive as a 
species.”487 This “insider account” offers some evidence of the mediating and 
interpretive position that an author plays in conveying these perspectives. Fisher does 
not include quotations from the Dalai Lama on a particularly Buddhist text or practice. 
Rather, she has seemingly chosen material that would have universal appeal for a 
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broad audience. Moreover, this material supports Fisher’s own concerns about the 
essential goodness of religion and the importance of interreligious understanding. 
The feature box on “Life in a Western Zen Monastery” includes a narrative 
description of particular practices and daily life at Zen Mountain Monastery, such as 
“For thirty-five minute blocks, separated by periods of attentive walking, they [monks 
and laypeople] support each other by practicing zazen together in silence” and “They 
chant in Japanese and English, with frequent bowing to each other, to their meditation 
cushions, and to the Buddha on the altar, in solidarity with all beings and gratitude for 
the teachings.”488 Fisher sums up the narrative stating: “From training in flower 
arranging to Aikido to explore the relevance of Buddhist principles in the workplace, 
Zen Mountain Monastery’s programs are oriented toward one central goal: the personal 
experience of enlightenment and its application in the twenty-first-century world.”489 
Here, Fisher frames these collective practices in terms of individual and personal 
experience.  
In the third and final feature box of the chapter, Fisher provides an interview 
with Karma Lekshe Tsomo about “the unusual pathways by which Westerners come to 
adopt Buddhism.” This narrative describes a conversion experience: “When I was 
nineteen, I went to Japan to go surfing, then traveled to Thailand, India, and Nepal. One 
the way I had a clear and beautiful dream that I was a nun. I knew I wanted to a nun, 
but where?” She then describes her activism for the rights of women in Buddhism: 
“Today, having completed my studies and full ordination, I work with the Sakyadhita 
International Association of Buddhist Women to gain equal opportunities for women to 
study, equal facilities for meditation practice, and also opportunities for women to 
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become ordained, if they wish.”490 Again, this feature box emphasizes broader themes 
that run throughout Fisher’s text, specifically individualism, voluntarism, and equal 
rights.  
Notably, these are the only three feature boxes in the chapter on Buddhism. 
Within the wide range of social practices and experiences associated with Buddhism, 
Fisher has chosen only these three. Thus, these individual accounts are curated, 
reflecting hermeneutical decisions. For example, emphasizing insider accounts is not a 
neutral practice. It reinforces the notion of religion as primarily personal and 
individual, which perpetuates liberal norms and value. In this case, it also works as a 
strategy of legitimation. The adherent becomes the authority and whatever the 
adherent says must be true, because it reflects his or her own experience, which has 
been situated as the essence of religion. The insider account becomes insulated from 
critique, as does the obscured interpretive work of the author. In fact, this 
phenomenological approach works to legitimate its own authority. 
Toward the end of the chapter, in a section on “Buddhism in the West,” Fisher 
begins by emphasizing diversity within Buddhism, while implicitly asserting 
Buddhism’s universal relevance: “Images of the Buddha are enshrined around the 
world. The path to enlightenment that first gained currency in India has gradually 
spread to Western countries as well as throughout Asia.”491 She attributes this 
expansion to Asian immigration and then points out that Buddhism has also been 
adopted by “Westerners.” While Asian-Americans can certainly be classified as 
“Westerners,” the implication here is that “Westerners” refers to individuals who do 
not claim Asian ethnicity or ancestry. She seems to anticipate arguments that 
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Buddhism is inherently an ethnic religion, inextricably tied to a particular culture and 
instead argues for Buddhism’s universal relevance. She states: “Buddhism is often 
embraced by people in the West because they long for peace of mind in the midst of a 
chaotic materialistic life.”492 She then returns to this tension between Buddhism as 
culturally particular and Buddhism as universal, questioning whether there is such a 
thing as an authentic Buddhism. She writes: 
Are Westerners able to achieve enlightenment by taking Buddhist workshops 
here and there? Particularly in the case of Tibetan Buddhist practices, 
Westerners often want to be initiated into the most highly advanced teachings 
without taking time for years of patient practice and being inwardly 
transformed by the step-by-step foundational teachings. Can teachings 
developed within a specific cultural context be directly transplanted into the soil 
of an entirely different culture? Most Westerners who are adopting Buddhist 
practices are living in highly materialistic societies with different priorities and 
values, rather than traditional Buddhist cultures or monastic settings. In their 
impatience to get results, many shop around from one teacher to the next and 
experiment with one practice after another, rather than persisting with one path 
over a long time.493 
 
In this criticism of Western or consumerist approaches to Buddhism, Fisher subtly 
asserts a notion of an authentic Buddhism, which involves a kind of transcendent 
spirituality, centered around truth-seeking and enlightenment, as well as a focus on 
individual practice, which she argues ought to involve tenacity and devotion. 
She essentializes Buddhist cultures, suggesting that they are transhistorical, or even 
pre-modern, not acknowledging the presence of modern “materialism” in historically 
Buddhist cultures such as Japan and South Korea.  
 Fisher goes on to further grapple with notions of authenticity and universality in 
Buddhism: 
Given the differences in culture, background, and motivation, are Western 
students and their teachers in the process of creating new forms of Buddhism 
adapted to Western ways? How authentic are these new forms? Some observers 
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feel that Western Buddhism, with its emphasis on inner practice rather than 
outer forms, is actually closer to what they construe as the core of early 
Buddhism than are later developments in the East. Contemporary Western 
Buddhists tend to be oriented to the goal of achieving enlightenment by their 
own efforts, which is reportedly what the Buddha prescribed for his followers, 
and are searching for ways to achieve that goal, though sometimes hoping to do 
with minimum effort.494 
 
Fisher seems to resolve this question in favor of universality, suggesting that, while 
some may argue that Buddhism is essentially an ethnic religion specific to the cultural 
context of Asia, in fact, it has a universal and transcendent essence. This positioning of 
Western Buddhism as closer to “the core of early Buddhism than later developments in 
the East,” according to “some observers,” echoes sentiments prevalent in the 
nineteenth century construction of Buddhist studies described by Masuzawa. As 
Buddhism was positioned as a world religion and designated as having a universalistic 
character, which included Aryan origins, some nineteenth century continental scholars 
asserted that a “true Buddhism” “should be more readily recognized and far better 
understood by Europeans than by native Asian practitioners.”495  
From Fisher’s perspective, Buddhism, separated from its cultural trappings, 
reveals an authentic core centered on the timeless pursuit of individual authenticity 
and self-actualization. At first glance, in this chapter, Fisher presents a narrative of 
Buddhism that is far more complex and nuanced than those described by Masuzawa 
and Lopez. Yet, a closer analysis uncovers an emphasis on what Masuzawa calls a 
“spirit of individual freedom and universal humanity soaring above the particularism 
of national tradition” that reproduces liberal norms and ideologies and brings to light 
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an intertextual relationship with the world religions discourse of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.496 
6.1.2 Islam: particular and political 
By the turn of the twentieth century, Islam was added to the rank of “world 
religions.” However as Masuzawa explains, for much of the nineteenth century, 
scholars vehemently argued that Islam was a very particular ethnic religion, not 
universal in scope, and decidedly not a world religion. It was “condescendingly viewed 
as narrow, rigid, and stunted, and its essential attributes were said to be defined by the 
national, racial, and ethnic character of Arabs, the most bellicose and adversarial of the 
Semites.”497 Masuzawa also adds in a footnote: “This outlook seems to be sustained to 
this day, even if the contrast is less explicitly racialized. On the whole, ‘typical’ 
Muslims are considered prone to militancy, while Buddhists are generally presumed 
pacific and meditative.”498 
While each textbook varies in its presentation of Islam, there are a number 
commonalities and patterns that appear. These textbooks tend to portray Islam as 
uniquely political among world religions. They work to generate sympathy for Islam, 
while simultaneously marking Islam as “other.” Some texts, in anticipation of a 
perceived negative “Islamophobic” discourse that defines Islam as inherently violent, 
backwards, or hostile to other religions and the West, recontextualize certain social 
practices. They engage in apologetics and look for ways in which they can attribute 
liberal norms and values to Islam, while clearly marking other social practices as 
problematic or inauthentic. In doing so, they exoticize and marginalize Islam.  
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The political positioning begins in the introductions to the chapters on Islam, 
which immediately situate Islam in juxtaposition to “the West.” Five of the six 
textbooks in this study were published after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Four 
texts—Brodd, Fisher, Neusner (in the chapter by John L. Esposito), and Young— refer to 
this event in the introductory paragraphs in their chapters on Islam. In the previous 
chapter, I discussed the use of September 11 motif as an example of a discursive 
strategy of legitimation, employed to justify the importance of the study of religion 
and the subsequent cultivation of a pluralist understanding and respect for religious 
diversity. The text samples I examined came from introductory chapters, along with 
concluding chapters on religion in the modern world. In the chapters on Islam I 
examine here, references to September 11 sometimes function in a similar way. The 
Brodd text states in passing: “In the United States and elsewhere, the 9-11 attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the subsequent warfare in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, gave rise to newfound interest in Islam.”499 Other texts make more explicit 
utilitarian arguments that link the September 11th event to a social need for better 
understanding Islam. The chapter on Islam in the Neusner text is written by John L. 
Esposito, a renowned scholar of Islamic Studies.500 Esposito begins by justifying a new 
civic requisite to study and better understand Islam:  
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington, DC, a basic knowledge of Islam is becoming essential for every 
American today… it is no longer appropriate to think of Muslims as those 
people in the Middle East or Africa or Asia. Islam, like Judaism and Christianity, 
is an American religion.501  
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Similarly, Young and Fisher rationalize the need to study Islam; they also suggest that 
current public perceptions about Islam are distorted and that better knowledge would 
remedy this problem. Young states: 
Since September 11, 2001, interest in Islam outside the Muslim world, especially 
in the United States, has risen rapidly. Unfortunately, the exploitation of Islamic 
teachings by Osama bin Laden and those responsible for the deaths of 
thousands of innocent people on that day has created confusion about Islam. 
Our task in this chapter is to look beyond distortions and stereotypes to try to 
understand what Islam actually is.502  
 
Fisher calls this distortion “ignorance” and describes it as “dangerous” and 
threatening: 
In fact, ignorance about Islam and perceived targeting of Muslims in general by 
the U.S.-led ‘war on terrorism’ have exacerbated a dangerous and growing divide 
between Muslims and non-Muslims in the contemporary world. Therefore it is 
extremely important to carefully study the origins, teachings, and modern 
history of this major world religion.503 
 
While these textbooks name September 11, 2001 as a turning point for the 
relationship between Islam and the West, this political positioning did not arise at just 
that moment in time. It reflects historical patterns of world religions discourse 
identified by Masuzawa, which are also evident in the Smith text. Originally published 
in 1958 and updated in 1991, the Smith text-- like Brodd, Fisher, Esposito, and Young-- 
begins by emphasizing tension and misunderstanding between Islam and the West. 
The text states: 
Of all the non-Western religions, Islam stands closest to the West—closest 
geographically, and also closest ideologically; for religiously it stands in the 
Abrahamic family of religions, while philosophically it builds on the Greeks. Yet 
despite this mental and spatial proximity, Islam is the most difficult religion for 
the West to understand. ‘No part of the world,’ an American columnist has 
written, ‘is more hopelessly and systemically and stubbornly misunderstood by 
us than that complex of religion, culture and geography known as Islam.’504 
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Here, Smith moves back and forth between situating Islam outside Western norms—
“the most difficult religion for the West to understand”-- and trying to establish 
commonalities—“closest ideologically.” Notably, Smith’s attempts to highlight a 
relationship between Islam and the West involve reframing and recontextualizing Islam 
in distinctly ecumenical or interfaith terms—“for religiously it stands in the Abrahamic 
family.” The concept of “Abrahamic religions”—a discursive construction that takes a 
variety of historical and social phenomena and recontextualizes them under a common 
category aimed at emphasizing shared roots—is “a modern creation, largely a 
theological neologism.”505 This discursive practice also resonates with Masuzawa’s 
descriptions of lingering nineteenth century assumptions about world religions, 
including the notion that Islam’s “universalist intensions derive partly from the fact 
that its founder had drawn considerably from Jewish and Christian sources.”506 Smith’s 
explanation of some of the basic theological concepts of Islam reflects these 
assumptions. He calls Abraham “by far the most important figure in the Koran,” which 
again emphasizes this idea of a familial relationship with Christianity and Judaism.507 
He defines the notion of the human self in terms of “the soul’s individuality and its 
freedom.”508 He goes on to compare the conception of the self within Islam to the more 
relational conceptions of self within Buddhism and Confucianism.  
In India the all-pervading cosmic spirit comes close to swallowing the individual 
self, and in China the self is so ecological that where it begins and ends is hard 
to determine. Islam and its Semitic allies reverse this drift, regarding 
individuality as not only real but good in principle. Value, virtue, and spiritual 
fulfillment come through realizing the potentialities that are uniquely one’s 
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own; in ways that are not inconsequential, those possibilities differ from those 
of every other soul that has ever lived, or ever will live in the future.509   
 
Here, Islam is described in terms that reveal liberal values— authenticity and 
spirituality as a path to the actualization of the autonomous individual. 
Smith explains the tensions between Islam and the West as the result of a long 
history of conflict arising from close proximity.  
Common borders have given rise to border disputes, which, beginning with 
raids and counterraids, have escalated into vendettas, blood feuds, and all-out 
war. There is a happier side; in times and places Christians, Muslims, and Jews 
have lived together harmoniously—one thinks of Moorish Spain. But for a good 
part of the last fourteen hundred years, Islam and Europe have been at war and 
people seldom have a fair picture of their enemies. Islam is going to be an 
interesting religion for this book to negotiate.510 
 
The use of the term “negotiate” is noteworthy here. Albeit subtly, Smith reveals his 
own normative position in the text. He essentially tells the reader that he is ordering 
and managing the religion of Islam. Smith is “negotiating” the terms of Islam to make 
it fit into his greater pluralist narrative. This process is also evident in his concluding 
paragraphs of the chapter, in which he explains that, due to brevity, this chapter has 
not included the great history of “the Muslim empire” and the story of how “Muslim 
philosophers and scientists kept the lamp of learning bright, ready to spark the 
Western mind when it roused from its long sleep.” He then sums up what he deems to 
be Islam’s challenges and potential: 
Nor would the story have been entirely confined to the past, for there are 
indications that Islam is emerging from several centuries of stagnation, which 
colonization no doubt exacerbated. It faces enormous problems: how to 
distinguish industrial modernization (which on balance it welcomes), from 
Westernization (which on balance it doesn’t); how to realize the unity that is 
latent in Islam when the forces of nationalism work powerfully against it; how 
to hold on to Truth in a pluralistic, relativizing age.511 
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Here, Smith once again looks for and emphasizes an underlying essence of religion—
this “Truth” and “latent unity”—which is also at the foundation of his prescriptive 
agenda.  
 The Brodd text, while far more contemporary than the Smith text, also reveals 
the normative position from which the author approaches religion. In the brief 
introduction to the chapter on Islam, Brodd states: “Many have been surprised to learn 
that Islam is deeply rooted in the biblical tradition, and that it reveres the great 
prophets of Judaism and Jesus Christ. Islam has also played a crucial role in the 
shaping of Western culture, especially during the Middle Ages.”512 Thus, Brodd begins 
this chapter trying to generate some sense of identification and sympathy by arguing 
that “they” are, in some ways, like “us.” At the same time, he places Islam outside a 
Western and “Judeo-Christian” norm. By saying that “many have been surprised” by 
this commonality, Brodd suggests the reader likely views Islam as “other.” He also 
makes clear he assumes his reader is an American Christian. While Brodd may intend 
to report a prevalent perspective, he also reinforces the notion of Islam as “other” in 
the reader’s mind. 
 In another example that reinforces the notion of Islam as “other,” Brodd 
inaccurately attributes a cultural practice regarding marriage to the whole of Islam. He 
states: “Muslims are urged to marry as early in life as possible. Marriages are 
traditionally arranged by parents; couples generally do not date. This custom of course 
contrasts sharply with the Western perspective, which places romantic love as the 
foundation for marriage.”513 This passage is included in a section titled “The Personal 
and Social Life of Islam.” Here, Brodd only addresses “care of the body, the status of 
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women, and struggle” or jihad, aspects of Islam that he likely perceives as 
misunderstood by or of concern to American, Christian readers, though he does not 
clearly label them as such. On the surface, this section seems to clarify points such as 
“the ideals of Islam regard men and women as equals, but with different roles,” that 
polygamy is actually rare within Islam and that “veiling” is no longer universal among 
Muslim women, but some educated women choose to wear the veil “as a means of 
embracing their own traditional heritage, not as a form of male domination.”514 As it 
does so, it implicitly frames its description of Islam in such a way as to suggest it 
embraces the liberal value of egalitarianism. Implicitly, he is arguing that liberal 
egalitarianism should be the norm by which to interpret Islam’s social practices. 
Moreover, Brodd does not discuss the particular cultural or historical contexts of these 
practices. These sweeping generalizations do not acknowledge the diversity within 
Islam, further contributing to the positioning of Islam as “other.”  
In a subsequent section, Brodd talks about Muslims around the world, including 
the approximately six million Muslims living in the U.S. He explains that many 
American Muslims have come to the U.S. through more recent immigration and he 
states that “today many of them are as typically American as they are Muslim.”515 On 
one hand, this appears to be a statement of inclusion, i.e., Muslims can be Americans 
too. On the other hand, stating this suggests that somehow to be “typically American” 
would not include being Muslim. One does not hear Christians described as being “as 
typically American as they are Christian.” This type of statement appears to challenge 
the status quo but actually reinforces it. 
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In the conclusion of this chapter, Brodd suggests that Islam sits in tension with 
pluralism. He states: 
Islam is distinctive among the great religions of the world for the extent to 
which it embraces the totality of life. There is simply no recognition of a 
division between what is religious and what is secular…. How does Islam see its 
place within our pluralistic world? Can a religion that understands itself as 
embracing the totality of life truly be tolerant of other religions?516 
 
He claims that the answer is twofold, that Muslims both believe that Islam is “the final 
revelation” and that “other religions include expressions of the divine will.” Once 
again, Brodd marks Islam as “other” as he suggests that Islam is uniquely and 
inherently illiberal— that it is not able to consign belief to the private, secular sphere 
and therefore inevitably clashes with liberal values of tolerance. However, then he 
concedes that Islam contains some universal values of harmony and unity: “Like the 
ideals of every religion, those of Islam are not always put into practice. Nevertheless, 
Islam’s overriding theme is the ideal of unity.”517 This closing section underscores 
Brodd’s prescriptive pluralist agenda. Brodd, along with all the other texts aside from 
Burke, has declared he takes a descriptive, phenomenological approach to the study of 
these religions, one which does not entail evaluating truth claims. Yet, all of these 
religions are evaluated in terms of how they function in the world and the ways in 
which they “can truly be tolerant of other religions.” 
 Like Smith and Brodd’s texts, the Esposito chapter (in the Neusner textbook) 
follows discursive practices that situate Islam as at once familiar and foreign, both 
legitimating and de-legitimating it simultaneously. For Esposito, whose chapter appears 
in a textbook focused on the American context, this chapter negotiates a space for 
Islam in the American religious landscape, albeit a highly regulated space predicated 
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on the ability to engage with liberal norms and values. Introducing the chapter, 
Esposito states:  
Islam suffers from a number of misconceptions. Many are surprised to discover 
that it is not some strange, remote religion in the Middle East but the second 
largest religion in the world… Muslims worship the same God who is revered by 
Christians and Jews… Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam also spread through 
much of the world. Islam is truly a world religion that embraces people of many 
races and languages.518 
 
By stating that “many are surprised” to discover otherwise, Esposito suggests that 
“strange, remote” is the normative characterization of Islam. He then attempts to 
counter this perceived strangeness by positioning Islam in proximity to Judaism and 
Christianity, again reinforcing a Judeo-Christian norm. Throughout the chapter, 
Esposito continually compares Islam to Judaism and Christianity, with statements such 
as “Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam includes a number of communities or 
branches” and “Muslim, like Jews and Christians, believe that there is one God.”519 
While this kind of comparative language might seem reasonable within a textbook that 
engages in a comparative study of religion, chapters on Judaism and Christianity do 
not frame these religions in terms of their similarities to the others. Moreover, these 
comparisons function as a practice of legitimation that situates Islam as a sufficiently 
universal religion and begins to expand the American religion of Judeo-Christianity 
(the Protestant-Catholic-Jew triune promoted by Herberg) to incorporate an Abrahamic 
paradigm.520  
 In another normative discursive move, Esposito contrasts Islam with the 
American value of secularism: “Islam is considered a total way of life for the religious 
community. For many in America who are raised with the idea of the separation of 
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church and state and the sense that religion is a private affair, Islam can seem 
confusing, especially since Islam does not have a ‘church’ to preserve and promote its 
beliefs.”521 By stating that Islam “can seem confusing,” Esposito marginalizes Islam, 
suggesting that it sits outside American norms and likely does not make sense or fit 
within an American social order. Under a section on “Muslim Immigration,” he asserts 
that the political culture of the U.S.—a liberal social order rooted in values of freedom, 
tolerance, and pluralism—provides a space of freedom in which Muslims can engage 
with a wider range of Islamic thought than in their countries of origin:  
Muslim students now can be found at universities across the country. America 
provides an environment in which these students can share their faith and 
ideas. The freedom in America enables them to explore political ideas that 
would be impossible in their own countries, as well as to come to know about 
the teachings of Muslim leaders from other parts of the Islamic world.522 
 
He implies, first, that Muslim students are likely not Americans, that the U.S. is not 
“their own” country, and, second, that in the United States, they can have a freer 
experience of Islam than elsewhere, i.e., Muslim countries. Thus, while Islam sits 
outside American norms, the liberal social order offers Islam the potential to be a truer 
version of itself. 
 In contrast with this language that situates Islam as “other,” Esposito also 
continually works to include Islam within the boundaries of legitimate religion in 
America. He describes an American Islam that negotiates a place within a liberal social 
order: 
In the face of adversity, Islam in America has proven to be a dynamic faith. As a 
result of their experience, Muslims are constantly demonstrating the flexibility 
of their faith. Incorporating American customs, Islamic centers often include not 
only the mosque but also a Sunday school where children study their religion, 
and a social hall for community events that range from bake sales to featured 
speakers… Most American Muslims have become integrated into American 
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society politically and socioeconomically. Muslims are present in the professions 
from local store owners to corporate leaders as well as teachers, professors, 
lawyers and physicians.523 
 
 While he starts off in the chapter telling the reader that Islam does not recognize a 
separation of church and state, he then goes on to say that American Muslims have 
become integrated into this political order.  
As Esposito discusses Islam and politics, he attributes negative phenomena, 
such as violence, extremism and terrorism, to factors external to Islam itself. He 
acknowledges that many perceive Islam to be inherently political and illiberal, stating 
in a section on “Islam and September 11”: “Given the fact that Osama bin Laden, the al-
Qaeda, and the 9/11 terrorists who crashed planes into the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon all called themselves Muslims, questions about the relationship of Islam 
to politics, violence, and terror have arisen.”524 He addresses political events associated 
with Islam in countries such as Turkey, Morocco, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia and 
concludes that “many Muslim countries face the same long term issues of 
authoritarianism, legitimacy, security, and terrorism” while also explaining that these 
countries include secularists and “Islamic reformers” who “call for greater 
democratization in the name of Islam.”525 He also explains that religious extremists and 
terrorists have hijacked “their religion using it to justify violence and terrorism.”526 He 
adds that extremism can found in all religions: “Extremist Muslims, like Jewish, 
Christian, and Hindu extremists, are a minority, though a dangerous minority.”527 
Again, Esposito subtly suggests that a liberal social order provides a superior 
environment in which Muslims can truly flourish: 
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The vast majority of mainstream Muslims, like their non-Muslim counterparts, 
will continue to lead constructive and productive lives informed by their faith. 
However, the perpetuation of authoritarian regimes, lack of freedoms, and 
repression of human rights will foster the concomitant feelings of 
powerlessness. The inability to address deep-seated issues and grievances 
within the political process will create discontent and instability and serve as a 
breeding ground for extremist movements.528 
 
He concludes with an affirmative comparison of Islam to the Judeo-Christian norm and 
a prescriptive appeal to pluralism as an American civic value:  
Like Jews and Christians before them, and indeed all religious peoples, the vast 
majority of Muslims struggle to preserve their faith and religious identity within 
America’s pluralistic society. The presence and participation of Muslims in 
America adds to the tapestry of nationalities and faiths that have come to 
constitute the richness and diversity of America.529 
 
The use of the term “richness” here supports the pluralist notion of diversity as a 
resource and a social good. 
 Fisher also takes a prescriptive approach to Islam in which she aims to 
illuminate a universalistic essence of Islam that is good, authentic and peace-loving, 
separated from political and institutional distortions. She identifies a number of 
potential concerns held by some people, likely non-Muslim Americans, and then 
explains how they are misperceptions.  Discussing women’s rights in Islam, Fisher 
states:  
Some customs thought to be Muslim are actually cultural practices not specified 
in the basic sources; they are the result of Islamic civilization’s assimilation of 
many cultures in many places. Muhammad worked side by side with women, 
and the Qur’an encourages equal participation of women in religion and in 
society. Veiling and seclusion were practices absorbed from conquered Persian 
and Byzantine cultures, particularly their upper classes; peasant women could 
not carry out their physical work under encumbering veils or in seclusion from 
public view.530 
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Here, Fisher separates Islam from culture, reinforcing liberal assumptions that frame 
religion as primarily about individual spiritual experience while situating institutional 
forms as secondary or peripheral.  
In a section titled “Islam in Politics”, Fisher aims to separate authentic religion 
from violence. She writes, for example:  
At present, the facet of Islam that is of greatest concern around the world to 
both Muslims and non-Muslims is its association with politics. Many 
governments are becoming Islamicized. Political leaders are referring more 
frequently to Islam and Qur’anic statements… Some charismatic leaders have 
used their own interpretations of Islam to ignite violent political expressions of 
frustration and hatred against Western global domination. These include 
suicidal terrorist attacks against civilian targets by those who have been assured 
that their self-sacrifice for the cause will earn them quick entry to paradise, 
contrary to Qur’anic passages refusing suicide and upholding the value and 
sanctity of each human life.531 
 
Thus, Fisher points to this theme of Islam as inherently political and even militant, but 
then suggests that frequently these politics betray the core values of Islam found in 
the Qur’an. She goes on to describe a number of political conflicts involving Muslims in 
Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia, among others.  Yet, she then 
emphasizes that, “As Islamophobia grows among non-Muslims, many leading Muslims 
are trying to explain to them that Islam does not equal violence.”532 She references a 
Muslim scholar, stating that “Islamic values are not aimed at creating a political state 
but rather a harmoniously integrated world society”533  
In an effort to depict a sympathetic portrayal of Islam, Fisher’s chapter 
reinforces the notion of Islam as inherently political. As an example, the chapter 
includes a photo of three women in black and a young boy weeping over a grave. The 
caption states: “Because they are involved in conflicts around the world, many Muslims 
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are mourning the loss of their loves ones, becoming refugees, or being attacked or 
killed. This scene of grief occurred in Falluja, Iraq.”534 There is nothing particular to 
Islam in this photo. Rather, it depicts a universal scene of grief and sadness. This 
photo and its caption seem to work for a humanizing effect, suggesting that most 
Muslims, while victims of distorted politicization of their religion, share a common 
humanity with the rest of us. Yet, Fisher has chosen to include this photo and caption 
in the section on Islam and politics, reinforcing stereotypes that Islam is plagued by 
militancy and violence.535  
In contrast, the chapter on Christianity in the Fisher text has no section labeled 
“Christianity in Politics.” It is structured to emphasize beliefs and personal practices. 
Fisher does not address Christian extremism or religiously motivated violence. This is 
indicative of Christianity’s normative position and subtly reinforces the notion that 
Islam is uniquely and inherently political. Of course, if every textbook’s chapter on 
Christianity included a section on “Christianity in Politics” that interrogated each and 
every instance in which some person or group engaged in violence in the name of 
Christianity, as well as biblical texts and theologies that support violence, it too might 
raise questions about whether it is an inherently violent religion. Notably, the Burke, 
Brodd, Neusner, and Smith texts, which all address politics and violence in some way in 
their chapters on Islam, do not include discussions of politics and violence in chapters 
on Christianity.  
The Young text gives equal attention to Christianity and Islam in a section on 
contemporary ethical issues. In the chapter on “War and Capital Punishment,” Young 
describes ambivalence toward war and violence in both Christianity and Islam. In the 
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section on Christianity, he writes “Within Christianity we find positions on the morality 
of war ranging from the pacifism of the ‘Peace Churches’ (like the Mennonites and the 
Church of the Brethren) to the ideology of ‘holy war,’ which equates a particular war 
with the will of God.”536 While he does not completely reconcile these tensions, he 
clearly emphasizes teachings that promote peace and nonviolence. In the section on 
Islam, he asks: 
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, interest in the Muslim teaching about 
war has taken on a sense of urgency. Were the actions of the nineteen Muslim 
men who hijacked commercial airliners that day, killing thousands of innocent 
people, sanctioned by the teachings of Islam? Or was theirs a distorted 
understanding of the Muslim teaching about when acts of war are justified?537 
 
Note here that Young identifies a “sense of urgency” for better understanding Muslim 
positions on war and violence. He does not point to this same urgency when he 
discusses these issues within Christianity. Young goes on to suggest that the violent 
actions of September 11 represent a distortion. While he explains that “the Qur’an 
clearly says that Allah approves of Muslims engaging in war,” he qualifies this by 
noting that “there are strong affinities between Christian just war theory and Islamic 
teaching the use of armed force.”538 After briefly discussing groups that advocate for 
preemptive violence, he argues that: 
The vast majority of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims strongly reject these 
groups’ [such as al-Qaeda] interpretation of Muslim teaching on war. To 
condemn Islam as a violent religion because of the actions of men like Osama 
bin Laden and his supporters would be comparable to condemning Christianity 
because of the Christian hate groups that label Jews and Muslims as enemies of 
God, and that have killed innocent people on the basis of their twisted 
interpretations of the Bible.539 
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He concludes the section by discussing “many alternatives to the extremist and violent 
interpretations of Islam dominating the news in the early twenty-first century.”540 He 
highlights the example of Uztaz Mahmoud Mohamed Tahah, who “known as the 
‘African Gandhi,’ created an Islamic movement in Sudan to resist colonialism with the 
same strategy Gandhi used in India” and explains that “his message has been heard 
and is being promoted by other courageous Muslim scholars and leaders today.”541 
Thus, Young conveys to his reader that most Muslims, like most adherents of all the 
other religions in the textbook, do not condone extremism and violence.  
The Burke text, however, takes a contrasting—and far less sympathetic—
approach as it clearly situates Islam in juxtaposition with liberal norms, as noted in the 
previous chapter’s section on the September 11 motif. Burke characterizes the 
relationship between Islam and the West as a clash of civilizations, as he asserts: 
Since the seventeenth century, with the rise of science, the emergence of 
democracy, and the development of the capitalist economy, Western society, 
which once lagged behind the Muslim world, has leaped dramatically ahead of it, 
becoming more knowledgeable, more technologically advanced, wealthier, more 
powerful, and, at least in its own view, more humane. The Islamic world, by 
contrast, sank into a general state of poverty and powerlessness during the 
period. As a result, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many 
Muslim lands were colonized by Western nations. Although colonization 
brought benefits, such as modern methods of communication, transport, 
medicine, and economic and political organization, the superiority of the West 
has been experienced by many Muslims as an extreme humiliation.542 
 
Here, Burke reproduces Orientalist sentiments as he equates the Islamic world with 
backwardness and the Western world with progress. He suggests that the most 
significant problem of Western colonization is that it merely threatens cultural pride; 
he ignores the illiberal foundations of colonialism and the ways in which it presents 
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threats to sovereignty and autonomy. Burke goes on to explain that in response to the 
alleged “superiority of the West”: 
some Muslims, especially those who have been educated or live in Western 
societies have argued that Islam can and should expand its intellectual horizons 
to include worthwhile features of the modern world such as science, democracy, 
capitalism, and the recognition of human rights. This would suggest a further 
development in the process of interpretation, ijtihad, which is sometimes 
referred to as ‘opening the door of ijtihad.’543 
 
In this passage, Burke once again contrasts Islam and the West. He conflates science, 
democracy, and human rights with the “features of the modern world,” that is, with the 
West.  
6.1.3 Pluralism, secularism, and the liberal social order 
Analysis of these texts reveals the interdiscursive themes of world religions 
discourse that are perpetually reproduced throughout the modern academic study of 
religion. Masuzawa argues that the trajectory of world religions discourse classifies 
and orders religions in ways that continually recreate a Eurocentric imperialist view of 
the world. She identifies an underlying logic of this Eurocentric worldview that is 
rooted in notions of universalism, involving “a universalist notion of history as a 
singular civilizing process, of which modern Europe was the triumphant vanguard and 
all other civilizations and non-European societies merely markers of various interim 
phases already surpassed by people of European descent” coupled with a Christian 
theological universalism.544 Initially, Christianity alone was considered to be uniquely 
universal. Where other religions were viewed as particular to a place, region, culture, or 
ethnicity, Christianity singularly held universal significance, as truly “transhistorical 
and transnational in its import, hence universally valid and viable at any place 
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anytime.”545 World religions discourse extended this notion of universal significance to 
religions beyond Christianity. However, as it did so, it simultaneously defined and 
ordered those religions in terms that reflected both Christocentric and Eurocentric 
assumptions.  
Masuzawa’s study concentrates on European discourse of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Yet, she also points out that this European ethos eventually 
became a Euro-American universalism, as the U.S. was the “final destination of the 
migration” of world religions discourse, which then supported “the ascendancy of the 
discourse of religious pluralism and diversity, the discourse that has since been viewed 
as a signature attribute of a specifically American ethos.”546 The underlying logic of this 
world religions discourse, inextricably intertwined with pluralist discourse, is premised 
not only on Euro-American and Christocentric assumptions of universalism, but also 
on the universalism of liberal ideology.  
Liberalism, with its notions of egalitarianism and the autonomous individual, as 
well as its appeals to universal reason, is a totalizing ideology. Its universal 
significance is fundamental to its logic. As the analysis here reveals, these world 
religions textbooks measure both Buddhism and Islam by norms of liberalism. As they 
do so, they also work to naturalize liberalism, to advance these norms as neutral, 
objective, and commonsensical. This liberal bias appears in these chapters on 
Buddhism where the authors filter out the “cultural” features of Buddhism, which 
might otherwise be used to argue that it is a particularly Asian religion, and instead 
focus on a presumptive core of Buddhism that has universal significance. As an 
example, Fisher explains that many believe that Western Buddhism “with its emphasis 
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on inner practice rather than outer forms, is actually closer to what they construe as 
the core of early Buddhism than are later developments in the East.”547 Of course, the 
aspects of Buddhism considered to be universally significant are those that represent 
liberal values—teachings and beliefs that evince notions of reason, authenticity, and 
individual spirituality. For example, Smith writes, “Yet in the end his [Buddha] appeal 
was to the individual, that each should proceed toward enlightenment through 
confronting his or her individual situation and predicaments.”548 
Evaluated by these norms, Islam is framed as more culturally particular than 
Buddhism, as holding a kernel of universal wisdom at its core that is frequently buried 
by particular cultural and political trappings. Notably, the politics of Islam are not 
explicitly compared and contrasted with the politics of liberalism, because liberal 
norms are not presented as political. Rather, these texts construe Islam as singularly 
political and culturally specific, set against the universal logic of liberalism, which is 
rarely even identified as liberalism and more often presented as “the way things are.” 
Much of Islam’s particular politics are attributed to a conflict with secularism. 
This line of reasoning can be found in textual samples such where Brodd argues that 
“Islam is distinctive among the great religions of the world for the extent to which it 
embraces the totality of life. There is simply no recognition of a division between what 
is religious and what is secular.”549 In another example, Burke claims “Muslims of the 
most traditional sort cannot be content to live in a secular society in the Western 
sense, which provides freedom of religion to all.”550 These texts argue that the politics 
of Islam are applicable only to Islam and thus not universal. Because they are so 
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specific to Islam, they have limited capacity to accommodate other religions or 
worldviews and support pluralism. The Islamic world is then contrasted with the 
secular, the latter positioned as the ideal social configuration for the accommodation 
of difference and diversity.  
These claims put forth a notion of the secular as a neutral public space free of 
religion, which then allows for diversity and the coexistence of differences. However, 
secularism is culturally particular and not neutral or universal. Saba Mahmood explains 
secularism as “not simply as the doctrinal separation of church and state but as the 
rearticulation of religion in a manner commensurate with modern sensibilities and 
modes of governance.”551 It is a core value of liberalism and it relies on, and 
simultaneously constructs, a liberal conception of religion, which situates religion as 
“an abstracted category of beliefs and doctrines from which the individual believer 
stands apart to examine, compare, and evaluate its various manifestations” and “an 
object of individual free choice whose abstract truths nonetheless have universal 
value—as long as they do not contradict the dictates of reason and science.”552 Jose 
Casanova adds that secularism is plagued by particular liberal biases, including “bias 
for Protestant subjective forms of religion, its bias for ‘liberal’ conceptions of politics 
and of the ‘public sphere.’”553 Viewed in this light, secularism is not a neutral space, but 
a particular configuration of religion. It exists in dialectical relationship with religion 
and exudes particular religious sensibilities while privileging Protestant forms and 
asserting a liberal notion of religion that is individual, private, voluntary, and 
universalist. Tracey Fessenden describes the ways in which the purported neutrality of 
secularism masks the politics of liberalism:  
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When secularism in the United States is understood merely as the absence of 
religious faith, or neutrality in relation to religious faith, rather than as a variety 
of possible relationships to different religious traditions—for example, an 
avowedly secular United States is broadly accommodating of mainstream and 
evangelical Protestantism, minimally less so of Catholicism, unevenly so of 
Judaism, much less so of Islam, perhaps still less so of Native American 
religious practices that fall outside the bounds of the acceptably decorative or 
“spiritual”—then religion comes to be defined as “Christian” by default, and an 
implicit association between “American” and “Christian” is upheld even by those 
who have, one imagines, very little invested in its maintenance.”554  
 
Thus secularism is a culturally specific, value-laden social formation. 
The discursive practices of these textbooks construct a normative notion of 
religion that in turn supports a particular configuration of civil society. In this 
arrangement, religion occupies its own discrete sphere, which then, ostensibly, ensures 
its free exercise. Moreover, by denying a monopoly of one religion, this arrangement 
allows for the flourishing of religious diversity. According to the pluralist narrative, 
this is a great strength of American society. Yet, this widely held notion that religions 
operate freely in American society obscures the particular liberal politics that 
construct both civil society and this conception of religion. Religion is constrained by 
the boundaries of the liberal social order. As Mahmood writes “The political solution 
that secularism proffers… lies not so much in tolerating difference and diversity but in 
remaking certain kinds of religious subjectivities (even if this requires the use of 
violence) so as to render them compliant with liberal political rule.”555 Indeed, despite 
all of the assurances of religious liberty, religion is highly regulated in American 
society.  
It is within these dynamics that pluralism operates. Pluralism is a regulatory 
discourse. Its discursive practices function as a form of governance that mediates the 
liberal sphere. The “deep understanding” that proponents such as Eck insist is central 
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to pluralism is constrained by pluralism’s task of reproducing and legitimating a 
liberal social order, so much so that this understanding often becomes less about 
unbiased recognition and more about rearticulating and recontextualizing religions in 
terms that reflect liberal norms.  
The textbooks in this study are prescriptive. They are concerned with questions 
of how we live together in the midst our differences. They grapple with seeking a basis 
for a common life-- a guiding framework for this basis, processes for acknowledging 
differences, and an ethos for these interactions. They prescribe pluralism and pluralist 
education as means for addressing these questions. They aim to advocate for more 
than just tolerance, for mutual respect for difference and diversity. Yet, as they set the 
terms of difference, they engage in a complex exercise of toleration, determining what 
counts as acceptable religion and what does not. 
Pluralism and tolerance have an interdiscursive relationship, mediated by their 
interdiscursive dependence upon liberal discourse. Like pluralism, tolerance is often 
associated with respect, coexistence, magnanimity and positive democratic values. Yet 
tolerance is not just some extension of good will. It performs a regulatory function. To 
claim that a person, group, or practice deserves tolerance is to claim that he, she or it 
is outside the norm, deviant in some way. It subtly serves to reinforce dominance and 
the normative.556 Wendy Brown describes tolerance as “a mode of incorporating and 
regulating the presence of the threatening Other within” and “a middle road between 
rejection on the one side and assimilation on the other.”557 Brown also argues that 
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these discursive practices often “soften or cloak the power, authority, and normativity 
in the act of tolerance.”558  
Fisher provides a textual example of tolerance discourse in these textbooks 
when she describes conflicts between Hindu nationalists and Christians: “Such 
conflicts are not in keeping with the Hindu ideal of tolerance for many ways to the 
divine.”559 Here, Fisher simultaneously sets tolerance as an ideal, while marking Hindu 
nationalism as “other,” that is, as a distorted or illegitimate form of Hinduism. Notably, 
in a section about pluralism and tolerance toward the end of the textbook, Fisher 
acknowledges that tolerance can have negative connotations, involving distain for or 
marginalization of the object of tolerance. She cites Wendy Brown’s work Regulating 
Aversion and subtly attempts to distinguish pluralism from tolerance.  
Brown proposes that the kind of ‘religious tolerance’ she is referring to becomes 
possible when religion is already relegated to the background in a society as 
having no claim on public life, or else as a solution to insolvable conflicts among 
dueling absolutist approaches to religious belief. It maybe also stem from the 
superior and condescending attitude of a religion in power toward religious 
minorities whom it is in a position to regulate. It typically does not spring from 
conviction that religions have equal truth claims, or even that religions are 
dealing with truths.560 
 
Yet, Fisher misses the crux of Brown’s argument, which is that tolerance discourse 
serves to establish dominance. Fisher’s “conviction that religions have equal truth 
claims” is a prominent position she asserts throughout her text. As the previous text 
sample from Fisher’s chapter on Hinduism reveals, maintaining this pluralist position 
requires delegitimating conflicting exclusivist positions. Fisher, like many other 
proponents of pluralism, seems to be convinced of its neutrality or universal validity.  
Along similar lines, Diana Eck, a well-known champion of pluralism, argues that 
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pluralism must go “beyond mere tolerance to the active attempt to understand the 
other.”561 However, even pluralism is not exempt from the regulatory practices of 
liberal tolerance. 
6.2 The Imagined Citizen 
To be sure, these textbooks do not merely describe religious diversity. They 
actively construct and prescribe means by which this diversity ought to be managed. 
Managing religious diversity involves a number of imaginative and creative processes. 
It simultaneously posits both difference and common ground that can provide a 
foundation for social cohesion and community. As these textbooks prescribe means 
for regulating diversity, they also construct notions of community and civil society. 
Benedict Anderson maintains that all community beyond those built on face-to-face 
encounters is imagined. Thus, Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined political 
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”562 He explains 
the imagined nature of the nation and the community as such “because the members 
of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, 
or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”563 
This imagined community must be carefully constructed. Linguists De Cillia, Reisigl, 
and Wodak maintain that the processes of communal identity formation, such as the 
national identity, “manifest themselves discursively.”564   
Analysis of these world religions textbooks reveals that they engage in this work 
of imagining community and identity rooted in ideals of liberal citizenship. They 
equate pluralist values with liberal civic values, constructing norms of specifically 
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American citizenship, or a broader global citizenship that nevertheless supports a kind 
of American-style cosmopolitanism or multicultural citizenship. They position their 
readers as citizens, engaging in the study of religion for the purposes of a greater 
common good. Many of the texts make a case for the importance of religion and its 
study through their relationship to the enactment of citizenship. These textbooks 
argue that learning about religions and developing an understanding of them will lead 
to respect for religions and religious diversity. This, in turn, will alleviate potential for 
social conflict. Some explicitly argue that this religious literacy is essential to good 
citizenship. Others argue that religious literacy will cultivate one’s moral character. 
Both lines of argument represent forms of governance.  
These arguments involve discursive strategies of perpetuation and justification. 
They involve legitimation. Not only do they legitimate a normative construction of 
religion as ubiquitous, they also legitimate a liberal social order in which good religion 
is that which affirms liberal norms of individualism (involving both voluntariness and 
the relegation of religion to the private sphere), freedom and equality. 
6.2.1 Liberal subjectivities and pluralist morality 
 As these textbooks construct their readers, positing ideals of how the reader 
ought to think and respond, they engage in the production of liberal subjectivities. 
From the perspective of governmentality-- Foucault’s conception of the modern 
enactment of power-- modern governance is accomplished through the regulation of 
individual actions and conduct, “a power through bodies rather than power over 
them.”565 For Foucault, modern subject formation involves the construction of 
individuality, or individual identity, as a means of regulation. The reproduction and 
legitimation of liberalism requires continually constructing liberal subjects, creating 
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individuals whose lives are governed by liberal norms. This involves the construction 
of notions of morality and ethics, which, as Mitchell Dean writes, “generally rest on an 
idea of self-government. They presume, at least since the seventeenth century in 
Europe, a conception of an autonomous person capable of monitoring and regulating 
various aspects of his or her own conduct.”566 Liberal governance regularly designates 
“what constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of individuals and 
collectives.”567  
 For most of the textbooks in this study, as they explain why and how to study 
religions, they also posit norms for self-regulation. In the introduction to the Smith 
text, the author explains that “the ultimate benefit that may accrue from a book such 
as this is help in the ordering of the reader’s own life.”568 In other examples, both the 
Brodd and Neusner texts argue that cultivating a capacity for empathy is essential for 
successfully understanding religions. Brodd writes in his introductory chapter:  
The study of religion should be approached with empathy, which is the capacity 
for seeing things from another’s perspective. We are familiar with the saying 
that we should never judge a person until we have walked a mile in his or her 
shoes. Empathy requires the use of the imagination and can be quite 
challenging. It is rewarding too, providing a needed tool for gaining insight into 
the ways of others. The study of religions would not advance far if it lacked 
such insight.569 
 
Neusner writes about “empathetic interest in other people.” Under a section titled 
“How to Study about Other Religions,” he explains the method of the book: 
The way taken in the pages of this book concerns not whether religions are true 
(which in the end is for God to decide) but how all religions are interesting and 
important. We maintain here that every religion has something to teach us about 
what it means to be a human being. Here we take a different path from the one 
                                            
566 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 19. 
567 Ibid. 
568 Smith, The World’s Religions, 3. 
569 Brodd, World Religions: A Voyage of Discovery, 18. 
 225 
that leads us to questions about religious truth. It is a path that carries us to a 
position of empathy for our fellow Americans, in all their rich diversity.570 
 
To be sure, empathy is frequently promoted as a social virtue. Cultivating empathy is 
often associated with kindness, compassion, and consideration. How can one truly 
recognize and understand another person without imagining that person’s 
perspective? The notion of empathy is predicated on the assumption that there are 
universals of human experience. It also assumes a deep, fundamental egalitarianism. 
Thus, one can imagine how another person feels because there are commonalities in 
human experience.  
Taking into account the general patterns of discursive practices in these texts, 
the notions of empathy put forth by Neusner and Brodd rely on a liberal anthropology 
or conception of what it means to be human. By asking the reader to begin to imagine 
the “other” through particular commonalities of human experience, these texts 
reinforce these liberal norms. These discursive practices also posit a pluralist morality; 
they assert appropriate and virtuous means by which to think about and respond to 
different religions. They tell the reader that religious diversity must be respected and 
valued. These discursive practices contribute to the work of “imagining communities.” 
They form liberal subjects, shape self-governance, and mediate the liberal public 
sphere. They lay a foundation for liberal civic identities. 
6.2.2 Religion and the American nation 
Notable among the other texts, the Neusner text clearly and explicitly frames an 
argument for the importance of religion in terms of a narrative of the American nation. 
The other texts in this study describe their subject as global in scope. The Neusner text 
defines itself in terms of the American context, applying the world religions framework 
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to religions in the U.S. In the introductory chapter, the author explains the significance 
of the textbook stating: “Such an introduction is important because to understand 
America, you have to know religion.”571 Neusner takes the assumption that religion is a 
universal aspect of the human experience and applies it to the American context. He 
asserts that religion is central to the American imagination, and, thus, understanding 
religions is essential to the task of informed American citizenship.  
The introduction makes several points about the significance of religion in the 
U.S. This includes section headings: “Americans are a Religious People,” “The Religions 
of the World Flourish in Today’s America,” and “America Began Because of Religion.”572 
Among the claims for the centrality of religion in the American narrative, Neusner lists:  
Religion played a fundamental role in America’s development by Europeans. The 
eastern part of the country was settled by people from Great Britain as an act of 
religion. The Southwest was founded by people from Spain and Latin America as 
an act of religion.573  
 
Claims that America was settled as “an act of religion” reveal discursive practices of 
recontextualization. Here, Neusner takes the complex events involved in the settlement 
and colonization of lands that eventually become the nation-state of the United States. 
These events, these “acts,” could be described by many terms, such as political, 
economic, social, cultural, military or imperial. In choosing to represent these events as 
“religious acts,” Neusner substitutes the actual social practices that took place with the 
ordering category “religious acts.” This discursive move also works to reinforce the 
importance of religion and legitimate a liberal social order premised on values of 
religious freedom and tolerance. 
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 Many statements arguing for the importance of religion evoke sentiments of 
American exceptionalism. Here Neusner claims: 
One cannot understand America without making some sense of its diverse 
religious life. The marvel of America is its capacity to give a home to nearly 
every religion in the world, and the will of the American people to get along with 
one another, with the rich mixture of religions that flourish here.574 
 
Another example of American exceptionalism appears under a section titled, “America 
Is Different”: 
Other countries have difficulty dealing with more than a single skin color, or 
with more than a single religion or ethnic group, and nations today break apart 
because of ethnic and religious difference. But America holds together because 
of the American ideal that anyone, of any race, creed, color, language, religion, 
gender, sexual preference, or country of origin can become a good American 
under this nation’s Constitution and Bill of Rights, its political institutions and 
social ideals. And while religions separate people from one another, shared 
religious attitudes, such as a belief in God, unite people as well.575 
 
Through these two passages, Neusner argues that the American nation is characterized 
by a plurality of religions because uniquely American social structures allow this 
plurality to thrive. This diversity makes America special and exceptional. As Neusner 
describes the role of religion in American society, he simultaneously prescribes 
tolerance. He positions religion as a unifying common ground in the production of the 
American nation. Yet, his choice of an illustrative unifying aspect of religion, “a belief 
in God,” reinforces a normative Judeo-Christian model for what counts as religion.576 
In this introductory chapter, Neusner puts forward an idealistic and sanitized 
version of American history.  
From colonial times onward, many groups that joined in the adventure of 
building the American nation brought with them their religious hopes and 
founded in this country a particularly American expression of religions from all 
parts of the world.577 
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In his brief narrative, Neusner describes religious diversity in the U.S. as born out of a 
great voluntary and hopeful adventure in nation-building. Yet a critical reading of 
American religious history reveals that not all religions making up this plurality 
arrived through the willful agency of their adherents. A great diversity of cultures, now 
referred to as Native American religions, already occupied the space that became the 
U.S. Other religions were brought to the U.S. through slavery. At one point, Neusner 
does acknowledge that “the first religions of America were those of the Native 
Americans.”578 However, he does not acknowledge that the story of religious diversity 
in the U.S. is not just one of hope and opportunity, but also imperialism, colonialism, 
and coercive power. Instead, Neusner’s depoliticized version of American religious 
history offers a cohesive pluralist narrative. It effectively conveys the notion that the 
American nation is founded on the values of religious freedom and tolerance. It 
constructs and reproduces liberal norms. 
Neusner argues that studying and understanding religion is crucial to good 
citizenship: “In America, there is no ‘other.’ Everyone is one of us. That is the message 
of this book: we all belong. Therefore, all of us bear the same tasks and responsibilities 
to make this a better country.”579 He declares that the purpose of the textbook is 
cultivation of good citizens.  
The goal of this course is to help you better understand the world you live in, 
which means understanding the people you meet. America is a huge and diverse 
country, and the secret of its national unity lies in its power to teach people to 
respect one another, not despite difference but in full regard of difference. We 
like one another as we are, or at least, we try to. And when we do not succeed, 
we know we have failed our country. A good American is a person who cares for 
the other with all due regard for the way in which the other is different.580 
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Neusner’s argument here brings to light the tensions and illiberal tendencies of 
tolerance and pluralism. For Neusner, particular religions are an aspect of individual 
identity, while the affirmation of religion in general, and, subsequently, religious 
diversity is a core feature of the collective identity of Americans. He argues that 
religious diversity and tolerance are fundamental to the well-being of the American 
nation—“the secret of its national unity.” Thus, good American citizens respect and 
work to preserve this diversity. Neusner contends that those who do not respect 
diversity and difference have failed their country, essentially marking them as deviant 
from norms of good American citizenship.  
Here lies the illiberalism of pluralism and tolerance, which is rooted in liberal 
universalism. Pluralism requires everyone to be a pluralist. Everyone must affirm a 
liberal conception of religion as a private, chosen belief and essential right as well as a 
civil society that protects its free exercise. Yet, this inclusivism has boundaries. Those 
who believe that some individual religions are better than others, and would then 
discriminate against these religions, fall outside these normative boundaries. Those 
who hold that religion should not be freely chosen but imposed by a collective also fall 
outside these boundaries. To be clear, much of U.S. history has involved discrimination 
against non-Protestant religions. Thus, Neusner’s narrative here marks a more 
progressive turn toward pluralism and respect for difference. Nevertheless, it comes 
with illiberal undertones. Moreover, if all differences require respect, how then should 
this intolerant, failed citizen receive respect from good citizens while being labeled as 
marginal and deviant? I suspect that Neusner would argue that this deviant person 
should be tolerated and, ideally, better educated. 
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6.2.3 Pluralism and civic identities 
While the Neusner text is singular among the textbooks in this study in its focus 
on norms of American citizenship, other texts still make claims that construct notions 
of citizenship framed more broadly. The Brodd text makes a case for the importance of 
understanding religion in terms of citizenship on a global scale. He argues that modern 
processes of globalization have increased diversity and subsequently require that this 
diversity be engaged and understood. 
Today more than ever before, we live in a global village… This unprecedented 
variety of interactions offers an abundance of opportunities to enrich our lives, 
by connecting us with people who think and live differently than we do. But it 
also poses challenges. For one thing, it is more difficult than ever to be 
adequately informed about one’s community—now that ‘community’ includes 
the entire world. And part of meeting this challenge is gaining a sound 
understanding of the world’s religious traditions. As the global community 
grows ever more close-knit, the relevance of religion in our day-to-day lives will 
continue to increase, not only at the level of international affairs, but locally as 
well.581 
 
Brodd also uses the constructive strategy of building a “we” group. By 
recontextualizing disparate populations as a unified “global village,” Brodd emphasizes 
sameness and encourages the reader to both identify with “others” and understand a 
timely justification for the study of religion. In a later chapter on “Religion in the 
Modern World,” Brodd makes a similar argument as he frames the study of religion in 
terms of multiculturalism:  “Multiculturalism makes it impossible for followers of a 
particular religious tradition to regard that tradition as the one and only. Educating 
ourselves about other religions is a means for getting along with our neighbors in 
today’s multicultural world.”582  
The passages here also reflect liberal arguments for cosmopolitanism. Martha 
Nussbaum defines the cosmopolitan as “the person whose allegiance is to the 
                                            
581 Brodd, World Religions: A Voyage of Discovery, 12. 
582 Ibid., 269. 
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worldwide community of human beings.”583 Cosmopolitanism asserts that the bounds 
of the nation and national identity hinder or limit liberal universalism and that liberal 
values of egalitarianism, freedom, and tolerance require that one identify as a citizen 
of the world. Yet as cosmopolitanism suggests that the liberal subject ought to yield 
local and particular identities in favor of a global, universal “human” identity shaped 
by liberal values, it ignores that liberalism is not, in fact, universal, but a particular 
cultural position. Thus, these discursive practices also work to further naturalize 
liberal norms. This imagined global community reinforces the universalism of 
liberalism.  
Smith also explains the motivations of his book through a narrative of a 
progressive global social order and ideals of citizenship. His narrative describes a new 
reality of globalization, in which a new global connectedness—“lands across the planet 
have become our neighbors”— brought about by advances in transportation and media 
technologies, calls for religious diversity to be taken seriously. He calls this post-war 
global age “the time when the peoples of the world first came to take one another 
seriously.”584 He argues that this “new situation” requires “world understanding” and 
calls us to be a “world citizen” and “Cosmic Dancers” whose “roots in family and 
community will be deep, but in those depths they will strike the water table of a 
common humanity.”585 This narrative represents a transformational discursive strategy, 
an emerging post-war narrative of equality and cosmopolitanism that signaled a shift 
away from an older dominant narrative that valued homogeneity and viewed “others” 
as threatening.  
                                            
583 Martha C. Nussbaum, For Love of Country? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 4. 
584 Smith, The World’s Religions, 7. 
585 Ibid. 
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A closer look at these world religions textbooks illuminates the ways in which 
they engage in this work of imagining community, at times a specifically American 
community and at times a cosmopolitan, global community, but always a community 
rooted in a liberal social order. As they elaborate a picture of the greater community, 
the nation or world, in which these diverse religions are found, they also tell their 
readers how they should interact in this community. They situate their readers as 
citizens, undertaking the study of religion for the purposes of a greater common good. 
Thus, these studies of religion work to mediate the liberal public sphere. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Huston Smith’s explanation of the purposes and benefits of the pluralistic study 
of religion provides a clear view into the regulatory nature of pluralism. In the first 
edition of the textbook, published in 1958, Smith offers an anecdote of an occasion in 
which he was asked to give a lecture about “other” religions to U.S. military officers: 
Recently I was taxied by bomber to the Air Command and Staff College at the 
Maxwell Air Force Base outside Montgomery, Alabama, to lecture to a thousand 
selected officers on the religions of other peoples. I have never had students 
more eager to learn. What was their motivation? Individually I am sure it went 
beyond this in many cases, but as a unit they were concerned because someday 
they were likely to be dealing with the peoples they were studying as allies, 
antagonists, or subjects of military occupation. Under such circumstances it 
would be crucial for them to predict their behavior, conquer them if worse came 
to worst, and control them during the aftermath of reconstruction. This is one 
reason for coming to know people.586  
 
Here, Smith’s anecdote points to legacies of knowledge production as means of 
subjugation and domination as well as justifications for colonialism and imperialism. 
Yet, in the emerging pluralist narrative he offers, he eschews this overt wielding of 
power and dominance as a motivation for learning about religions. He goes on to write:  
It may be a necessary reason; certainly we have no right to disdain it as long as 
we ask the military to do the job we set before it. Nevertheless one would hope 
that there are motives for understanding more elevated than that of national 
security.  President Eisenhower moved into these when he remarked, ‘With 
everyone a loser in any new war, a better understanding than ever before is 
essential among people and among nations.’ These simple words give 
expression to world impulses, world dangers, world destinies. Here the motive 
for understanding is not military success; it is to make military action 
unnecessary. In a word, the motive is peace.587 
 
Smith walks a careful line here to avoid criticizing the U.S. government and its military 
while gently offering an alternative. He acknowledges the security function of modern 
government, and the knowledge production it requires. With the introduction of 
nuclear weaponry, World War II increased the stakes of warfare, and in the Cold War 
                                            
586 Huston Smith, The Religions of Man (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958), 8. 
587 Ibid. 
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world that followed, the policy of “mutually assured destruction” presented the danger 
of everyone losing. Thus, Eisenhower and Smith argued that understanding was 
necessary for peace in a modern world where the stakes of misunderstanding could be 
so high.  
For Smith, pluralism could offer a means for social cohesion. However, Smith 
did not view this notion of pluralism-as-governance as pluralism at its best. By the 
second edition, written in 1991, after the end of the Cold War, Smith’s anecdote about 
lecturing at a military base was simplified, and this statement was edited to “It may be 
a necessary reason, but one hopes there are others. Even the goal of avoiding military 
engagement through diplomacy is provisional because instrumental. The final reason 
for understanding another is intrinsic—to enjoy the wider angle the vision affords.”588 
While Smith distinguishes “instrumental” from “intrinsic” motivations for pluralism, 
both serve a regulatory function. This “wider angle” offered by pluralism is a 
cosmopolitan ethos, a kind of self-governance that reproduces liberal norms. 
There are many ways in which Smith’s book seems like a post-war relic, full of 
such generalizations and oversimplifications that are unavoidable in trying to present 
entire religions in the course of 70 or so pages. Careful analysis might lead one to 
conclude that it ought to be more of an artifact of a point in time in the study of 
religion than a current text. Yet, it continues to be a popular best seller. It has an 
appealing message: there are many different kinds of people in the world and these 
differences do not threaten us but make the world a better, richer place, and hence 
they deserve to be appreciated. Moreover, the many religions of the world are 
essentially perennial sources of wisdom and truth. By studying them, we can become 
better individuals, gaining insight into ourselves, our own traditions, and the complex 
                                            
588 Smith, The World’s Religions, 7. 
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world around us. Smith’s book offers a cosmopolitan moral path and promises of 
global citizenship. This promise was ground-breaking when it first appeared in 
America in 1958. At that time, Americans had begun to believe that Catholics and Jews 
could be included alongside Protestants as authentic Americans. Smith wanted to push 
this notion of legitimate American religion beyond Protestants, Catholics and Jews to 
include Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, Confucians, Taoists, and indigenous religions.  
 This pluralist message still resonates today with a good many people engaged 
in the introductory study of religion. Yes, the book does offer a cursory introduction to 
many different religions that can be accessible and revealing for students new to the 
study of religion. However, the book also promotes a broader worldview and a 
seemingly more open way of living. It offers a particular view of what it means to be a 
good citizen in a complex modern world. I argue that this message is the crux of the 
book—religions and religious diversity are good. While many critics find this book 
parochial and quaint, arguing that it is time to move on to more sophisticated texts, 
they miss the core message and function of the text, and hence its appeal.  
The other five textbooks in my study reflect more current scholarship in the 
study of religion. Yet, they offer a similar message. They contend that religion has an 
important, largely positive place in the world. It deserves respect, and the cultivation of 
this respect requires knowledge and understanding. It requires the study of religion. 
This is the task of these textbooks.  
 At the same time, these textbooks implicitly privilege a particular model of 
religion that is belief-based, private, voluntary, and liberal, which in turn situates this 
conception of religion as legitimate and all others as marginal. They aim to take a 
global or “world” approach to religions that involves presenting a view of an 
interconnected world, largely shaped by contemporary modern processes of 
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globalization. Yet these textbooks are written by American scholars, primarily for an 
American audience. They seek to universalize, but they carry a particular, contextual 
view of the world, that is, the world of religions viewed from an American perspective 
of organizing collectivities. These textbooks reproduce the dominant American 
discourse of religious pluralism, which is embedded in the world religions model, as I 
have argued along with Masuzawa, McCutcheon, and Fitzgerald. Most of these 
textbooks also assert that by fully engaging in their task, the reader is not simply 
fulfilling a course requirement, developing critical thinking skills, or learning about an 
academic discipline. Rather, the reader is contributing to the mission of social 
cohesion and engaging in an act of citizenship. These textbooks discursively work to 
reproduce cultures, maintain boundaries, and form citizens. They take diverse 
religions and cultures and recontextualize them to assert what counts as legitimate 
American religion and legitimate religion more broadly.  
Using Fairclough’s discourse analysis reveals this pluralism as a liberal 
discourse that works to legitimate a liberal social order. In Foucault’s terms, it is a 
discourse of governmentality. To view pluralism from this perspective allows for a 
better understanding of how the liberal public sphere is continually reproduced. 
Liberal governance does not always— or even often— operate through a top-down 
imposition of power and authority. Rather, it functions most effectively when it is 
woven into the fabric of what counts as common sense and take-for-granted 
“knowledge” of how the world is or ought to be. The production and reproduction of 
liberal civil society takes place through these unseen practices. Liberal governance 
becomes naturalized and appears seamless. Uncovering these practices presents an 
opportunity to question their assumptions and the norms they reproduce.  
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At the same time, this language of pluralism represents a transformation away 
from both more exclusive language that overtly privileges Christianity over other 
religions and the language of secularism that has declared religion as fading and 
irrelevant. As Fairclough argues, in liberal societies, this is how social change is 
enacted—through shifts in discursive practices, through the articulation and 
rearticulation of discourses.589 Pluralist discourse aims to foster and support a liberal 
social order that embodies the highest ideals of freedom, equality, and justice. For 
many non-Christians who have historically been excluded from full participation in a 
civil society that only recognized Protestant or Judeo-Christian identities, this 
represents a real move toward a more open and participatory society. Yet for all its 
inclusive goals, pluralism still engages in practices of exclusion.  
To use Albanese’s vocabulary, pluralism advocates inclusivity and the 
celebration and protection of “manyness.” It also promotes a kind of social unity, a 
shared narrative, a “civic we.” Yet, this diversity can only be understood and realized 
through the “oneness” of a liberal framework. Ironically, this is an exclusive and 
coercive form of plurality that can only be protected through the liberal rule of law and 
the liberal conception of freedom. Moreover, this unity requires participation in the 
liberal public sphere. Religions that do not value and protect the liberal conception of 
the free and autonomous individual, the liberal conception of diversity and plurality, 
or the liberal concept of pluralism are not given a place at the proverbial table. These 
communities are marginalized, either rejected or tolerated while marked as deviant 
and dangerous. From a utilitarian perspective, one might argue that these limitations 
placed on religions and religious freedom are necessary and reasonable, that they 
ensure the greater good and protect the foundational values of our society. Many 
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might ask why illiberal religions should be protected and not pushed to embrace 
liberal values of equality, autonomy, and freedom. 
My argument here, however, is that the politics of liberal pluralism comes with 
costs. Frequently the limitations of pluralism are veiled and its intolerant aspects are 
hidden. In fact, pluralism is most often seen as not political at all. Conversely it is seen 
as political but only having the political agenda of expanding freedom and tolerance—
all understood as self-evidently good. When the politics of pluralism and tolerance are 
veiled, the student of religion cannot see how power is constructed and enacted. They 
cannot imagine why these dynamics should be questioned or how to do so. It becomes 
normal to take for granted that pluralism is only good and benevolent without 
carefully considering the implications of its exclusionary practices. 
The American discourse of pluralism celebrates a uniquely American social 
arrangement of religious freedom and diversity that is said to result in the flourishing 
of American liberal democracy. The history of religious diversity in America is a story 
of many different people, bringing different cultures and religions, occupying the same 
territory and needing to find a means for social cohesion and stability. It was the result 
of a true plurality; no one group was large enough to impose its will on the rest of the 
population. It was also the result of empire. The migrations that have brought so many 
different peoples to what is now the United States came as the result of British and 
European imperialism, settler colonialism, and the transatlantic slave trade, among 
other formations and processes of expansion, contact and exchange. Moreover, 
historically, the study of religious diversity under the discourse of pluralism, as the 
passage from the Smith text at the beginning of this chapter illustrates, justified a 
strategy of imperialism that maintained a “certain kind of transnational order” and 
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served “as an intellectual instrument of international trade, military conquest, and 
political administration of alien subjects.”590  
 Yet, pluralist narratives, both in academia and in the broader society, tend to 
ignore histories of violence and domination (with the notable exception of Islam). 
Instead, they emphasize a progressive historical evolution toward harmony and social 
cohesion. Moreover, these narratives with their calls for understanding assume that 
each of us ought to know the other, that one has the right to know the other in the 
liberal pursuit of self-actualization. This assumption presupposes that the 
construction of this knowledge will take place on a level playing field or on some kind 
of neutral ground. It does not recognize the power and politics involved in the 
construction of knowledge and the complex dynamics of representation. By pushing 
for an easy and cohesive narrative of religious diversity, pluralism can lead to what 
Karen McCarthy Brown calls “premature resolution of differences,” which she points 
out “somehow always ends up being a resolution on our terms.”591 In his critique of 
discourses of pluralism, Russell McCutcheon also laments the tendency toward the 
easy resolution of differences. He asks whether these discourses might serve more as 
“a means for distracting attention from material difference (such as economic 
plurality) by disengaging it from the historical and resolving it on a cultural or spiritual 
level.”592  
Thus, how might the American discourse of pluralism emphasize respect for 
religious diversity and differences while fully acknowledging the histories of 
imperialism and colonialism that have shaped this social arrangement? This is a 
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complex matter that involves keeping in view the ways in which colonialism and 
imperialism have formed the American religious landscape as well as the lingering 
legacies that affect contemporary American discourse on globalization and the 
universal relevancy of American liberal values, such as religious freedom and human 
rights. Can a pluralist narrative be attentive to current dynamics of power amongst 
religions in this country, and ways in which the study of religion and regulation of 
religion in the public sphere reproduce neocolonial categories of classification and 
arrangements of dominance? Most accounts of pluralism offer it not as one possible 
acceptable perspective among many, but as a singularly universal and moral approach 
to understanding religions. The dominant discourse of pluralism presents itself as the 
only acceptable option. Yet a critical pluralism requires interrogating the power, 
privilege, and assumptions naturalized by this dominant discourse. 
 These obscured politics accompany liberal pluralism’s coercive and totalizing 
tendencies. By insisting on a liberal monoculture, pluralism contains illiberal elements 
that contradict its own objectives. Moreover, the liberal pluralist narrative ignores or 
excludes voices of non-liberal religions, such as indigenous religions, for example, that 
promote liberty, equality, and rationality, but do so on their own terms. Often, these 
religions reject the liberal definition of the individual and instead recognize a 
relational individual, with an identity tied to larger communities. Yet, liberal pluralist 
narratives often remake and recontextualize these religions in liberal terms. In doing 
so, the liberal politics of pluralism suppresses perspectives that could provide a 
counterweight to and critique of liberalism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism. 
Accordingly, the politics of pluralism can limit the possibilities for engaging diverse 
social worlds. As pluralist narratives advocate for more equitable and just societies, 
they can simultaneously reproduce historic social arrangements of inequality and 
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domination. Moreover, pluralist discourse can unknowingly be used in the service of 
illiberal governmental policies. For example, by keeping the politics of liberalism out of 
sight, this discourse and its associative arguments for liberal, cosmopolitan citizenship 
could conceivably be used to legitimate American neo-imperialist foreign policies that 
call for interventionism in authoritarian states and the export of American-style 
democratic values.  
7.1 Directions for Further Research 
This textbook analysis raises a number of questions that do not fall within in 
the scope of this dissertation and present avenues for further research. In this study, I 
have analyzed textbooks as a discursive site. This analysis does not address how these 
textbooks are used in classrooms. The textbooks themselves do not necessarily shed 
light on the pedagogical rationales and learning objectives of the instructors who use 
them. Do instructors use a pluralist framework for their courses? Do they see 
limitations of pluralism and the world religions model? If they do, how do they address 
them? Perhaps some instructors problematize aspects of these textbooks. Perhaps they 
offer their own critical assessments of the construction of the category of religion. Do 
instructors teach the entirety of these textbooks? If they leave out certain sections, 
which ones do they leave out and why? Do they supplement these textbooks with other 
primary or secondary source readings? Do they supplement the information provided 
by textbooks by inviting adherents of the world religions into their classrooms or by 
organizing field trips to various religious communities? Do instructors see their world 
religions courses as contributing to a civic ethos? If they do, how do they address this 
ethos in their classes? These are important elements for understanding how these 
textbooks operate within religious studies classrooms.   
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Asking how the discourse of pluralism is actually delivered in American 
classrooms then raises questions about how this discourse is received by students. Do 
they accept or resist the discourse of pluralism? Is pluralism a new orientation for 
them? Does it reinforce or challenge previously held beliefs? Do these textbooks and 
the pluralistic study of religion affect their understandings of what it means to be a 
good citizen in a religiously and culturally diverse society? Moreover, how does the 
liberal construction of religion impact the lived religious experiences of readers? How 
do readers respond when they read about their own religion in a way that does not 
correspond with their own experience or self-understanding? Does it change the way 
they think about their own religions? These questions should be investigated through 
an ethnographic study involving interviews of instructors and students, as well as 
analysis of course syllabi and supplemental texts. This would be an important step in a 
larger project of exploring the ways in which religion is constructed and transformed 
through education as well as how these processes form norms of citizenship.  
 I see my study as part of a growing body of scholarship that examines the often 
unseen political work that accompanies processes of education. It would be useful to 
compare the function of the discourse of pluralism in religious studies textbooks with 
other discourses of governmentality in American textbooks, such as those in courses 
of American history, politics and “civics.” Such a study would examine how the 
discourse of religious pluralism has reinforced, challenged, and paralleled the 
discourse of multiculturalism. Has multiculturalism faced the same obstacles as the 
discourse of pluralism? Has it achieved the same widespread acceptance? Does it 
suffer from the same myopia about its presuppositions? It would be fruitful to engage 
sociologists, political scientists, philosophers, and other scholars of multiculturalism 
in an interdisciplinary dialogue around these issues. 
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Finally, I hope that this study may lead to investigations into the practice of 
pluralism. As I have used a critical discourse analysis framework and the concept of 
recontextualization to analyze these world religions textbooks, I have simultaneously 
engaged in my own practice of recontextualization. I have taken texts which may have 
been the result of individuals organizing the knowledge they know best, in terms that 
are familiar to them and standard in their field, in ways they have deemed will be 
accessible to the novice student of religion, and I have argued that these texts 
represent practices of liberal governance. Perhaps these authors have not imagined 
themselves engaging in this practice. Yet, this is how liberalism operates. It is largely 
invisible and inescapable to those living in liberal societies. It is perpetuated and 
reproduced through discourses and practices so naturalized that we do not even 
recognize them as liberal practices.  
My study, and the ways in which I have critically theorized and framed the 
discourse of pluralism, is also strategy of transformation. By reframing these taken-
for-granted discursive practices in critical terms, I have attempted to shed light on how 
the regulation of religion in civil society is enacted and naturalized. As I have examined 
the manner in which these textbooks help to mediate and transmit the liberal public 
sphere, I have also tried to move the discourse of pluralism toward encountering and 
confronting the ambivalence and complexity involved in religious diversity in the U.S. 
By theorizing a critical discourse for negotiating the shortcomings of liberal hegemony, 
this study is a modest contribution to the larger project of cultivating more equitable 
and less coercive forms of knowledge production. 
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Appendix A: 
World Religions Textbooks Survey  
 
1. Thank you for your interest. This survey is part of a research study to identify five 
popularly-used world religions textbooks. This textbook study will provide data for a 
doctoral dissertation, which will involve analyzing the discourse of religious pluralism 
found within world religions textbooks and the ways in which this discourse asserts 
notions of American civic identities. If you choose to participate, you will complete a 5 
- 10 minute survey that is completely anonymous. Survey questions focus on world 
religions textbooks used in your high school classes. You may decline to answer any 
questions that you do not wish to answer and you can withdraw your participation at 
any time by not submitting your responses. 
 
2. Name up to five World Religions textbooks you have used in your class. 
 
3. Do you have a favorite World Religions textbook? If so, which one and why? 
 
4. Do you have a least favorite World Religions textbooks? If so, which one and 
why? 
 
5. Do you use other texts in your class, such as primary texts or articles? 
 
6. What is the title and grade level of the course in which you use these texts? 
 
7. How is your institutional setting best described? 
public 
private 
other (please specify) 
 
8. If your answer to the previous question was private, would your institution be 
best described as: 
parochial/faith-based 
secular 
other (please specify) 
 
Thank you for your time, thoughtfulness, and participation in this study. This survey is 
part of a research study conducted by Tiffany Puett as part of a doctoral dissertation, 
under the supervision of David Seljak, Department of Religious Studies, University of 
Waterloo.  
 
The objectives of the research study are to identify five popularly-used world religions 
textbooks. These five textbooks will become the data for a textual analysis of the 
political discourse of religious pluralism. This analysis will examine the relationship 
between the discursive space of world religions textbooks and the material realities of 
religious pluralism in liberal society, with particular focus on how this discourse 
addresses civic identities and works to govern the role of religion in civil society. 
  
Should you have any questions about the study, please contact either Tiffany Puett, 
tpuett@uwaterloo.ca or David Seljak, dseljak@uwaterloo.ca. Further, if you would like 
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to receive a copy of the results of this study or the final dissertation, please contact 
either investigator. This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance 
through, the Office of Research Ethics. In the event you have any comments or 
concerns resulting from your participation in this study, please contact Dr. Susan 
Sykes at 519-888-4567, Ext. 36005 or ssykes@uwaterloo.ca. 
 
